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ABSTRACT 
This study is about the impact of decentralisation on the business sector in the 
district of Sidoarjo, East Java, Indonesia. It presents three themes in exploring 
changes related to business people during the early implementation of the 
policy: (1) services and local regulations related to the business sector and the 
business people's responses; (2) corruption at the local level and its effect on 
business people; and (3) emerging patterns of local government-business 
relations. 
In theory, decentralisation can bring the government closer to the people. It will 
make better information available on the people's preferences for services 
provided by the government. It will also enhance accountability and reduce 
corruption in the government since people can more easily control local 
governments' actions than those of the central government's. Devolving 
power to the local government will change the relationship structure between 
government and business. However, in practice, the study found that 
decentralisation does not necessarily lead to positive impacts on the business 
sector. 
Ethnographic approaches were applied to gather and analyse data during the · 
fieldwork. They included documentation investigation, surveys and in-depth 
interviews. Fieldwork in Sidoarjo was conducted from November 2001 to July 
2002. Current issues related to the Sidoarjo government have been explored 
through Indonesian newspapers up to January 2005. 
The research found that, in terms of services provided by the local government, 
the results are mixed. The local government has espoused two contradictory 
policies. Business-related services have been restructured to encourage the 
existing business people and to invite new investors. Local taxes and levies 
have also been reformed to increase local government revenue, but they have at 
the same time haplpered business activities. A certain group of business people 
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can enjoy the facilitation of services, but others do not. Most medium-large 
businesses suffer a lot from the new local regulations associated with the 
increases in local taxes and levies, whereas small businesses have not been 
affected. 
Business people see corruption as a common phenomenon and regard it as 
having mushroomed during the early implementation of decentralisation. 
Actors involved are not only people in the bureaucracy but also those in the 
local assembly, in NGOs, and journalists. However, corruption is not always 
seen as a bad thing. The perception of business people towards corruption 
depends on whether it directly affects their business activities or not. 
Regarding the local government-business relations patterns, evidence in this 
study shows that they do not form a simple picture. It depends on what type of 
business is involved. 
For local contractors, their relations with the local government have changed. 
They are not subordinates of the local government any more and they can 
influ~nce the local government policy openly and collectively through their 
business representation. Medium-large businesses hold a different model of 
relations with the local government. They are represented formally in the 
determination of the minimum standard of wages. Interestingly, the way the. 
business people respond to the decisions is not collectively through their 
business representation. Rather, they use individual connections and covert 
relations with local government officials. In contrast, small businesses are not 
greatly affected by the policy of decentralisation. The local government has 
paid little attention to them, and they also do not rely on the local government. 
In short, whether the decentralisation policy exists or not, their business 
activities go on as usual. 
In general, decentralisation has had different impacts on local government 
regulations related to business activities. However, positive changes in 
business-related services have been nullified by the increases in local taxes and 
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levies. Corruption has not decreased, but tends to involve more actors at the 
local level. From the business people's perspective, both changes in local 
regulations and policies as well as in the extent of corruption have been 
perceived differently according to the different types of business. 
Decentralisation has also brought about new emerging models of relations 
between local government and the business sector. 
The findings of this research are important for the existing debates on 
decentralisation. Although decentralisation is believed to improve development 
at the local level, this is not necessary true in relation to business activities. 
Devolving power to local governments has produced distortive policies that 
make it difficult for business people to run their business. The problems of 
decentralisation come from an unbalanced structure, that is providing local 
governments with more employees but lacking financial capacity. Local power 
holders also tend to misuse their power. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the Study 
Indonesia is legally a unitary state. At the moment, the country of more than 
210 million people and 17,000 islands stretching over 5,000 kilometres from 
west to east encompasses 32 provinces and more than 416 districts and cities1• 
They contain a wide array of resources, languages, religions, customs and 
ethnic variations. Despite such differences, they have been united under the 
Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesat.uan Republik Indonesia, 
NKRI). It is not an easy thing to manage such differences under one unitary 
state. Therefore, decentralisation in Indonesia is still an unfinished topic of 
debate amo:ngst political elites. 
A number of principles have been brought to play in defining the term 
'decentralisation/ autonomy'. For example, under various laws, there were 
different principles used such as 'real autonomy' (otonomy nyata), 'as wide as 
possible autonomy' (otonomi seluas-luasnya), 'real and responsible autonomy' 
1 The official report of Direktorat Pengembangan Daerah dan Perbatasan, Direktorat Jenderal PUMDA. 
Departemen Dalam Negeri dan Otonomi Daerah (The Directorate of Regional and Boundary 
Development, Directorate General PUMDA, Department of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy) 
published in February 2001, covers 32 provinces, 268 districts and 73 cities. In the latest development, 
the total number of districts and cities has grown to 416. See 
www.gtzsfdm.or.id/documents/library/on ind/Najum Propinsi Kabu Kota.pdf, printed on 11 October 
2003. See also the interview with the Minister of Home Affairs in 'Peningkatan Peran Gubemur (The 
Increase in the Governor's Role)', Jawa Pos, November 6, 2003. 
(otonomi nyata dan bertanggungjawab), and 'autonomy in the framework of the 
NKRI' (Otonomi dalam bingkai NKRI) reflecting different responses to 
separatists' demand s. 
At the formal level, decentralisation has been concerned only with the tug-of-
war between the central and regional governments2. The implications of 
decentralisation on the society -particularly business people-- have received 
little attention from policy makers and researchers. 
1.2. Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this study is to understand the impacts of decentralisation3 on 
the Indonesian business sector4. Specifically, this research is aimed at 
investigating what the local government does when power is devolved from 
the centre; how the business sector perceives and responds to the subsequent 
changes in policies and regulations; and what local government-business 
relationss are like before and after decentralisation. 
The argument of this thesis is that decentralisation of power brings about both 
blessings and burdens for local governments and for business people. On the 
one hand, with the new power in the hands of local government, room for 
manoeuvre for local government to develop local regulations and policies is 
2 Regional government as used in this thesis covers provincial and district/city/regency government. 
Local government refers to district/city/regency government. 
3 I will use the term 'decentralisation' interchangeably with 'increasing local autonomy'. 
4 The term 'business' in this research includes small businesses (trade), medium and big businesses 
(manufacture) and contractors (service). I do not include the informal sector such as street traders. 
5 Local government-business relations refers to the degree of interdependency between the two actors and 
to the way they interact with each other. 
2 
greater vis-a-vis the central government. On the other hand, limitations of 
economic resources faced by local government can influence local government 
policy, particularly taxes and levies, which may in turn hamper the business 
sector. A combination of the two conditions will determine how local 
government plays its role in shaping regulations and policies, in providing 
public services and in controlling and encouraging the business sector. In this 
regard, corruption is an important issue that will be addressed as one of the 
concerns in this thesis. Further, actions of local government officials and 
responses from business people, formal or informal, will affect the pattern of 
local government-business relations. 
The above arguments are important as the success of decentralisation depends 
not only on how the central government deliyers its power to local government 
but also on how local government manages the power with other stakeholders. 
Policies and regulations adopted by local government officials to develop the 
local economy are not always compatible with the wishes of the business · 
people. Local taxes and levies are instruments for financing development 
programs and public services. However, they may also become a burden on 
business activities. Decentralisation may lead to better accountability that can 
reduce the degree of corruption. However, decentralisation may also be 
vulnerable to capture by local elites, making the corruption worse (Bardhan 
2002). In terms of local government-business relations, it is interesting to 
investigate whether or not decentralisation has changed the existing patterns. 
3 
Much has been written about government (at the national level)-business (large 
companies) relations with large differences of definition, terminology and 
emphasis such as a predatory state model (Haggard 1989), a patrimonial state 
model (Crouch 1979) or patron-client relationship (Muhaimin 1990), a 
corporatist model (King 1982) and a pluralist model (Macintyre 1988). My 
concern in this thesis is government at the local level and business with various 
sizes and types. There is very little written on local government-business 
relations. This thesis will contribute to the existing literature on government-
business relations. Also, this thesis can make a useful contribution to the debate 
on decentralisation in Indonesia. 
1.3. Justification for the Study 
1.3.1. Why is Decentralisation Important? 
Decentralisation is in fact not a new phenomenon in the development 
discourse. Cohen et al. analyse the discussions held in the nineteenth century 
about the centralised state. There were two different views. The first was that 
an over-centralised state is characterised by 'apoplexy at the centre and 
paralysis at the extremities'. The other was that 'the centralised state is the 
best instrument to destroy unfair and unproductive caste and privilege and 
smash the hold of local elites in the countryside' (Cohen et al. 1981: 3 ). 
In the last few years, despite some advantages of centralisation, many scholars 
have recognised the importance of decentralisation such as greater participation 
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by implementers and the community in decision making, decision making that 
reflects local needs, and more responsive local government (Cheema and 
Rondinelli 1983; Slater 1989; Slater 1997; Smith 1985; Turner 1999). 
Decentralisation is one of the most commonly used mechanisms for 
transforming society and is part of a broader process of political and economic 
reform in most countries (World Bank 1997). The need for decentralisation may 
be universal regardless of the size of the population and of the total area of a 
country. A small country like Jamaica may be said not to need decentralisation 
(Prud'homme 1995: 203). That is in contrast to the case of South Pacific states 
that are demanding decentralisation regardless of the smallness of the states 
(Larmour 1999: 149-164). 
There are some conditions that lead decentralisation to occur. The first is 
political changes. They 'have given voice to local demands and the need to 
bring the economic and political systems closer to local communities' (Litvack 
et al. 1998: 4). In this respect, the function of decentralisation is to strengthen· 
accountability and political skills (Smith 1985: 4) and to promote liberty, 
equality and welfare (Hill 1974; Maas 1959). The second is that decentralisation 
of power is also believed to be an instrument for the preservation of a national 
political system. Some governments use decentralisation to cope with political 
instability that is often brought about by minority groups or secessionist 
movements (Smith 1985: 3). Third, under the influence of globalisation, 
technology changes and global integration of factor markets have influenced 
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the structure of government. These lead to the creation of supranational bodies 
to administer the growing economic integration among nations on the one 
hand, and decentralisation of power may ensure the efficiency of the increasing 
number of public services on the other. Fourth, the failure of centralised 
systems has promoted regional and local governments to play their role in the 
political and economic process (Litvack et al. 1998: 4). 
Although criticisms of decentralisation have been many, in practice, 
decentralisation is often taken for granted. A certain amount of euphoria about 
adopting decentralisation has occurred in developing countries. International 
donor agencies such as the World Bank and IMF also support such programs 
by offering technical expertise in preparing and implementing programs 
related to decentralisation. Many public services in developing countries have 
been reformed by applying the concept of decentralisation. 
However, evidence shows that decentralisation always brings problems in 
itself. Crook and Manor have reminded us that 'decentralisation cannot work 
independently or even against contradictory forces coming from the social and 
political factors within which they are embedded' (1998: 302). Eaton (2001) 
shows evidence of political obstacles from national politicians who often 
renege o~ their earlier support for decentralisation. Prud'hom me (1995) has 
also warned of some dangers of decentralisation; it can adversely affect the 
distribution or equity or make macroeconomic polices more difficult to 
implement. It can also undermine efficiency or cause even more corruption. 
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Given the controversial and sometimes contradictory evidence in the 
international literature and the current trend of decentralisation practices, it is 
therefore still intriguing to investigate decentralisation as a subject of study. 
1.3.2. Why the Business Sector? 
Why should this study focus on the impact of decentralisation on the business 
sector? There are two main reasons for that: first, practically, business is one of 
the main actors in development processes; second, there is a shortage of both 
theoretical and empirical studies on the subject. The former reason deals with 
the contribution of this study to improving policies relevant to business 
activities. The latter reason is concerned with enriching the existing literature 
that has ignored the potential impact of decentralisation on the business sector 
such as the simplification of licensing procedures, increases in taxation and the 
degree of corruption. 
The first reason can be referred to the debate on the role of market to counter 
the governments' failure. The neo-liberal approach offers prescriptions for 
solving economic problems by deregulation and reducing the economic role of 
the state to that of a 'night-watchman' (Chang and Rowthom 1995: 16-17). 
The World Bank (1987) also recommended a market-led model of development 
in its statement in the World Development Report 1987. 
In most developing countries, the government is still the central agent of 
development activities. This condition might be difficult to sustain for several 
reasons. First, most developing countries are now facing some difficulties in 
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providing a budget for developmental activities. The budget deficit has forced 
some governments to reduce their role and to surrender their functions to the 
private sector. Second, many governments have failed to provide better public 
services. Instead of delivering services more efficiently, most governments tend 
to create a monopoly. Poor services and a high cost economy are common in the 
government services. Third, corruption is prevalent in most government public 
services. The trust of the public in government bodies is diminishing rapidly. 
The second reason relates to studies on decentralisation that have been 
conducted by the World Bank, IMF, other international donor agencies as well 
as academics. There are several categories of this kind of research which are 
described in more detail below. 
The first type of research relates to reasons of why a country introduces 
decentralisation policies and of why it fails to adopt them. The second is 
concerned with the issue of central-local government relations and of how they 
share power. The third deals with output of decentralisation program such as 
fiscal decentralisation and corruption reduction. The fourth focuses on impacts 
of decentralisation on government programs · such as poverty eradication, 
health service delivery, and education. 
Almost all such studies have followed more 'state-centred'6 than 'society-
centred' approaches. The evaluation of decentralisation is only based on 
6 I use the term 'state-centred' as the emphasis on the interactions within the state such as between 
executive and legislative officials or between central and local apparatus, and on the perceptions of state 
officials. 
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internal mechanisms of governmental bodies such as central-local power 
sharing. In terms of impacts of decentralisation, attention is also directed 
toward changes within governmental institutions such as the allocation of 
financial resources to certain programs, the transfer of authority in decision 
making, and capacity building of local governments. In fact, it is also important 
to think of decentralisation from the 'society-centred' perspective, particularly 
business people. 
For the first 'state-centred' category, Eaton's (2001) research comparing 
Argentina and the Philippines is an attempt to understand the struggles among 
political actors at the national and subnational levels over decentralisation. The 
political decision made at the national level does not ensure that 
decentralisation will work as has been expected. In the case of Argentina, the 
President reversed the decentralisation due to the potential challenges from 
fiscally-independent provincial governors. In the Philippines, legislators also 
cancelled decentralisation because their status was threatened (Eaton 2001). · 
This is clearly a view from the 'state-centred' approach. 
Similar 'state centred' approaches in the second category (central-local 
government relations) are provided by Amal (1992), Magenda (1989), 
Sucharithanarugse (1979) who have discussed the role of the central 
government of the New Order Government in controlling the regions. Amal 
(1992) described how the central government used the armed forces, 
depoliticisation of political parties and financial resources to control regional 
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governments. Magenda (1989) analysed the weakened position of the 
aristocracy vis-a-vis th e national government. 
Some studies can be seen as focusing on the third category (output of 
decentralisation). Bird and Vaillancourt (1999) investigate fiscal decentralisation 
in developing countries, including the case of Indonesia. Ahmad and Mansoor 
(2002), discuss the impacts of decentralisation on fiscal capacities of regional 
governments in Indonesia. They argue that oil and gas revenue sharing as well 
as a general allocation fund will significantly increase the central 
government's deficit. They also emphasise that regions without oil, gas or 
forest resources will find it difficult to finance their decentralised expenditure 
responsibilities7. 
Carbonara (1999), Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Fjeldstad (2003) are other 
examples of the third category of 'state-centred' approaches relating 
decentralisation and corruption. By using the case of the USA states, Fisman 
and Gatti present evidence that larger federal transfer relates to higher rates of 
conviction for abuse of public office. Again, these studies only deal with the 
internal government. Corruption that is felt by business people and has impacts 
on business activities has not been explored in the existing literature. 
7 According Ahmad and Mansoor (2002), regional development spending is going to increase some 4 per 
cent. However, this spending is unlikely to be covered since specific grants from the central government 
might no be more than 2 per cent of GDP. The general allocation fund of 3.8 per cent of GDP will be 
used to cover personnel spending of 2.5 per cent, leaving only 1.3 per cent of GDP as a contribution to 
development spending. It means that 0. 7 per cent of GDP will have to be covered by local revenue or 
borrowing. 
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There are many studies related to the fourth category (impacts of 
decentralisation). Some have used the 'state-centred' approaches, some others 
have applied the 'sod ety-centred' approaches. Gilson et al.' s (1994) research 
can be placed in the fourth category, 'st ate-centred' approaches, since it 
discusses the impact of decentralisation on the health sector in Tanzania. 
Limited authority posed by managers in managing resources caused 
inefficiency and poor quality of health care. 'Resource constraint, conflicts 
between the demands for central ·control and local discretion, limited 
institutional capacity, and political and cultural influences over the 
implementation of decentralisation' (Gilson et al. 1994: 451) are the main 
obstacles preventing more effective management. 
Some studies conducted by the World Bank can be included in the fourth 
category, but are 'society-centred'. They relate to impacts of decentralisation 
on school management in El Salvador (World Bank 1994; World Bank 1997) and 
on health care for the poor in Peru (World Bank 1997; World Bank 1999). Other· 
studies also relate decentralisation to education, health care, roads in six 
countries of Latin America: Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia (Burki et al. 1999). 
However, little research has focused on the impacts of decentralisation on the 
business sector. If they exist at all, studies have been only partial. Some research 
investigates decentralisation and public service delivery of governments' 
programs (Azfar et al. 1999). Some others seek to understand the impacts of 
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decentralisation on the degree of corruption (Brojonegoro 2004; Gurgur and 
Shah 2000; Khouw 2004). 
Several studies on decentralisation and the business environment have been 
conducted in some provinces in Indonesia (SMERU 2001a; SMERU 2001b; 
SMERU 2001c; SMERU 2001d). The studies focused on changes in local 
regulations in the early period of decentralisation that may affect the business 
environment. In three Kabupaten (district) in North Sumatra, local governments 
have tended to increase the number of new taxes and levies that have a 
potentially distorting impact on the business sector. Many business people have 
been complaining about the policy (SMERU 2001d). Similar trends have also 
been occurring in North Sulawesi and Gorontalo (SMERU 2001c). 
Those studies have been very useful in presenting views of the impact of 
decentralisation on the business sector. The authors interviewed business 
people to explore changes at the local level. Another study, by KPPOD8 to 
create district ratings also paid attention to local regulations influencing the 
business environment (K.PPOD 2002b). Unfortunately, there are two issues that 
have not yet been thoroughly explored. The first is corruption, often said to be 
the main problem faced by business people. Second, the previous studies have 
not investigated government-business relations. This second is the main 
concern of my research, but I also inquired about corruption. 
8 KPPOD (Komite Pemantau Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah or Regional Autonomy Watch) was under 
Kadin (Chamber of Finance and Industry). It consists of academics and business people. 
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This thesis attempts to fill this gap by examining the implications of 
decentralisation that are perceived from the business people's perspective. 
Practically, this is an important issue because unless business people feel 
comfortable with the decentralisation and local government policy, their role in 
development will not be optimal. Analytically, the research uses a 'society-
centred' framework i nstead of following the current 'state centred' trend. 
1.4. Decentralisation: Why is it Important in Indonesia? 
Constitutionally, decentralisation is mandatory for Indonesia as it is stated in 
Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution9• After an amendment to the constitution, 
this was also emphasised in the same Article of the second amendment to the 
1945 Constitutionto. Historically, decentralisation from the pre-colonial era to 
the so-called reformasi11 era shows various form, model and coverage of power 
devolved12. In practice, decentralisation policy in Indonesia has been modified 
several times (Gerritsen and Situmorang 1999). 
9 Article 18 of the Constitution, 1945 refers to the territorial decentralisation of gcwernment stating 'the 
division of the area of Indonesia into large and small regional territories together with the structure of 
their administration shall be prescribed by statute, with regard for and in observance of the principle of 
deliberation in the governmental system of the State, and the traditional rights in the regional territories 
which have a special character'. 
10 The first amendment of the 1945 Constitution came to an end on October 19, 1999, whereas the 
second, third and fourth amendments were on August 18, 2000, on November 9, 2001, and on August 
10, 2002 respectively. The second amendment of the 1945 Constitution, Article 18 (1): 'The Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia shall be divided into provinces and those provinces shall be sub-
divided into regencies and cities, which each province, regency, and city possess a regional government, 
as regulated by laws; (5) The regional governments shall carry out the widest possible autonomy, except 
in governmental affairs that by the laws shall be determined as being the affairs of the Central 
Government. 
11 Reformasi refers to the period of struggle since the resignation of[ former] President Suharto on May 
21, 1998. 
12 The structure of regional and local government varies from time to time. In the period of the new 
republic in 1945, Indonesia was divided into eight provinces, whereas currently Indonesia has thirty two 
provinces (excluding East Timor). In terms of the model, the main base of autonomy has changed from 
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1.4.1. Various Issues of Power Relations 
Various issues of decentralisation have arisen from time to time (a detailed 
discussion of these issues is presented in Chapter four). In the pre-colonial 
period, power relations in Indonesia were characterised by horizontal 
competition among kingdoms to gain and hold influence over other kingdoms. 
The colonial period was dominated by tensions between Holland and the 
Netherlands India in managing the colony. In the early independence period, 
the main concern was the conflicts between Java and the outer islands. During 
the Soeharto government, the main problems of decentralisation were related to 
the relationship between the central and regional/local governments. 
Centralisation has been the dominant theme practiced in Indonesia. 
Since independence, a number of laws related to decentralisation have been 
passed (Gie 1993; 1994)13: Law No. 1/194514, Law No. 22/194815, Law No. 
1/195716, Law No. 18/196517, Law No. 5/19741s, and Law No. 22/199919 
together with Law No. 25 of 199920. 
province to kabupaten (district) or kota (city). During the second occupation of the Dutch Government in 
1945-1949, several regions were federated states, and this federation model was put forward as an 
alternative to the unitary model during the reformasi era. 
13 A detailed discussion of the laws related to decentralisation and local government is in Chapter three. 
14 On National Regional Committees (Komisi Nasional Daerah). 
15 Basic Law on Regional Government (Undang-Undang Pokok tentang Pemerintahan Daerah). 
16 On the Essentials of Regional Government (Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan Daerah). 
17 The principle for this law was 'the granting of the widest possible regional autonomy' (pemberian 
otonomi seluas-luasnya). 
18 This law changed the previous principle of autonomy to a 'concrete and responsible autonomy' for the 
regions (otonomi yang nyata dan bertanggungjawab). 
19 Concerning 'Local Government' (Pemerintahan Daerah). 
20 Concerning 'The Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions' (Perimbangan 
Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah). 
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1.4.2. Changes After the Fall of Soeharto (1998) 
Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999 were issued in 1999 replacing Law No. 5/1974. The 
new laws were released when the financial crisis had just begun, and was 
followed by economic and political crises. Rupiah depreciation, foreign debt, 
and bankruptcies then followed the economic crisis.21 Subsequently, there were 
some pressures for political reform after President Soeharto was toppled in 
1998. Demand for more power by local elites varied from arguments in favour 
of federalism to calls for independence. The crisis of legitimacy reached a very 
low point where the central government had insufficient resources to buy 
political loyalty from local elites. Dissatisfaction of local elites with the Jakarta 
elites has in fact been a persistent theme, due to the limited access to power at 
the local level. Political power has been dominated by people from Java, 
especially since the early Soeharto era. The transfer of resources from rich areas 
outside Java has taken place for a very long time. Aceh, Riau and West Papua 
are resource-rich regions but their people are poor. Important positions and 
decisions were also determined from Java. District heads (bupati) and provincial 
heads (governor) were appointed from Jakarta, especially from the armed 
forces (Samego et al. 1998: 106-107; Suryadinata 2002: 164-165)22. 
21 The social and political context when Law No. 5of1974 was issued is very different from that of the 
more recent Laws No. 22 and 25of1999. During the 1970s, the central government, supported by a huge 
amount of income from the oil boom, was very strong and maintained very tight control over political, 
economic and social development in Indonesia. 
22 In 1973, 22 of the 26 provincial governments were headed by ABRI. The domination of ABRI as the 
district head (Bupati) was also strong. Until 1998/1999, ABRI was still dominant in all positions. For 
example, out of 329 Bupati!Wa/ikota, 122 had military background, and 15 of 27 governors also had 
military background (see Samego et al. 1998: 106-107). 
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Regional autonomy was offered in 1999 by President Habibie to avoid 
centrifugal forces in some provinces23, Most local elites seemed to be convinced 
that power devolved through local autonomy is similar to a federalist model; 
through local autonomy, they feel substantially independent since they can run 
their own affairs. However, some regions are still struggling for special 
autonomy24 or independence2s. 
With the implementation of Law No 22/1999 on January 1, 2001, some changes 
occurred. In terms of authority, the new law reduced significantly the role and 
size of the central government. Except for five areas (security and defence, 
foreign affairs, religion, fiscal and monetary policies, and judicial affairs) which 
were retained by the national government, all responsibilities have been 
transferred to the provincial and local governments. The central government 
can only control local governments in areas of national interest. In terms of 
structure, 'the greater autonomy of local government has broken down the 
hierarchical relationship between the districts and the provinces' (Brojonegoro· 
2004: 127). District and provincial governments are now equal. District/ city 
heads are now accountable to the local assembly (DPRD), and not to the 
23 These included East Timor, Aceh, West Papua, Riau and East Kalimantan at that time. 
24 Two regions have eventually been granted special autonomy by the central government: Law No. 18 of 
2001 on Special Autonomy for the Nangro Aceh Darroessalaam Province (August 9, 2001) and Law No. 
21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province. For Aceh, the Central Government allowed 
Mahkamah Syariah to be established as part of the adoption of Islamic syariah. For West Papua, the 
Central Government agreed with the existence of Maje/is Rakyat Papua (Papuan People's Assembly) 
consisting of informal leaders, religious leaders and women. They are positioned in the regional and local 
government structure and have the right to assess the local regulations and candidates for governor and 
district heads. 
25 Under President Habibie, the Central Government conducted a referendum in East Timor on August 
30, 1999 that was championed by the pro-independent groups. 
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governor. DPRD is also stronger than the executive because regional heads are 
elected by DPRD. 
In terms of financial sharing, the conditions prior to the current decentralisation 
were very centralised. It is very interesting to compare Indonesian local 
governments which have such a huge range of functions with Australian local 
governments that have a limited range of functions (but state governments are 
relatively powerful). According to McNeill (1997),in 1993-1994, Australian local 
authority outlays comprised 5 per cent of total public sector outlays, the states 
accounted for 53 per cent, and the Commonwealth contributed the remaining 
42 per cent. In the United States, the share of local government in the direct 
expenditures of all three levels of government was 26 per cent, the state 
governments accounted for 20 per cent and the federal. government for 54 per 
cent. These comparisons show the difference of the national/ federal 
government domination over the state/provincial and local governments. 
Indonesia was very centralised compared to its counterparts. The total outlays. 
of the state governments in Australia was higher than that of total local 
governments and the federal government. The total outlay of the USA public 
sector has shown that the total outlays of the local governments were higher 
than those of the state government, however, the federal government outlays 
were still higher than those of the local government (see Figure 1.1). 
However, Law 25/1999 has changed the sharing of revenue derived from the 
exploitation of natural resources with regional governments. The regional 
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subsidies (500) and Presidential Instruction (lnpres) grants have been included 
in general purpose grants administered through a General Allocation Fund 
(DAU), the total of which is set at 25 per cent of central government domestic 
revenue (Brojonegoro 2004: 127). With the new decentralisation, the revenue 
sharing arrangement for oil, gas, mining and reforestation fees between the 
central and local government has changed (see Table 1.1). For example, the old 
arrangement for sharing of oil revenue was 100 per cent for the central 
government. The new arrangement for oil revenue is 85 per cent for the central 
government and 3 per cent for the province of origin, 6 per cent for the district 
of origin, 6 per cent for other districts in the province of origin (Brojonegoro 
2004: 128). Significant changes. have also occurred in the revenue-sharing 
arrangement for gas. Consequently, the central government budget in 2002 
decreased to 64 per cent whereas the total district government budget increased 
to 27 per cent.26 
26 Calculated from the Directorate General of Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah, the Department 
of Finance of the Republic oflndonesia (2002). See http://www.dpjkpd.go.id printed on August 20, 2002. 
Detailed discussion of this issue will be in Chapter five. 
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Figure 1.1. Comparison of Tota~ Public Sector Outlays 
by Local, State and Federal Governments in Indonesia 
(1994), Australia (1993) and the USA (1992) 
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Source: McNeill, J., 1997. 'Local Government in the Australian Federal System' in B. 
Dollery and N. Marshall (eds), Australian Local Government Reform and Renewal, 
Macmillan Education Australia, South Melbourne: 17-39; and the Department of 
Finance, the Republic oflndonesia (2002), http://www.djpkpd.go.id I apbd I anggaran. 
htm, printed on 20 August 2002. 
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Table 1.1. Changes in the Distribution of Natural Resource Revenue since Decentralisation 
Revenue Source Old Sharing Major Change New Sharing Arrangement 
Arrangement 
Oil revenue (penerimaan negara dari 100% centre Assignment of share of revenue after 85% centre; 3% province of origin; 
pertambangan minyak bumi) tax deduction to regional governments 6% district of origin; 6% other 
districts in province of origin 
Gas revenue (penerimaan negara dari 100%centre Assignment of share of revenue after 70% centre; 6% province of origin; 
pertambangan gas) tax deduction to regional governments 12% district of origin; 12% other 
districts in province of origin 
Reforestation fee (dana reboisasi) 100% centre Regional government component 60% centre; 40% regional 
integrated into specific grants governments of origin 
Forestry enterprise license fee ( iuran hak 55% centre Continued, with new sharing 20% centre; 16% provinces; 64% 
pengusahaan hutan) 30% provinces arrangement districts 
15% districts 
Forestry production royalties (provisi 30%centre Continued, with new sharing 20% centre;·16% provinces; 32% 
sumberdaya hutan, formerly iuran hasil 70% regional arrangement favouring districts in district of origin; 32% other 
hutan) governments province of origin districts in province of origin 
Mining land rent ( iuran tetap sektor 65%centre Continued, with new sharing 20% centre; 16% provinces; 64% 
pertambangan) 19% provinces arrangement district$ 
16% districts 
Mining royalties ( iuran eksploitasi) 30%centre Continued, with new sharing 20% centre; 16% provinces; 32% 
56% provinces arrangement favouring districts in district of origin; 32% other 
14% districts province of origin districts in province of oriein 
Fishery enterprise fee (pungutan 
- Newly introduced 20% centre; 80% distributed 
penKusahaan perikanan) equally among districts 
Fee on fishery income (pungutan hasil - Newly introduced 20% centre; 80% distributed 
perikanan) equally among districts 
Source: Ford, J.F.G. and Brojonegoro, B.P., 2004 (forthcoming). 'Intergovernmental Fiscal relations and State Building: The Case of 
Indonesia', in Bird, RM. (ed.), Asymetric Fiscal Decentralisation: Glue or Solvent?, World Bank, Washington DC., all cited in Brojonegoro, B., 
2004. Brojonegoro, B., 2004. 'The Effects of Decentralisation on Business in Indonesia: New Challenges, Old Problems' in M.C. Basri and P.V. 
Eng (eds), Business in Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore:128. 
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1.4.3. Problems in the Implementation 
During the early implementation of the new laws, a variety of conflicts has 
occurred. Provincial governors find that many bupatis (district head) are now 
disobedient and fail to attend coordination meetings held by provincial 
governments. Businessmen complain that local governments are very greedy in 
collecting revenues by introducing many kinds of taxes and levies. KPPOD 
(KPPOD 2002a) found many problems related to local regulations produced by 
local governments. The problems were associated with the costs that are 
inevitably paid by business people. This burden includes irrelevant charges, 
double charges, and enormous increases in charges. Out of 340 local regulations 
collected by KPPOD, only 103 (31 per cent) were not problematic for business. 
There were 237 (69 per cent) local regulations categorised as having technical, 
substantial and principal problems (see Table 1.2.). However, the warning 
issued by KPPOD was assumed to reflect the interests of big businesses in 
Jakarta that were worried about their businesses at the local level when local. 
autonomy was. implemented. 
Related to 'substantial' problems, there are 144 local regulations. They are 
associated with the lack of clarity of tariff structure. The amount of tariff levied 
should be appropriate to the services received by business people. In terms of 
'principal' problems, there are 35 local regulations that are regarded by 
KPPOD as inhibiting trade and constitute double counting. For example, some 
districts charge vehicles passing through their territory. In terms of double 
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counting, business people are charged twice, by the district and provincial 
governments. 
Table 1.2. Problem Categories Related to Local Regulations 
Category of Local Taxes Local Levies Non- Total 
problem Taxes /Levies 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
No Problem 19 37 72 31 12 21 103 31 
Technical Problemt> 9 18 47 20 2 4 58 17 
Substantial 19 37 88 38 37 66 144 42 
Problem2> 
Principal Problem3> 4 38 26 11 5 9 35 10 
51 100 233 100 56 100 340 100 
1) No connection between the title and the content of the local regulation. 
2) No clear tariff structure whether it is tax or levy. 
3) Inhibiting trade and double counting 
Source: fawa Pos, 'Perda Kebablasan Disorot I.agi, Daerah Tak Peduli, Depdagri fuga Adem 
Ayem (Uncontrolled Perda questioned again, regions do not care, Depdagri keeps 
silent)', fawa Pos, April 1, 2002, taken from KPPOD (Regional Autonomy Watch) 
report, 'Pemeringkatan Daya Tarik Investasi Kabupaten/Kota' (The Ranking of 
Investment Attractiveness of District/City), KPPOD, 2002. 
The CCI survey of the Indonesian investment climate shows that there are some 
critical obstacles to business people. They are 'policy uncertainty, legal 
uncertainty, and corruption in both national and local governments' (CCI 
2003: ii). Other issues that arose during the early decentralisation period were 
cost of financing, legal system, taxes rates and licensing by both national and 
local government (van der Eng 2004). According to CCI, regional taxes have 
become excessive (2003: ii) and 'corruption has become less predictable under 
decentralisation' (2003: 39). Corrupt practices have mushroomed after 
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decentralisation. Local parliament members have become some of the main 
actors in corruption.27 
Warnings about the implementation of decentralisation have come from the 
central government, businessmen and politicians. The Minister for Trade and 
Industry, Rini Suwandi, stated that 'the implementation of local autonomy to 
increase high cost economy2s. Former deputy secretary-general of PAN (Partai 
Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party) Bara Hasibuan also mentioned 
that 'some regions see autonomy as an opportunity to seek retribution for 
political and economic injustice ..... Some of the victims will be private 
companies' 29. The Chairman of Kadin, Aburizal Bakrie, warned of' 1,006 local 
government regulations to burden the business world' 30. Therefore, proposals 
for revision have also been presented by the three groups. 
27 Many reports in national and local newspapers talked about corruption involving local officials. See 
for example 'Bila DPRD dan Eksekutif Jor-Joran Habiskan Vang Rakyat (lflocal parliament and the 
executives compete to eat up people's money)', Jawa Pos, August 01, 2002. 
28 See 'Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah Tingkatkan Ekonomi Biaya Tinggi (Regional autonomy . 
implementation to enhance high cost economy)'. Rini said that Pemda (local government) should not only 
increase local revenues but also create economic environments conducive to advancing the economy in 
the local areas, Kompas, September 2, 2001. 
29 See 'Indonesia small bureaucracy, big task', The Australian Financial Review, May 10, 2001 
30 See 'J,006 Perda Beratkan Dunia Usaha (1,006 Perda to burden business community)'. Two weeks 
before the Minister of Home Affairs also mentioned that there were 3000 local government regulations 
that had to be verified to avoid inconsistencies between local government regulations and central 
government regulations, Kompas, 6 September 2001 
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1.4.4. Debates on Proposals of Revisions 
A proposal for revisions of the new laws came first on 17 May, 2001 from the 
then Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri (formerly President)31• However, 
APEKSI (Asosiasi Pemerintahan Kota. Seluruh Indonesia or Association of 
Indonesian City Government), APKASI (Asosiasi Pemerintahan Kabupaten 
Seluruh Indonesia or Association of Indonesian City Government) and ADKASI 
(Asosiasi Dewan Kabupaten Seluruh Indonesia or Association of Indonesian 
District Assembly) have rejected the proposals.32 They argued that the 
deviations from the implementation of local autonomy were caused by the 
central government and they accused the central government of being afraid of 
losing power. Their primary argument is that the central government had no 
willingness to issue Peraturan Pemerintah or PP (government regulation). They 
found that only 20% of the required total number of PP had been issued. Due to 
this lack of PP, local governments have tended to interpret the law according to 
their own interests. The second argument is that the central government has 
inadequate information to assess whether local autonomy has failed, since it 
has only been in operation for one year. 
31 See Jawa Pos, March 7, 2002 
32 See 'Prates Dinafikan, Pusat Kian Ngotot Revisi UU Otda: Akhiri Dewan-Kepala daerah Saling 
Jatuhkan (Protests ignored, the Central was to force to revise the decentralisation law: to finish the 
legislative-executive conflict)', Jawa Pos, April 8, 2002. See also 'Daerah Kompak Melawan, Tolak Draf 
Revisi UU Otonomi Daerah Versi Depdagri (Regions hand in hand to fight, reject draft revision of 
decentralisation law of Depdagri version)', Jawa Pos, January 31, 2002. The National Working Meeting 
of APKASI on May 28-30, 2002 produced an agreement among the members to force the national 
assembly to reject the revision. 
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At the DPR (national assembly) level, the voices advocating revision have been 
divided. The faction of PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or 
Indonesian Democratic Party) of Struggle (the majority party) together with the 
President, have fought for the revisions. The Vice President, from PPP (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party}, has also supported the 
revision proposal, although the members of PPP have rejected them. Golkar 
(Golongan Karya or the Functionaries Party) (the former ruling party) does not 
agree with the revisions. PAN33 has proposed federalism rather than local 
autonomy, meaning that federalism gives more authority than autonomy. The 
PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National Awakening Party) faction supports 
the revisions that are directed towards enhancing the implementation of local 
autonomy34• 
Due to the sharp conflicts in the debate, President Megawati released a 
statement to guarantee that local autonomy would be continued35. Commission 
II of the DPR did not include the revision of the law in its agenda in May 2002, · 
whereas the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) had already changed the term 
'revision' to 'improvement' and postponed its plan of improvement36. 
3s The chairman of PAN, Amien Rais, who is also the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly, 
has reminded the government not to rush to revise the law. The spirit of revision has to be based on 
analytical considerations, and not merely on the behaviour of the implementor. See 'Jangan Terburu 
Revisi (Don't rush to revise), Jawa Pos, April 8, 2002. 
34 See 'Parpol lkutan Berpolemik soal Revisi UU Otonomi, Berpihak Daerah atau Demi Pemilu 2004? 
(Political party involved in polemic of draft revision, for sake of the region or of 2004 election) 'Jawa 
Pos, February 11,2002. 
35 See 'Mega Jamin Otda Terus (Mega to guarantee autonomy goes on)', Jawa Pos, March 14, 2002. 
36 See Jawa Pos, July l, 2002. 
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However, shortly after the postponement of the revision announced by the 
Department of Home Affairs, demands for the revision have been forced by the 
Indonesian Provincial Government Association (Asosiasi Pemerintah Propinsi 
Seluruh Indonesia or APPSIJ headed by the West Java Governor Nuriana37. 
One year later, the revision of Law No. 22of1999 on Regional Government has 
been on the list that the DPR promised to finalise it at the end of its current term 
early in 200438. The Revision Team from the MOHA chaired by its Secretary 
General prepared the new revision. From the DPR, a committee chaired by Zein 
Bajeber also drafted a proposal for revision to be put together with that from 
· the MOHA. He expected that the amended law would take effect in October 
2004.39 
Interestingly, on March 3, 2003, the chairman of APKASI also welcomed the 
Central Government to revise the law. He stated that it was not inconsistent 
with his previous statements. His argument is that the implementation of local 
autonomy has taken two years and that the governmental system has changed 
from indirect to direct election of the president and the vice-president. This will 
lead to election system changes at the local level and the revisions are 
37 The governors came to the President office in Jakarta to make lobbies to undertake the revision. They 
requested the central government to redefine the relationship between districts and provincial 
governments since Law No. 22 of 1999 has brought about various interpretations. See 'Revisi Ditunda, 
Para Gubernur Lobi Presiden Megawati (Revision postponed, governors to lobby President Megawati)', 
Jawa Pos, August 13, 2002. See also 'Agar Bisa Berbuat Kepada Bupati (In Order to Do Something to 
Disrict Heads)', Jawa Pos, July 8, 2002. 
38 See The Jakarta Post, August, 16, 2003. See also Decentralisation News, GTZSIDM, No. 48, August 
22, 2003. 
39 See Decentralisation News Issue 49 (September 12, 2003). See also 'Central government set to revise 
regional autonomy', The Jakarta Post, August 14, 2003. 
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unavoidable4o. Finally, at the APKASI National Meeting in Jakarta on August 
25 and 26, 2003, around 300 delegates from the regions encouraged the 
government to revise the law with a note that the revision has to be directed 
toward improvement, not recentralisation or withdrawal of authorities that had 
been given to local governments.41 Eventually, the DPR has agreed with and 
ratified the revision of the law on September 200442. The fundamental change in 
the new law is the adoption of direct election for the bupati and governor. 
Recentralisation of authority from local governments to the central government 
does not happen under the new law. 
1.4.5. Summary 
In the reformasi era, although issues of central-local relations are still prominent, 
problems arise from tensions between local governments and DPRD and 
between local governments and business people. Tensions between local 
governments and business people are critical during the early stages of 
decentralisation implementation in Indonesia. Therefore, this research is very" 
relevant to the issue of decentralisation and its impacts on the business sector. 
40 See 'Ketua Apkasi: Sudah Saatnya Otda Direvisi (The Chairman of Apkasi: It is the time to revise)', 
Centre for Local Government Indonesia, http://www.clgi.or.id/view.asp? printed April 23, 2003. 
41 See 'APKASI National Meeting in Jakarta Supports Revision of Law 22/1999, Formulates 
Preconditions' Decentralisation News, Issue 49 (12 September 2003). See also 'Apkasi Dukung Upaya 
revisi UU Otonomi Daerah' (Apkasi supports the revision of local autonomy law), Media Indonesia, 
August 26, 2003. 
42See 'DPR Akhimya Menyetujui Revisi UU Otonomi Daerah (Parliament eventually agreed with the 
revision oflocal autonomy law)', Media Indonesia, September 29,2004. 
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1.5. Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapter two is concerned with the theoretical foundations of decentralisation 
related to the forms of local government and their impacts on the business 
sector. The chapter discusses issues of economic rationale of decentralisation 
such as allocative efficiency and cost recovery, and accountability and 
corruption. It then discusses the models of government-business relations. 
The next chapter will present the research methodology. In this chapter, the 
research problems and questions will be formulated. Choices of case study and 
ethnographic approaches will be discussed in relation to the type of data and 
analysis that will be used. 
Chapter four discusses the practice of decentralisation in Indonesia from the 
historical perspective. The chapter will also examine the nature of 
decentralisation and local government from time to time. It addresses, in 
particular, the issue of autonomous and integration models in the context of 
Indonesian local government. It includes the vertical relationship between the 
central, provincial and district governments as well as the horizontal 
relationship between the executive and the legislative. 
Chapter five will discuss the impact of the decentralisation policy on the local 
government of Sidoarjo. The chapter will overview the subsequent changes in 
Sidoarjo local government as consequences of decentralisation. The gains and 
losses faced by the Sidoarjo government will be analysed since these will 
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determine what the Sidoarjo local government does. A number of local policies 
and regulations will be presented to understand the directions of the Sidoarjo 
local government's p olicies. 
Chapters six, seven and eight will present the impacts of decentralisation on 
Sidoarjo business people. Chapter six will focus on how decentralisation affects 
public services related to the business sector. It will show policies of Sidoarjo 
local government to meet its interests of enhancing local development between 
inviting new investors and extracting local taxes and levies. Chapter seven will 
analyse the implications of decentralisation for corruption in Sidoarjo. The 
perception of corruption from the business people as well as the real effects of 
corruption on business people will be discussed. A number of cases will be 
presented to show how corruption is continuing at the local level. Chapter eight 
focuses on local government-business relations since decentralisation. Three 
different types of business will be analysed to understand what local 
government-business relations look like. 
The concluding chapter firstly summarises the findings and then looks at the 
significance of the findings for wider decentralisation in Indonesian as well as 
at the broader theoretical perspective on decentralisation and local govemment-
business relations. 
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Chapter Two 
DECENTRALISATION, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AND THE BUSINESS 
SECTOR: 
An Analytical Framework 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theories on decentralisation and the hierarchical 
relationship between central and local government. A persistent theme in 
current development models is the need for reducing overcentralisation of the 
state by dispersing the management of state functions throughout local and 
regional governments. This process of decentralisation of power involves 
deconcentration, devolution, and privatisation, all of which have implications 
for the format of central-local government relations. In the modern state 
administration it is essential for local and regional government officials to have 
close contacts with individual citizens. That condition should lead to better 
governance in providing public services in several ways: allocative efficiency, 
accountability and cost recovery (Azfar et al. 1999) as well as corruption 
reduction. Those arguments are highly relevant for the business sector-related 
services. 
The chapter is also concerned with how decentralisation leads to changes in 
local government-business relations. In order to understand this, the existing 
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models of the horizontal relationship between local government and the 
business sector will be discussed. There are pro-market and pro-state 
approaches that are generally used to analyse national governments and big 
businesses in other countries. The chapter then summarises some approaches 
that have been prominently used to interpret government-business relations in 
Indonesia. 
The purpose of the chapter is to review the existing theories related to 
decentralisation, local government and the business sector. I argue that one 
model cannot describe properly the complexity of local government as well as 
of that in its relations with the business sector. A certain model may fit only 
certain issues. Corporatist models that previously characterised local 
government-local contractors in Indonesia may have changed. Patron-client 
and pluralist models of the relationship between local government and 
business may exist at the same time at the local level but in different types of 
business. 
2.2. Typology of Decentralisation 
The term decentralisation generally refers to 'reversing the concentration of 
administration at a single centre and conferring powers of local government' 
(Smith 1985: 1) or 'the process of devolving political, fiscal and administrative 
powers to subnational units of government' (Burki et al. 1999: 3). Those 
definitions refer to decentralisation within government that can take two 
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forms: deconcentration and devolution (Crook and Manor 1998: 6). However, 
Rondinelli and Nellis (1986: 5) define decentralisation in broader terms as: 
the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the 
raising and allocation of resources from the central government and 
its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units 
or levels of government, semi autonomous public authorities or 
corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or non-
governmental private or voluntary organisations. 
From this perspective, decentralisation is not only about central-local 
relationships within the government system. It also includes transfer of 
authority to organisations beyond the government such as semi-autonomous 
authorities, non-governmental private · organisations and voluntary 
organisations. 
Turner and Hulme (1997: 53) classified the derivation of decentralisation as 
shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Forms of Decentralisation 
Nature of Delegation 
Within formal political 
structures 
Within public 
administrative or 
parastatal structures 
From state sector to 
private sector 
Notes: 
Basis for Delegationt 
Territorial 
Devolution (political 
decentralisation, local 
government, democratic 
decentralisation) 
Deconcentration3 
(administrative 
decentralisation, field 
administration) 
Privatisation of devolved 
functions (deregulation, 
contracting out, voucher 
schemes) 
Functional 
Interest group2 
Representation 
Establishment of 
parastatals and quangos 
Privatisation of national 
functions (divestiture, 
deregulation, economic 
liberalisation) 
1. In this study, geographical decentralisation, such as the establishment of a new capital city 
or the transfer of parts of headquarters offices to locations outside of the capital city is not 
included. This is because such activities merely involve relocation not delegation. 
2. This form has not received as much attention from writers on decentralisation as other 
forms. 
3. Rondinelli and his associates (see Rondinelli and Nellis 1986) often call this form 
'delegation'. However, this is somewhat confusing as all forms of decentralisation are, at 
least in theory, delegations. 
Source: Turner, M. and Hulme, D., 1997. Governance, Administration and Development: 
making the state work, Kumarian Press, Connecticut,: 153. 
A variety of definitions of decentralisation exist. Devolution is the transfer of 
public governmental functions from the central government or from upper to 
lower levels of subnational government. Deconcentration is the delegation of 
authority from the central government, the head of a territorial jurisdiction, or 
the head of upper-level administrative vertical agencies to their officials in the 
regions. Co-administration is the appointment by the central government or an 
upper-level regional government of an autonomous regional government to 
implement governmental functions, with responsibility to the higher level 
33 
government (Gerritsen and Situmorang, 1999: 49-50). Privatisation is another 
form of decentralisation that involves downsizing the state through 
privatisation, contracting out and other liberalising devices found in the new 
public management (Rondinelli and Minis 1990 cited in Turner 1999: 8). 
With deconcentration, the central government is actually only 're locating its 
officers at different levels or points in the national territory' and is not giving 
up any authority (Crook and Manor 1998: 7). According to Turner (1999: 6-8), 
devolution is the one and only true form of decentralisation since 'it cedes 
control such agencies and resources to political actors and institutions at lower 
level' (Crook and Manor 1998: 7). Subnational governments receiving transfers 
of authority are electorally accountable to the populations of their territories. 
This is different from deconcentration, where an official is appointed by and 
accountable to central government from which authority is delegated. 
Parastatals are an example of the extension of decentralisation by the replacing 
of state agencies with private business and non-profit organisations or non-· 
governmental organisations (NGOs). 
2.3. Decentralisation and Central-Local Government 
Relations 
Decentralisation within government, by its nature, is concerned with local-
central relations. This is closely related to the discussion about the role of local 
government; what is local government and how does local government interact 
with central government? Forty years ago, Mackenzie (1961: 1) said 'there is no 
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theory of local government'. Local government's institutions represent a 
variety of values, autonomy, participation and efficiency (Kjellberg 1988). The 
relationship between local and central government can range from 
independence to dependence. 
According to Stewart (1981), there is always a dilemma inherent in the existence 
of both local government and central government. It comes from a claim that 
each has its own legitimacy derived from being elected and each may be 
controlled by political parties. In some authorities, controls come from different 
political parties (Stewart, 1981: 24). Kjellberg (1988) has distinguished two 
different perspectives on the role of local government in a modern context. 
2.3.1. The Autonomous Model 
According to Kjellberg (1988), the autonomous model considers that local 
government is relatively separated from the central organs and the local 
authorities' actions are unimpeded .. Regardless of the magnitude of the 
municipal sphere, the role of the state is only to monitor the activities of local 
authorities. There has to be clear demarcation of function between the domain 
of the state and the domain of the local authorities. The state cannot intrude 
upon the domain of the local authorities and vice versa. 
This kind of model can be seen in the English local government (Alderfer 1964). 
The existence of local governments was not the creation of the central 
government although they were integrated into the national system. 
Furthermore, local government has relative independence from the jurisdiction 
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of central government functionaries. Except for a few and minor exceptions, the 
basic characteristic of British local government is that the local units are free 
from control of other local authorities. This perspective has some affinity with a 
liberal ideology. In this sense, local government has local decision making 
agencies with more or less independent existence and powers. This type of local 
government is more decentralised than deconcentrated. 
Autonomous local government can be similar with other metaphors such as the 
'partnership model' which perceives the relationship to be characterised by 
mutual dependency and cooperation (Thrasher 1982). Partnership models are 
often regarded as the 'ideal' at the local level, and see central government and 
local authorities as more or less co-equal partners in providing services (Wilson 
and Gaine 1994: 110). According to Wilson and Game, such models have two 
weaknesses: 'the concept of partnership tends to be left vague and imprecisely 
defined' and ;[they] disregard the constitutional reality of Britain as a unitary 
state, and local government being necessarily, therefore, a subordinate creation· 
of the national parliament'. 
Rhodes (1981) developed an alternative power-dependence model which views 
sub-national government as being freer from central domination as a result of 
its control over the processes of policy formulation and implementation. This 
model focuses on bargaining based on resources possessed by both central 
government and local authorities which they can use against each other. They 
have not only legal, constitutional and financial resources, but also political, 
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informational and implementational resources. In this respect, inequalities in 
the distribution of resources probably exist, however, they are not necessarily 
cumulative (Wilson and Game, 1994: 110). Rhodes emphasises that a local 
authority may lack some resources but argues that it could have other 
substitute resources. For example: 
... a central department lacking the constitutional/legal resources to 
prevent (or encourage) a specific local initiative can attempt to get its 
way by withholding (or supplying) financial resources (Rhodes 1979: 
29-31). 
Another metaphor used by Rhodes (1998, 2006 in press) to describe the 
aspect of the central-local relationship is 'networks' or ' resource-
exchange' where each seeks to influence the other. A network is a complex, 
dynamic, multiple and overlapping relationship in a policy making process. 
2.3.2. The Integration Model 
A second perspective, the integration model, views the relationship between 
local government and the state differently. According to Kjellberg (1988), the. 
functional divisions between central and local government are made in a 
flexible and pragmatic way. The emphasis is on the integration between the two 
different levels of government. The division of functions should be based on the 
needs of particular circumstances and it requires flexible adjustment. Looking 
at the Norwegian case, Kjellberg (1988) sees municipal activities as a most 
important part of national policy. The role of local authorities is an extension 
channel of state policies. The state and the municipalities are becoming more 
inter-connected in all sectors of public activity. 
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This model is similar to one that prevailed in the French model of local 
government. There is a prefect representing the interests of central government 
(Smith 1985). The hierarchical model of French local government is 
characterised by centralisation, chain of command, hierarchical structure, 
executive domination, and legislative subordination (Alderfer 1964: 7). The 
local governments have no power that is granted to them by a constituted 
authority. In the French model, every higher local unit has administrative and 
financial controls over the lower echelons. This model is close to 
deconcentration where all governmental power lies with the central 
government, and local units act simply as agents of the central government. The 
integration model thus has some affinity with an interventionist ideology, 
through which the central government strengthens its influence through local 
government. 
Thrasher (1982) calls this model the 'principal-agent model' where local 
government is to be supervised from the centre. This model sees local· 
authorities as having a completely subordinate relationship to central 
government: they are arms or agents of the centre, with little or no discretion in 
the task of implementing national policies (Wilson and Game 1994: 107). 
Jones and Stewart (1983) and Chandler (1988) likewise see local government in 
different terms, through the coercive and stewardship models, respectively. 
Chandler argues that the term 'agent' is not entirely appropriate since the 
centre has always been prepared to allow local authorities a considerable 
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measure of discretion. Both models see that sub-national government or local 
government is effectively dependent on the wishes of the centre for this 
independence. 
2.4. Decentralisation and Impacts on the Business Sector 
Decentralisation is therefore a complicated process. In many countries, the 
processes of decentralisation have led to several questions: What functions 
should or should not be devolved? How should sources of revenues be shared? 
What are the significances of decentralisation? These questions are addressed in 
the next three sections. 
2.4.1. Functions and Policies 
There exists a theoretical framework relating to the functions and revenues 
assigned to subnational governments. The literature on fiscal federalism says 
that ·there are three roles given to the public sector: macroeconomic 
stabilisation, income distribution, and resource allocation (Inman and. 
Rubenfeld 1997; Oates 1972). Macroeconomic and income distribution policies 
are given to the central government whereas the role of resource allocation is 
assigned to subnational governments. 
Ripley (1985) categorises domestic policies into four types: distributive, 
competitive regulatory, protective regulatory and redistributive. Related to 
business activities, government policies can also be divided, into three types: 
direct policy, indirect policy and regulatory policy. Direct policy includes 
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government activities that are aimed at assisting business activities such as 
credit and financial assistance and subsidies. Indirect policy comprises the 
provision of infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water and 
telecommunications. Regulatory policies include licensing services, protection 
and competition, wages, and taxes and levies. 
Whether such policies are located in the central or local government depends 
on the impact and coverage of the policies and the capacity of local 
governments. According to Burki et al. (1999: 21), in terms of macroeconomic 
policies 'local economies have no access to an independent monetary policy 
and are too open for effective countercyclical measures'. The central 
government should be responsible for income distribution policies because 
'local attempts to address income disparities are likely to provoke higher-
income groups to move to low-tax areas and low-income groups to move to 
high-benefit areas' (Burki et al. 1999: 21). 
2.4.2. Sources of Revenues 
In theory, money follows function. However, this theory raised a dilemma 
since delivering control over revenue means giving power. If subnational 
governments have independent control over broad tax bases, they can act 
contrary to the central government's wishe s. 
There are three source of income to finance subnational governments: user 
charges, taxes and transfers. User charges can be applied to 'impose cost 
directly on individual consumers and can ration consumption by price' (Burki 
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et al. 1999: 27). Direct taxation is appropriate to pay for services if the benefits 
cannot be restricted to individual consumers and do not go beyond the 
jurisdiction of the subnational government. For example, direct taxation can be 
used to pay for local police services (Burki et al. 1999). Transfers can also be 
used as a tool of financing local government services to 'correct' local 
governments' decision making processes. Transfers can be used as a 
distributional tool to balance services among different subnational 
governments. Transfers can also be applied in order to reduce economic 
distortion that would arise if subnational governments only depended on their 
own tax bases (Burki et al. 1999: 28). 
In practice, different countries have different policies in this regard. In the UK, 
municipalities depend mostly on transfers from the central government; 
reaching 72 per cent of the total revenue. Taxes and user charges are 16 per cent 
and 12 per cent respectively. This situation is similar to that of Brazil that has 
the proportion of revenues as follows: transfers (67 per cent), tax (19 per cent). 
and user charge (14 per cent). Mexico has a similar pattern to that of Brazil 
(Burki et al. 1999: 28). 
Other countries such the US, France and Germany exhibit similar patterns. In 
the US, for example, transfers are 37 per cent whereas taxes and user charges 
are 41 per cent and 22 per cent respectively. In France, the proportion is as 
follows: transfers (48 per cent), taxes (34 per cent) and user charges (18 per cent) 
(Burki et al. 1999: 28). 
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However, some problematic issues have arisen from decentralisation and 
macroeconomic stabilisation. First, decentralisation often leads to a separation 
between who spends and who collects the money. This could occur where 
subnational governments overspend because they expect to get more resources 
from the transfers given by the central government. Second, the central 
government can have deficit spending if the transfers increase while tax bases 
have been given up to subnational governments. Third, central government 
will rarely reduce in size although some functions may have been transferred to 
subnational governments. This leads to Burki et al. (1999: 36) to claim that 
'decentralisation will lead to excessive decentralised expenditure and to 
problems with macroeconomic management' (Burki et al. 1999: 36) . 
2.4.3. The Economic Significance of Decentralisation 
There exist several driving forces for decentralisation. In terms of the economic 
rationale of decentralisation, they are: allocative efficiency and cost recovery, 
and accountability and corruption reduction. 
2.4.3.1. Allocative Efficiency and Cost Recovery 
One common argument for decentralisation is that it improves resource 
allocation efficiency (Musgrave 1983; Oates 1972) and responsiveness of 
government (Oates 1972). The term allocative efficiency is also called 'economic 
efficiency', meaning that whatever is produced meets consumer needs 
(Mardjana 1993: 50). Economic efficiency is an application of welfare economic 
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concepts (Rees 1984: 15), and it is concerned with making some people better 
off and no one worse off (Curwen 1986: 52). 
It is believed that decentralisation can bring the government closer to the 
people. Subnational governments are considered to have better information 
about the preferences of the local population than the central government 
(Azfar et al. 1999) whereas the central authorities usually have limited 'time 
and place knowledge' (Hayek 1945, cited in Ostrom et al., 1993). Due to being 
more accessible to their constituents, local officials have the incentive to be 
responsive (Ostrom et al. 1993). 
There are some principles through which decentralisation can lead to an 
efficiency gain of public services. Efficiency will take place if: 
• Local demands for a service differ across localities 
• There are no substantial economies of scale associated with the service 
• There are no substantial spillovers of costs or benefit from the service 
• The service is amenable to at least partial local financing through taxes or 
charges 
• Local government has the capacity to deliver the service 
• The service is meant to provide substantial redistribution of income or 
wealth (Andrews and Schroeder 2003: 30). 
Decentralisation therefore provides diffusing responsibilities across different 
entities and it becomes a basis for comparison and competition (Litvack et al. 
1998: 26). In developing countries, where intetjurisdictional mobility may be 
constrained, competition among service providers of goods that can be 
privately consumed within a jurisdiction increases options for residents 
(Litvack et al. 1998: 26). 
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Economists also justify decentralisation on the grounds of cost recovery. 
Related to allocative efficiency that addresses citizens' needs, under 
decentralisation it is expected that 'people are more willing to pay for services 
that respond to their priorities' (Ford 1999: 6) and people are more willing to 
'maintain services that match their demand' (Azfar et al. 1999: 3). The 
willingness is also expected to increase 'especially if they have been involved in 
the decision making process for the delivery of these services' (Ford 1999: 6). 
In addition to that, decentralisation may enable to provide more effective local 
monitoring than by the central government officials, since local officials can 
obtain information more easily. According to Seddon (1999: 94), 
decentralisation gives an advantage to local government because 'the central 
government would have to invest far more resources to obtain the same 
information'. 
Allocative efficiency and cost recovery are therefore important aspects of 
decentralisation. From the economic interpretation, the public choice theory' 
also explains that 'individuals are assumed to choose their place of residence 
by comparing packages of services and taxes on offer by different 
municipalities' (Smith 1985: 30). Unless they are satisfied with the services, 
they will be likely to 'vote with their feet', that is, move to other areas where 
'the mix of services relative to taxes come closer to meeting their preferences' 
{Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972; Smith 1985: 31). 
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2.4.3.2. Accountability and Corroption Reduction 
A relationship clearly exists between decentralisation, accountability and 
corruption. Political decentralisation can lead to political accountability since 
representativeness in decision making processes can enforce transparency. 
When it embodies accountability and transparency, decentralisation is assumed 
to reduce corruption. 
2.4.3.2.1. Accountability 
Accountability refers to 'the degree to which local governments have to explain 
or justify what they have done or failed to do' (Blair 1999:96). The success of 
decentralisation lies in the accountability and achievement of performance of 
public services provided by local governments. However, decentralisation does 
not necessarily produce better accountability unless there is sufficient authority 
to deliver results. Devolving power to local government would lead to local 
democracy that 'provides for greater accountability and control than field 
administration, public corporations or appointed agencies' ( Smith 1985: 27). 
There are several mechanisms that are normally used to increase accountability. 
In this regard, there are two categories through which citizens can participate in 
service delivery and express their preferences for public policies: voice and exit 
(Azfar et al. 1999). 
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Voice relates to demands for choices and expressing problems with delivery. 
The voice mechanisms are: 
• Elections 
• Surveys 
• Town meetings/public hearings/hotlines 
• Legal recourse 
• Ombudsman's of fice 
• Local referenda 
• Direct community involvement in service delivery 
• Demonstrations (Azfar et al. 1999). 
Exit relates to actions if the service delivery is unsatisfactory and the voice 
mechanisms are ineffective. Citizens can leave the service provider and switch 
to another. Whether they exercise the exit option by moving to another 
provider in the same jurisdiction or in another jurisdiction depends on the 
existence of alternative suppliers (Paul 1992). Whether or not they will exit also 
depends on whether there is perfect information and mobility of labour and 
capital (Tiebout 1956). Decentralisation is therefore an opportunity for local 
governments to compete with each other to provide the best services to citizens. 
2.4.3.2.2. Corruption 
The most popular and simplest definition of corruption is from the World Bank: 
'the abuse of public power for private benefit' (Tanzi 1998: 564). Corruption is 
also defined as 'the transgression of formal rule governing the allocation of 
public resources by officials in response to offers of financial gain or political 
support' (Khan and Jomo 2002: 8). However, both definitions cover only those 
who have formal power such as the executive, judicial and legislative bodies. 
Alatas (1990: 2) gives a broader definition of corruption than the previous ones, 
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stating that 'essentially, corruption is the abuse of trust in the interest of private 
gain'. Alatas discerns seven types of corruption: transactive, extortive, 
investive, nepotistic, autogenic, supportive and defensive. Those are 
distinguished by who is involved and how the corruption happens. 
Corruption comes in many guises: bribery, extortion, embezzlement, 
trafficking, kickback, fraud, deceit, cronyism, collusion, and nepotism (Carino 
1986). The degree of corruption can vary, from petty bribes involving small 
sums paid to low level officials to grand bribes paid by multinational 
companies giving millions of dollars to government leaders or politicians to 
obtain lucrative business contracts (Quinones 2000: 24). In this regard, money 
politics is another corruption-related concept that appears very often in the 
political games between political leaders and other actors. Goodpaster (2002: 
99) describes it as 'the purchase of political favours or influence'. 
Quinones (2000) says that corruption is always a two-way transaction, 
consisting of a supply side (the briber) and a demand side (the one who. 
receives the bribe). However, this view is not necessarily true since corruption 
can exist without the briber. In many cases, corruption is like an act of a thief 
stealing resources from government institutions. Autogenic corruption reflects 
that corruption does not necessarily involve two or more people (Alatas 1990). 
The existence of different forms of corruption does not mean that one is worse 
than any of the others. Petty corruption can have more serious consequences 
than those arising from a grander type. While some people say that corruption 
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has very negative impacts on economic development, other empirical evidence 
shows that corruption can grease the machinery of commerce (Wei 1998). 
Therefore, business people can perceive corruption differently depending on 
how it impacts on their business activities. 
Tanzi (1998: 565) classifies acts of corruption into several different categories. 
These categories of corruption are important to help understand the practices of 
corruption at the local level. 
• Bureaucratic (or "petty") or political (or "grand"), for example, 
corruption by the bureaucracy or by the political leadership, 
• Cost reducing (to the briber) or benefit enhancing, 
• Briber initiated or bribee-initiated, 
• Coercive or collusive, 
• Centralised or decentralised, 
• Predictable or arbitrary, and 
• Involving cash payments or not. 
2.4.3.2.3. The Relationship between Decentralisation and Corruption 
The relationship between decentralisation and corruption shows contradictory 
perspectives (Gurgur and Shah 2000: 3). On the one hand, decentralisation is 
viewed as a panacea that has significant potential in reducing corruption at the 
local level. On the other hand, decentralisation is viewed as a pandora's box. 
In this respect, decentralisation is considered to be a stimulus to corruption. 
Devolving power to sub-national governments may even increase the level of 
corruption. 
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Theoretically, decentralisation is assumed to enhance accountability and reduce 
corruption in the government. It is assumed that by decentralisation local 
governments become closer to the people. In turn, citizens can more easily 
control local governments' actions than the central government's actions. 
Although corruption still exists at the local level, local officials may not engage 
in massive corruption due to limited powers and scope (Wildasin 1995). 
In contrast with the theory above, decentralisation is also believed to increase 
corruption because of elite capture. According to Manor (1991: 101), 
decentralisation 'is always attended by an increase in the number of persons 
who are involved in corrupt acts', however, it does not mean that the total 
amount of money involved increases. Goodpaster (2002) also claims that 
decentralisation has created greater opportunities for local corruption. 
Similarly, Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997) state that the extent of state intervention 
relates to the degree of corruption; decentralisation has in fact increased the 
degree of intervention by local governments in business activities. The· 
increased role of local government is shown by the following indicators: (1) an 
increase in the levels of taxation; (2) an increase in the levels of public spending; 
(3) an increase in regulations and controls on economic activities. 
Some explanations have been put forward for why decentralisation tends to 
create more corruption. It happens due to the lack of centralised forces and 
agencies that can enforce honesty (Banfield 1979: 98). Using the principal-agent 
theory, corruption occurs at the local level due to information problems where 
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the 'principal' (central government) fails to control the 'agent' (local 
government) (Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978). 
2.5. Decentralisation, Local Government and the Business 
Sector: Empirical Evidence 
This section discusses the empirical evidence for the application of 
decentralisation. When a law establishing decentralisation has been passed, it 
does not mean that everything will work automatically. 
2.5.1. Central Control 
In fact, decentralisation requires strong central authority, not an authoritarian 
rule, but a sure and certain central structure of authority (Bryant and White 
1982: 167). Although the existence of local government and its acceptance of 
power from the central government are based on law, the central government 
can still control subordinates through various instruments. In Bangladesh, the 
national political elite were extremely miserly in transferring or delegating 
authority and power to local government. Some rules and instructions passed· 
by the central government narrowed the scope of local governments (Hulme 
and Siddiquee 1999: 39). In Thailand, officers of local government have been 
heavily influenced by officers from the central government and the provincial 
governor. Research units and technical assistance centres are under the 
supervision of the heads of offices who are ministerial representatives at the 
provincial level (Wongsekiarttirat 1999: 92). 
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The amount of local revenue collected relates to the weaknesses or strengths of 
local government. In Thailand, local governments have inadequate revenue to 
finance their activities. Only 10 per cent of the whole revenue of the country is . 
allocated to all local governments, while the other 90 per cent is used by the 
central and provincial governments (Wongsekiarttirat, 1999: 92). In Bangladesh, 
although local governments have the right and authority to collect taxes and 
levies from their residents, they receive very little income. Revenue from local 
and income tax is only 5 per cent of the total budget, meaning that the other 95 
per cent comes from the central government (Hulme and Siddiqquee, 1999: 39) 
2.5.2. Responsiveness in Service Delivery and Cost Recovery 
The research findings related to public services after decentralisation are mixed. 
In the case of the Philippines, provision of basic services has been conducted for 
a long time by local governments. However, it is not such an easy thing to 
absorb the devolved services because it requires both structural and cultural 
orientation away from top-down centralised service delivery to an area-based· 
decentralised mode of operation (Turner 1999: 114). In Papua New Guinea, in 
the vital area of agricultural extension, a decline in service delivery has been 
associated with decentralisation (May 1999: 133). 
Successes of the decentralised approach can be observed in several cases. In 
Mexico, the 'recovery of O&M (organisation and management) costs increased 
from 30 per cent to about 80 per cent' after the management of irrigation 
systems were transferred from the government to users' associations (McLean 
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1999: 76). In Ghana, the population target of water provision has reached 78 per 
cent. Water supply and sanitation programs have been successful in Benin, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, India and South Africa under decentralised governments 
(McLean 1999: 76) 
2.5.3. Accountability and Corruption 
In practice, decentralisation has brought about different impacts on 
accountability and corruption. Although evidence for this is scanty, several 
important findings must be considered. Treisman (1998) observes that under 
decentralised regimes, corruption is greater than that in centralised ones. There 
are indications of plenty of corruption among local officials. In Bangladesh, for 
example, the culture of corruption has been a persistent feature of local-central 
relations through to the present time. A significant amount of public 
expenditure that was channelled to the rural elite encouraged financial 
wrongdoing and malpractice on a massive scale (Hulme and Siddiquee, 1999: 
22). 
2.6. Models of Government-Business Relations 
There are two groups of models that can be used to explain the relationship 
between government and the business sector. The first group comprises models 
generally used to analyse the relationship between government and businesses 
in developed and newly industrialised countries. They are pro-market and pro-
state models. The second group is concerned more with government-business 
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relations in Indonesia: the predatory state model, the patrimonialism state 
model, the patron-client relations model, the corporatist model and the pluralist 
model. 
2.6.1. Pro-Market versus Pro-State Models 
2.6.1.1. Pro-Market Arguments 
In the USA, interactions between business and government entities are often 
adversarial. Stevens et al. (1988: 7) say that 'government regulators or other 
public agencies may, as controllers in the environment of business seeking to 
further public ends, directly affect the cost of private production, thereby 
reducing profit, return on investment, return on assets, or return to the 
shareholders or other stakeholders'. Jacoby (1975) concludes that businessmen 
view government agencies as a bad thing since the behaviours of the 
government officials have become the obstacles, constraints, delayers and 
impediments to economic progress. 
Neo-classical economists and political economists point to the state as an 
'invisible foot' corresponding to the 'invisible hand' of the market, 
characterising the state as an economic predator, and seeing it as an arena for 
encouraging directly unproductive activities (Colander 1984; Krueger 1974; Lal 
1984). From the neoclassical political economy perspective, government failures 
can be affected by several causes. The first is that there is a tendency for the 
private sector to subvert a public-interest-driven policy agenda to rent-seeking 
behaviour. Second, the predatory behaviour of state officials can lead to a 
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degree of state intervention that is in excess of the socially optimal level. Third, 
the administrative incompetence of government can prohibit bureaucrats from 
serving public interests and enforcing rules. 
State intervention in the economy through regulatory mechanism, investment, 
marketing boards, and parastatal industries soon becomes central in explaining 
the economic stagnation and imbalances experienced by a wide range of 
countries. It is widely believed that business and government have clashing 
interests and pull against each other. Therefore, the neo-liberal approach offers 
prescriptions for economic problems consisting largely of deregulation and 
reducing the economic role of the state to that of a 'night-watchman' (Chang 
and Rowthorn 1995: 16-17). 
Grindle (l 996) explains the case of Mexico, that by the 1980s, had created a vast 
web of restrictions, licensing mechanisms, and restraints that in turn 
encouraged rent-seeking by private agents and public officials. For example, 
import activities and all internal freight . transport required government 
approvals. However, in practice, the rules that are compulsory for business 
people could be avoided through side payments to public officials; special 
friendships and arrangements arise between business and elites and high level 
government officials. To avoid being prosecuted, people can find a way around 
the laws in order to make things work. Therefore, it was very common that 
many private sector firms in Mexico City were always 'staffed with lawyers, 
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political influentials, go-between whose primary responsibilities entailed 
managing relations with the government' (Grindle 1996: 83). 
In summary, the role of the state in the economy and business activities has 
been seen by these writers as very dangerous. The state would only reduce the 
opportunity of business people to increase productivity and profit. 
2.~.1.2. Pro-State Arguments 
Studies from Korea and Taiwan have questioned the validity of no government 
intervention in the economy. In contrast to the negative view on the role of the 
state, there has been a tendency for economists and political scientists to look at 
only the positive aspects of the state (Chiu and Lui 1998: 137). States were 
important in the process of development because states alone were seen as able 
to provide a set of conditions essential to economic development: law, order, 
effective macroeconomic policy, infrastructure development, investment in 
human capital, and enhancement of equity or various instruments: 
governments provision, subsidy, production and regulation (Hughes 1994: · 
107). 
The statist perspective emerged as a critique of the free market interpretation of 
developing countries. Chang (2000) shows that the spectacular successes of 
Japan and the so-called first-tier Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs)43 could 
43 Hongkong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
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not be easily explained by pure market economics. The answer is the 
availability of the strong and pro-business developmental state as well as the 
role of non-state institutions such as local networks. The states can play a role in 
introducing new technologies that need huge and expensive investment and 
have a strategic role to play in taming domestic and international market forces. 
Hutchcroft (1994) uses the term 'developmentalist state' to describe the NICs 
states where the state apparatus is relatively stronger vis-a-vis business 
interests. 
A very extreme argument says that a liberal market requires authoritarian 
regimes that can prevent trade unions from pushing up wages. Amsden (1992: 
61) takes an example from late-industrialising countries where 'the state has 
disciplined labor and is driving wages down as far as politically possible'. The 
state encourages the migration of labor to support labor-intensive 
manufacturing and keeps real wages down (Stein 1995b: 9). In Singapore and 
Taiwan, the states are concerned with keeping labor costs down. For example,. 
by 1965 and 1968, the government of Singapore had passed a series of anti-labor 
bills intended to reduce direct and indirect labor costs, which further increases 
the profit for labor-intensive manufacturing for export. 
In Korea, the government is really concerned with fostering entrepreneurship 
and has given successful entrepreneurs cheap credit (Stein 1995a); it provides a 
virtual free trade regime for exporters by maintaining the exchange rate near 
the free trade level, exempts intermediate inputs and export sales from indirect 
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taxes, and grants exporters unrestricted and tariff-free access to imported 
inputs (Matthews and Ravenhill 1994). 
Korea has had a 'developmental state' where the existence of the state is 
relatively autonomous, shielded from business pressures and has been a 
domineering entity which commands, manipulates and disciplines the private 
sector in line with clearly-defined objectives and preferences (Moon 1994). The 
state gives guidance to business people and government and business are tied 
closely. Although they are interdependent, the relationship is vertical, 
asymetric and hierarchical. The state is a unitary and cohesive actor with 
enormous strength, autonomy and capacity. Endorsed by a competent and 
meritocratic bureaucracy and authoritarian politics, the state can take the lead 
in orchestrating the market and business people to achieve high economic 
performance (Moon 1994). 
In short, it is clear that the evidence from NIC countries has weakened the 
previous assumptions about the state in the economy. The state can play a role 
in the economy through its public policy. 
2.6.2. Approaches to Government-Business Relations in Indonesia 
Many approaches have been used to interpret the relationship between the state 
and the society in Indonesia. Some have given particular attention to the 
position of business. Using different cases, they have come to conclusions that 
have different definitions, terms and emphases in relations to government-
business relations in Indonesia. 
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Evans (1989) notes that the characteristics of Southeast Asian countries cannot 
be associated with either developmental states or klepto-patrimonial states. A 
point of comparison between Indonesia and NICs is that the state structure of 
Indonesia is less coherent and disciplined. Chang (2000) sees the failures in 
Southeast Asian countries as being due to pathological institutions such as 
government-business relationship ('cronyism') . Using Haggard's (1994) 
predatory state model, Indonesia can be seen as having a distortionary form of 
state intervention. Korean and Taiwan bureaucracies exhibit profit seeking 
behaviour, whereas the four Southeast Asian countries are characterised by 
rent-seeking behaviour. According to Bhagwati (1982) rent-seeking activities 
can range from lobbying within legal limits to outright bribery and corruption. 
Kunio (1990) uses the term 'ersatz capitalism' to describe the case of Southeast 
Asian countries, which he sees as being dominated by rent seekers. They 
always try to make a connection with the government for the sake of their own 
business advantages. Within such ersatz capitalism states are 'crony . 
capitalists' and 'bureaucrat capitalists'. There are many political elites, their 
children and families involved in business activities. They not only demand 
protection from foreign competition, but also concessions, licences, monopoly 
rights and subsidies from the government. As a result, this protection tends to 
create various actions against the law such as corruption, collusion and 
nepotism. 
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Crouch (1979) used the term patrimonial state/bureaucratic polity to interpret 
the politics of government, seeing politics as mainly a struggle among the elite 
for the sake of the rewards of office. Such contenders do not take account of the 
interests of the masses. In this patrimonial state, 'rulers maintain power 
through a combination of patronage-distribution within the elite and repression 
of opposition outside it' (Crouch 1986: 45). This picture of government-
business relations presented in the patrimonial and bureaucratic polity is still 
regarded as valid at the present time. Addressing the question of the 
significance of business in the political arena, Crouch saw the responsiveness of 
the state to business interests as being on a patrimonial basis where individual 
senior officials provide particularistic concessions to client business people. 
Muhaimin (1991) coined the term 'clientelism' arguing that the economic 
policies of the Indonesian Government on business activities from 1950 to 1980 
produced the same types of business: client businesses and rent seeker 
businesses. In the patronage business model, connections with bureaucracy are. 
very important to ensure that their business will be successful. Bureaucrats 
implementing policies greedily exploit the private sectors by using their power 
of allocating resources and licensing. Instead of using formal institutions, 
patron-client relationships are 'restricted to personalised and particularist 
concessions from a patron within the state to an individual or individuals on 
the outside' (Macintyre 1988: 28). 
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King (1982) described business-government relations in Indonesia using a 
corporatist model. In terms of the role of government, corporatism sees the 
government as the key participant in policy making. Beresfor (2000: 15) argues 
that the government tries to structure interest groups through state-designated 
channels so that the groups can represent a wide range of opinions within a 
particular field and then the government bargains with them for outcomes. 
According to King (1982), in the case of Indonesia the state controls other actors 
through repression and cooptation. A network of corporatist organisations is 
used to control opposition to the regime. Instead of using organisations to 
influence the state, corporatist organisations are created by and dependent on 
the state as agents of the state in controlling the society. 
Macintyre (1990) presented a different perspective with his pluralist model. The 
pluralist model has been associated with the norms of liberal democracy 
assuming that in the policy making process the major actors are groups. There 
are several groups whose members' shared interests are tied together. The role. 
of governmental organisations is just to ensure that competition among the 
groups is fair (Gray 1994). While other observers of Indonesia see the state 
apparatus as the dominant actor, Macintyre (1990: 245) concludes that 'sections 
of business today can and do organise themselves in a collective fashion and 
pursue group interest in an independent manner'. Business people do not 
behave in a clientelistic manner, nor are they dependent on personal patrons 
within the government. 
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A study conducted by Dwiyanto et al. (2000) shows how business people 
behave in response to local regulations and policies that may hamper their 
business activities. Various survival strategies have been used by business 
people such as making contacts with the important stakeholders involved in 
shaping the local regulations and policies. Some business people use their 
business associations to address their problems such as changes in government 
regulations. Other stakeholders at the local level that can be used for dealing 
with local regulations and policies include political parties, local legislature 
members, local government and central government as well. 
Macintyre (1990) and Crouch (1986) also discuss the issue of ethnicity in 
business-government relations. In Indonesia, Chinese people dominate 
business activities although in terms of number they are a minority. Addressing 
the significance of business as a political force in Indonesian politics, Crouch 
remains sceptical of its political impact. Racial resentment has prevented the 
Chinese from being influential in politics. Therefore, due to political exclusion, . 
they tend to make personal connections with government officials for political 
favours (Crouch 1986). Similar to Crouch's statement, Macintyre (1994: 8) 
commented on the Chinese position that leads them to develop informal ways 
where ' ... Chinese business people avoid high profile collective political action 
and rely instead upon more covert forms of political representation ... '. 
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2.7. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided an overview of the theoretical perspectives on 
decentralisation and its relations to the business sector. The existing scholarly 
literature has been investigated for guidance on the characteristics of 
decentralisation and of local government. The discussion above has shown a 
variety of models of local governments: (1) the autonomous model with its 
variants such as partnership model, inter-dependent model and network or 
exchange; (2) an integrated model with its similarity with principal-agent 
model and stewardship model. 
Since the models come from developed countries such as the UK and France, 
there is a continuing debate over whether the theoretical approaches can be 
applied in developing countries like Indonesia, a country that has a different 
background and political system. The question about the models reviewed is 
which model is relevant to Indonesian local governments? Has the current 
decentralisation policy brought about local governments as autonomous 
institutions or strengthened them as agents of the central government? 
In terms of impacts of decentralisation on the business sector, in theory, 
devolving power to local authorities is expected to make the government closer 
to the people being served. However, the arguments that decentralisation lead 
to allocative efficiency and cost recovery, and accountability and corruption 
reduction present little valid evidence, especially if the theory is related to the 
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business sector-related services. Even in some public services such as education, 
health and sanitation, the causes and effects of decentralisation are still mixed. 
Empirical evidence is needed to answer questions such as whether 
decentralisation has positive or negative impacts on business people. Theories 
related to the economic rationale for decentralisation can be used to analyse 
whether or not the authorities delivered to local governments leads to better 
services for business people and to corruption reduction. 
One other concern related to the theoretical perspective is in regard to the 
model of local government-business relations. The utility of the various models 
presented for interpreting Indonesian local government-business relations is 
still questionable. In the case of Indonesia, different analysts have come to 
different conclusions about the same situation such as the predatory state 
(Haggard 1992), ersatz capitalism (Kunio 1990), state patrimonialism (Crouch 
1979), client businessmen (Muhaimin 1990), corporatism (King 1982) and 
pluralism (Macintyre 1988). They arrived at different models of business-. 
government relations because they used different cases and had a different time 
frame. 
The question about this past research is: are they still relevant to the current 
situation and do they also represent valid models of the relations at the local 
level between local government and business people? The shift of power from 
the centre to the outer areas has raised an interesting question on the changing 
role of local government and how it establishes a model of relationship with 
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business people. When a new policy on decentralisation is being implemented, 
business people are still not secure about whether the environment will be good 
for business or not. Does the new structure of local government accord with 
such models as predatory states, patron-client relationship or pluralist models? 
Will the new power holders be the new patrons? With the weak executive body 
at the local level on the one hand, and the strong legislative body on the other, 
will business people still maintain their relationships with persons in the 
bureaucracy? 
The next discussion (Chapter 3) will be focused on the research methodology. 
The chapter is concerned with the research questions that are raised following 
the theoretical review and with how the data will be collected to answer the 
questions. 
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Chapter Three 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research problem, addresses research questions 
identified at the end of chapter two and presents the research method. In this 
section I argue that several methods have to be used in order to address the 
research questions. One important thing in this discussion is the reasons for 
selecting the area and the methods. The chapter will argue that comprehensive 
understanding of how local government responds to the changing situation and 
of how this change influences business people needs case study and 
ethnographic approaches through documentary investigation, survey 
questionnaires, and in-depth interviews. It is still rare for researchers of 
development administration to use case study and ethnographic approaches. 
Only recently have political scientists applied ethnographic approaches that 
were originally from the discipline of social anthropology (Rhodes 2006 in Press 
in press). Fenno (1990) noted that observation is no longer adequate for political 
scientists in analysing political behavior44. In the last section, I will present the 
44 According to Fenno, political scientists are now moving toward interpretive trends used in rural 
anthropology, treating culture as "texts" to be understood through interpretation of their "deep structure". 
Culture is treated as "webs of meaning" to be understood through critical analysis. A key theorist who 
represents this approach is Clifford Geertz, see http://www.qvctc.commnet.edu/brian/interpr.html. 
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limitations of the methods and the difficulties encountered in applying them in 
the field. 
3.2. The Research Problem 
While many previous researchers have focused on central-local government 
relations and on impacts of decentralisation on the delivery of governmental 
programs such as education, health, and poverty, in this study I focus on 
impacts of decentralisation on the business sector. 
Figure 3.1. illustrates the problems of the decentralisation policy. For the local 
government, the transfer of authority to the local level has an impact on its 
budget. The financial capability of the local government may determine the 
types of policies/actions that will be issued~ The local government may have 
different policies/ actions in relation to different types and sizes of business. For 
business people, changes in government policies and regulations may create a 
new environment that may be uncertain for running a business. For example, · 
who will control business-related licenses? How will the local government 
serve business people? How will the local government use taxes and levies as a 
policy instrument of the local economy? Do local government officials become 
more corrupt when they have more power? 
The concerns held by local government officials and business people may 
differ. On the one hand, the local government officials may be concerned with 
how to manage the local economy and their institutions, as well as their own 
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interests. They may use formal mechanisms such as through local regulations 
or informal ways such as through personal actions. On the other hand, business 
people may be concerned with how to manage their business activities better in 
a changing environment. They may also use either formal or informal ways to 
respond to local government policies/actions. Formal ways refer to activities 
done through business representation whereas informal ways refers to personal 
connections and lobbying government officials. These disparate interests may 
lead to the making of different models of local government-business relations. 
There are two possibilities of risk facing business people. If the central 
government is predatory, a decentralised policy may create a better 
environment for business people since local government may be less predatory 
in its policies over business activities. However, a decentralised policy under a 
predatory central government can also lead to the same or worse business 
environment if local government has a similar style to that of the central 
government. 
The Asia Research Centre (2001: 27) voices similar expectations about the 
situation in Indonesia. The decentralisation policy applied in an uncertain 
political and economic climate will probably produce shaky prospects in the 
short term. Further, this may lead to other problems. 
One immediate concern is that decentralisation is being 
implemented chaotically, leaving it vulnerable to inefficiency and 
abuse. 
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It is very common in developing countries that the budget is limited and the 
inter-governmental fiscal relations are not well arranged. This has brought 
about a problem at the local level (The Asia Research Centre 2001: 22): 
The fiscal weakness of the central government may also cause (in 
fact it has) budgetary constraints in the regions, prompting the 
locals to introduce new taxes. This may hamper business activities 
·at a time of global economic slowdown. 
In addition to this, according to The Asia Research Centre (2001: 22): 
corporate players have generally viewed decentralisation with 
caution. Their immediate concerns have been whether its 
implementation will increase the cost of doing business, through 
higher transaction fees, increased taxes, new corruption and more 
burdensome bureaucracy. 
Figure 3.1.: Problems of Decentralisation, Local Government and the 
Business Sector 
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3.3. Research Framework 
Decentralisation will thus influence the relationship between central and local 
government. It will also change the form of local government. The transfer of 
authority from the central to local government may enhance the efficiency of 
resource allocation and cost recovery. It may also increase accountability that, 
in turn, reduces corruption. Those factors may influence the services provided 
by local government to business people. From the perspective of business 
people the improvement in such indicators may be perceived as inexpensive, 
particularly if they result in better services, low taxes and levies, and less illegal 
payment for services. Also, with decentralisation, both the central and local 
government may have different relationship with business people. 
Figure 3.2.: Framework for Research on Decentralisation and Local 
Government-Business Relations. 
Central government 
Local Government 
Allocative efficiency Accountability 
Cost recovery Corruption 
Business people 
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3.4. Research Questions 
As discussed in Chapter two, decentralisation brings about changes in central-
local government relations. Further, decentralisation may continue to produce 
other changes. Decentralisation may lead local governments to change local 
regulations and policies related to business activities, and may involve local 
governments in more corrupt practices and may create new patterns of 
relations with the business sector. 
Therefore, there are four sets of research questions I will elaborate to answer the 
questions about the impact of decentralisation on the business sector. 
1. What is the relationship between the local government of Sidoarjo and the 
central government? How independent is the local government over the 
central government resources? And how does the central government 
control the local government? 
2. What is the nature of the decentralised local government of Sidoarjo in 
terms of policies related to the business sector? Who controls business-
related services at the local level after decentralisation? What regulations 
were changed? What are the responses of business people in relation to the 
new regulations of local government? Do different types and sizes of 
company exhibit different responses? 
3. Has local autonomy increased or reduced corruption in Sidoarjo local 
bureaucracy and assembly? And, what is the perception of business people 
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of corruption at the local level? Which types of corruption impact on 
business people? Does corruption have the same impacts on different types 
and sizes of business? Have the local government policies and the degree of 
corruption become predatory towards business people? 
4. What kind of relationship is there between the Sidoarjo local government 
and the business sector? Are they adversarial or do they reflect a close 
relationship? How do business people influence local politics to gain 
benefits for their business? Do different types of business have different 
types of relationships with the local government? 
The above four sets of research questions will be answered in Chapters five, six, 
seven and eight, respectively. 
3.5. Research Methodology 
3.5.1. Why a Case Study? 
This research has used a case study approach. There are several reasons for this 
choice. First, as mentioned by Yin (2003: 4), the case study method is chosen 
' ... when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its 
context'. Understanding the phenomenon of government policy such as in a 
decentralisation program is so broad a topic that '[it] cannot be narrowly 
defined; [and has] to cover complex multivariate conditions and not just 
isolated variables' (Yin 2003: xi). 
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Second, by focusing on one district rather than attempting 'mass observation' 
involving many districts, a case study enables a researcher to address 'how' 
and 'why' questions. It is different from a survey of many districts that can 
only answer 'what' questions (Yin 1984). A 'what' question is the simplest 
response in any research. For example, in the case of this research, to have data 
on corruption, the 'what' question can only be used for such a question as 
'has decentralisation reduced corruption?', to which there is only a 'yes' or 
'no' response. The 'how' question can explore more in relation to the degree 
and types of corruption. For example, how much money is being corrupted?; 
how can corruption occur?; and how are people involved in corrupt practices? 
Countering criticism of qualitative methods by Borman et al. (1986) who claim 
that they are too subjective, too value laden, not replicable, not generalisable, 
and not systematic, Krenz and Sax (1986) argue that, in quantitative research, 
there is a gap between measures and 'reality'. Such research often produced 
little 'truth'. In quantitative research, it is possible for researchers to re-· 
engineer the data to reach a 'manipulative truth' of cause and effect 
relationships in their modelling. 
Third, previous researchers from the World Bank, UNDP, and IMF used nation 
broad-based secondary data or surveys to address decentralisation topics. 
Ahmad and Mansoor (2002) and Ahmad et al. (2002) from the IMF are examples 
of secondary data users analysing the Indonesian decentralisation impacts on 
regional revenues. Research done by the Centre for Population and Policy 
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Studies (Centre for Population and Policy Studies 2002) in cooperation with 
Rand Corporation is an example of the second category. They used surveys 
covering hundreds of districts across Indonesia. It has the advantage of 
covering broad areas, however, its data lacks depth. The survey questionnaires 
help to obtain aggregate but not detailed data in every single district surveyed. 
In contrast, a case study can trace changes in every aspect of a district's 
government by carrying out direct observation and systematic interviewing. 
3.5.2. Why Sidoarjo? 
Field research was concentrated in Sidoarjo, East Java. Sidoarjo is a kabupaten 
(district) with the smallest area of land but it comprises the second largest 
industrial district in East Java45 and it has become a buffer zone of City 
Surabaya. It is some 20 kilometres south of the City of Surabaya, the provincial 
capital and 25 kilometres north of Pasuruan, another big, industrial district in 
East Java. The district consists of 4 wilayah pembantu bupati (assistant district 
regions) and 18 kecamatan (sub-districts). The districts are divided into desa · 
(village government in the rural area) and kelurahan (village government in the 
urban area). There are now 325 desa and 28 kelurahan in Sidoarjo (Badan Statistik 
Sidoarjo 2002). 
The district covers an area of 634,38 square kilometres and had a population in 
2000 of 1,549,883 people. Sidoarjo's population density ranges from 690 
persons per square kilometre in Jabon sub-district to 5,166 per square kilometre 
45 The Province of East Java consists of 29 districts and 9 cities. 
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in the most industrial sub-district, Waru. The average population density for 
the district in 2000 was 1997 people per square kilometre (Badan Statistik 
Sidoatjo 2002/. 
There were two main reasons for choosing Sidoatjo as my case study. First, 
Sidoatjo represents one of the daerah percontohan ('pilot areas') for 
decentralisation which was introduced in 1995; it has enabled Sidoatjo to step 
ahead in adopting the new policy of decentralisation 'better' than other 
districts in East Java. This is very evident in Sidoatjo; while other districts are 
restructuring various local agencies, Sidoatjo has been doing it since 1995. 
Consequently, Sidoatjo has been able to concentrate on new regulations such as 
local taxes and levies in responding to the new environment. 
Second, Sidoatjo is the second largest industrialising district in East Java after 
City Surabaya. I predicted that impacts of decentralisation and local autonomy 
on the business sector could probably be observed there. Being the second 
largest industrial district in Indonesia, Sidoatjo had 108 project investment 
agreements (US$1,114,077,000) with foreign investors and 258 project 
investment agreements (US$1,400,941,052) with domestic investors from 1967 to 
March 2002.46 Manufacturing industry is the main contributor to gross regional 
product. In 1995, 1996 and 1997, the industrial sector increased steadily as 
shown in the gross regional product reaching Rp2,235,599,320,000.00, 
Rp2,683,062,410,000.00 and Rp3,198,948,800,000.00, respectively. There was a 
46 Interview with Mr Putu from BPM Jawa Timur, January 20, 2002. 
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further dramatic increase in 1998 and 1999: Rp4,488,756,360,000.00 and 
RpS,186,883,990,000.00, respectively. The entire gross regional product coming 
from industry has contributed 54.32 per cent of the total gross regional product 
of Sidoarjo. In contrast, the trade sector contributed only 20.39 per cent whereas 
agricultural sector only 6.33 per cent in 1998 (Kantor Statistik Sidoarjo 2000). 
According to the Dinas Perindustrian (Local Agency of Industry) of Sidoarjo, in 
the year 2000, there were 341 large industries employing 45,600 people, 1,737 
small industries with 42,161 employees and 11,525 cottage industries with 
46,342 workers. However, despite the numbers of industries being clear, the 
official records of the names and addresses of the companies are not available 
either in the Dinas Perindustrian or other local agencies. 
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Map of Sidoarjo, East Java, Indonesia 
EAST JAVA PROVINCE 
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Source: http:IIwww.worldatlas.com I we bimage I countrys I asia 
/ciamaps/id.htm and http://www.sidoarjo.go.id/ kecamatan/ 
OOlkecamatan.htm, printed on October 15, 2004. 
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3.5.3. Methods of Collecting Data: Ethnographic Approaches 
Related to preparing the case study, ethnographic approaches were applied 
during the fieldwork. According to Bernard (1988), ethnographic process 
constitutes more of a strategy than a method. Therefore, in ethnographic 
research the researcher can utilise several methods, including both qualitative 
and quantitative methods (Bernard 1988; Fielding and Fielding 1987; Pelto and 
Pelto 1979). According to Michael Agar (1980 in Johnson 1990: 9), the most 
important aspect of ethnographic fieldwork is a collaborative relationship 
between the researcher and the object of study in order to have information 
exchange. The relationship can be either 'fortuitously encountered or 
consciously constructed' CTohn son 1990: 1). 
The ethnographic approach uses not only respondents but also informants. 
These terms must be distinguished: respondents are those who are selected on a 
random basis and are asked to respond to more structured or formal surveys; 
informants are individuals chosen on the basis of their attributes (access to 
certain knowledge or information, position in an organisation, or social status) 
and are interviewed in an informal, in-depth and detailed manner, and in a 
naturalistic setting CTohnson 1990: 10). 
I started doing fieldwork in Sidoarjo on November 10, 2001 by firstly 
introducing myself to local officials, especially the district head of Sidoarjo. I 
had to have a formal permit to do fieldwork from Dinas Kesatuan Bangsa dan 
Perlindungan Masyarakat/Diskesbanglinas (Local Agency for National Unity and 
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People Security). Although I already had the letter, it took about two months to 
develop a friendly relationship and to convince the people that the data I 
acquired would be used only for academic purposes. In the third month, I 
began to have already had a collaborative relationship with them. Overall, I 
spent eight months in the field collecting and exploring various data related to 
local government policies and gathering the responses of business people. 
In this study, a number of data collection methods were used. 
3.5.3.1. Documentation Research 
This method was used for collecting data related to government policies, policy 
achievements, and statistical data. Historical data related to government 
policies were explored through the government's documents. The sources of 
the data include: Undang-Undang or UU (Law), Peraturan Pemerintah or PP 
(government regulation), Keputusan Presiden or Keppres ·(Presidential Decree), 
Keputusan Menteri or Kepmen (Ministerial Decree), Peraturan Daerah or Perda 
(local government regulation), Risalah Dewan (local assembly proceedings), 
Keputusan Bupati (District head decision), and Kabupaten Sidoarjo dalam Angka 
(Sidoarjo Regency in Figures). The latest developments of decentralisation 
policies at either the central or local level were monitored via several 
Indonesian newspapers. Cases of corruption that were secret when I did 
fieldwork have now been opened up and become public knowledge in the 
current media. 
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3.5.3.2. Survey of Business People 
Since this study focused on the impacts of decentralisation on the business 
sector, a survey of business people was still needed. This survey covered small, 
medium and big businesses spreading across areas of Sidoarjo in order to elicit 
responses of business people about decentralisation and local autonomy 
policies. Due to difficulties in obtaining precise data on the number and 
location of a company, it is difficult to determine the sample number, in order 
to be representative. 
The other difficulty in obtaining data related to the source of data. Dinas 
Perdagangan (Local Agency for Trade) is supposed to be responsible for the 
availability of data. However, it gave me only a list of 50 companies that was 
manually typed and hand written, produced in 1994. This data of course is not 
valid any more since there was a deep crisis in 1998 causing some companies to 
close down. Other data are available in the Dinas Kependudukan dan Catatan Sipil 
(Agency for Civil Registration and Population), KADINDA (Local Chamber of. 
Commerce and Industry) and GAPENSI (Construction Businessmen 
Association). However, the information about the companies in these 
institutions was not complete and valid. 
In January 2001, I started sending questionnaires by mail to 700 companies. 
However, only about 80 questionnaires were returned. There were 50 other 
letters returned due to an unknown address, change of address, or shutdown of 
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the business. It means the rate of response was only about 11 per cent. From 
these returned questionnaires, I followed up with an in-depth interview. 
3.5.3.3. In-depth Interviews 
In-depth interviews were employed to acquire deep data. Reliable data related 
to corruption are very difficult to obtain through formal documents or 
questionnaires. Trust is thus very important to secure information from 
respondents/informants about corruption. Therefore, a close relationship with 
respondents/informants has to be developed to create trust. The ethnographic 
approaches employed by anthropologists provided opportunities to me to 
interact with informants intensively. 
An in-depth interview with pejabat (someone who hold an official position) and 
staff members of Pemda Sidoarjo (Sidoarjo local government) was conducted to 
obtain information on how they perceive local autonomy policies based on the 
new law. It also explored the vision of local officials in anticipating the 
changing environment. 
Officials that were interviewed included Bupati (district head), Kepala Dinas 
(local agency head), members of DPRD kabupaten (district level peoples' house 
of representatives), administrative staff, provincial government officials and 
members of DPRD propinsi (provincial level peoples' house of representatives). 
Interviews involved about fifty people and some were visited three or more 
times to check responses. Some of them were interviewed as informants. They 
provided me with the current and upcoming policies. 
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In-depth interviews were also conducted with more than eighty business 
people across the Sidoarjo area. Most of them are owners or managers of the 
companies chosen for interview. Interviews also covered business associations 
such as KADINDA, GAPENSI, APIND047, cooperatives as well as labour 
unions. This was to explore perceptions of business people in relation to the 
implementation of local autonomy. It was also to explore and compare their 
experiences of making contacts with government officials. Each interview was 
conducted for one to three hours and some companies were interviewed two or 
three times. A number of businessmen were enthusiastic in discussions. These 
kinds of people were selected as informants. 
3.6. Limitations and Constraints of the Research 
There are a number of limitations to this study. One immediate limitation of the 
study arose mainly from the nature of the case study. As mentioned before, the 
case study has limited coverage in terms of the number of local governments 
observed. Therefore, generalisation of the study is limited. The second 
limitation relates to the representativeness of the business people chosen as 
only 126 questionnaires that were analysed in this research. Such numbers are 
small compared to the total number of companies operating in Sidoarjo. Third, 
the questionnaires cannot help in acquiring data related to informal actions 
between the local government officials and business people. Therefore, the 
47K.ADINDA is Kamar Dagang dan Industri Daerah (Local Chamber of Finance and Industry). 
GAPENSI is Gabungan Pengusaha Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia (National Association of Construction 
Businessmen). APINDO is Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia (Association oflndonesian Employers). 
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amount of corruption and of money paid to the local government illegally 
cannot be detected from the questionnaires except, but only from in-depth 
interviews and ethnographic approaches. Corruption is such a sensitive issue 
that involves not only government officials as receivers, but also business 
people as givers. It was very easy to have information of the perceptions of 
business people about corruption. On the contrary, it was very hard to elicit 
information that showed whether they were involved or not. Some people were 
very open in discussing it but some others were not. 
However, this case study also has strengths in terms of the depth of the data 
obtained. Every single change in local regulations can be observed through the 
data such as the amount of new charges or the adoption of new procedures. 
This study is also strong in terms of the responses of business people related to 
corruption issues: these could only have been obtained through in-depth 
interviews. Therefore, the ethnographic approaches applied in this research 
gave advantages to me in obtaining data not usually revealed concerning· 
corruption at the local level. 
Compared to other methods used by researchers investigating decentralisation, 
my ethnographic approach can be seen as complementing the existing research. 
SMERU's (2001) studies used more observation, secondary data and short 
interviews. World Bank reports as well as IMF studies generally use analysis of 
apply secondary data as well as broad surveys. 
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The next discussion (Chapter 4) will be focused on the history of 
decentralisation and regional governments in Indonesia. The chapter is 
concerned with the issues of central-local government relations and of 
executive and legislative body relations. 
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Chapter Four 
DECENTRALISATION AND REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN INDONESIA 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the historical setting for decentralisation in Indonesia. 
The Dutch colonial government that occupied the archipelago for more than 
three hundred years and the three and a half year Japanese interregnum 
influenced the early formation of regional-central government relations in 
Indonesia. During the post independence period, a number of laws on 
decentralisation were issued to address various political demands. In this 
chapter, I will show that the flavours of decentralisation have depended upon 
how the pressures arose. It is quite obvious that the pressures for the emergence 
of decentralisation have been many and various. 
The chapter shows that debates on decentralisation have been concerned only 
with the vertical relationship between the central and local governments and 
the horizontal relationship between the executive and legislative bodies. The 
format of power relations written in the laws has focused on the actors within 
the state institutions. The society, particularly business people, is excluded. 
Also, implications of decentralisation for the business sector have not yet 
become a matter of concern. 
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4.2. Decentralisation in the Pre-Colonial Era and After 
4.2.1. Indonesia in the Pre-Colonial Era 
Indonesia comprised many kingdoms, each with its own authority. In the early 
fourth century, the Hindu Tarumanegara Kingdom was established in West 
Java. In 450 AD, the Hindu Kutai Kingdom was established in Kalimantan. In 
Sumatra, two kingdoms were established in 650: Melayu and Sriwijaya, 
whereas in Central Java, the first kingdom was Kalingga4s. It is now very hard 
to trace the model of government of the kingdoms. Each kingdom was 
independent and there was no single authority exerting control over other 
kingdoms. 
There were many big kingdoms in old Indonesia such as Sriwijaya in Sumatra 
and Majapahit in Java. According to Djohan Hanafiah49, Sriwijaya, located in 
Palembang, dominated the western part of Indonesia, including Malacca. In 700 
AD Melayu fell and then Sriwijaya dominated the area of Sumatra and became 
one of the world centres of Buddhism and science. Sriwijaya expanded its 
power to rule Central Java. However, the intention of Sriwijaya was to deliver 
autonomy to sub-ordinates to manage their own affairs. In the era of Sriwijaya, 
the existence of marga was legally recognised. Marga had its own court, treasure 
and regulations, enabling them to cope with its own problems. 
48 See "Indonesia Seki/as Catatan Tahun Demi Tahun" (Indonesia a Brief Note from Year to Year), 
http://www.jawapalace.org, . 
49 See 'Kembali ke Otonomi Sesungguhnya (Return to the real autonomy)', Kompas, 29 Juni 2001. 
85 
In Java, the Majapahit Kingdom was one of the biggest kingdoms in Indonesia. 
Raden Wijaya was the first king of Majapahit, 1293-1309. Under King 
Hayamwuruk with Gadjah Mada as the prime minister, Majapahit was 
considered to be the 'golden era', all areas of Indonesia were under the control 
of the Majapahit empire (Slametmuljana 1976: 96). 
The administration of the kingdom consisted of the king and the king's closest 
relatives. Headed by the king, they formed the Royal Advisory Council. At the 
centre of the government, one patih and four executive ministers were 
responsible for the administration (Slametmuljana 1976: 96). 
The administration at the provincial level under King Hayamwuruk comprised 
twelve vassal states, each headed by a local ruler, and five provinces, each of 
which was ruled by juru pangalasan. Each province/vassal state comprised 
several areas, called kabhupaten, ruled by a bhupati. Each kabhupaten was divided 
into several districts, called kawadanan and chaired by a wadana. Kawadanan 
comprised several groups of villages, named pakuwuan. The smallest unit under 
a village was buyut. 
According to the Nagarakretagamaso, the ruler of the vassal states and the 
provinces regularly visited the patih and the four executive ministers to discuss 
matters and orders from the central government. The office of the patih in the 
central government was responsible for planning, whereas the office of the 
50 Nagarakretagama is a journalistic book written by Mpu Prapanca written in 1365, describing the 
situation in the Majapahit Kingdom, http://ms.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kakawin Nagarakretagama, printed on 
October 20, 2003. 
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vassal states and the provinces supervised the implementation of planning the 
country (Slametmuljana 1976: 97). 
4.2.2. The Arrival of the Europeans 
The Portuguese were the first of European people to arrive in Indonesia. The 
greatest Portuguese naval commander of the age found Malacca which became 
the chief market for spices. The first Europeans were well received by Sultan 
Mahmud Syah. In 1522 the Portuguese built a fort in Ternate after realising that 
the cost of spices in Malacca was five to seven times that in the islands where 
they were produced (Furnivall 1944:14-17; Ricklefs 1993). 
The Dutch routed the Portuguese, beginning a long domination and strong 
influence for three hundred and fifty years over the archipelago. In 1597 also 
began a period called the 'wild' or 'unregulated' voyages: there were 
twenty-two ships of five different companies in 1598 vying for a share of the 
Indonesian spice trade. In March 1599, the fleet under Jacob van Neck reached 
the 'Spice Islands' of Maluku, a voyage that netted about 400 per cent profit 
(Ricklefs 1993: 27). 
This fierce competition among Dutch shippers then became undesirable for 
them. This led ten companies to merge to form the United East India Company, 
the VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) within less than 5 years. These 
companies altogether sent out 14 fleets and 65 ships, of which 54 made the 
return voyage safely. These companies were backed by the Dutch State and 
soon needed common rules and a policy that did not permit competition in the 
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spice trade in Netherlands India5t (Furnivall 1944: 21). According to Cribb 
(1994), the charter received by the voe gave it a quasi-sovereign power that 
had been the basis of the permanent Dutch presence in Netherlands India. The 
Dutch crown granted the monopoly and united the competing Dutch traders in 
order to steer clear of Portuguese expansion (Walker 1968: 21-23). The European 
administrative officials were assigned at the time to establish and protect the 
monopoly of the company over all commercial activities in the Netherlands 
India. The monopoly was important to rule the trade. 
Jan Pieterszoon Coen became the governor-general of Netherlands India from 
1618-1629. He conducted territorial expansion in Java and, by stalling the 
English, the Dutch then became the masters of the whole archipelago and 
continued to prosper from its trade. Moreover, the conflict among the 
sultanates in Java and between them and the rulers from other islands had 
facilitated the territorial expansion of the Dutch (Walker 1968). 
When a series of depressions in Europe occurred, the Dutch were forced to 
change their policy and objectives from relying on the exclusive trade in spices 
to the growing of sugarcane and coffee. Agricultural enterprises were 
established to manage these commodities. Land then became such an important 
commodity that supervision and control needed to be switched from isolated 
51 The term 'the Netherlands India' or 'the Netherlands Indies' was used during the Dutch colonial 
government. The term 'Indonesia' was not used until it formally appeared in the 'Soempah Pemoeda · 
(Youth Oath) declaration on October 28, 1928. 
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trade agents to administrators with sufficient power to maintain Dutch 
suzerainty over native affairs (Walker 1968: 24). 
4.2.3. The Administrative Structure under the Dutch Colonial 
Government 
A centralised structure was introduced into of the Netherlands India 
government. The application of this system of organisation was based on the 
argument that in a colonised country with a highly fragmented population, the 
interests of the state could only be achieved by a centralistic government 
relying on bureaucracy (Hoessein 1996: 2). In this regard, centralisation was 
achieved through control from within the occupied region and not from 
Holland. The States-General in Holland exerted minimal control over the 
company and power was gradually transferred from Holland to the 
Netherlands India. The Governor General had eight regional governments, 
each of which was controlled by a governor. In Batavia (now Jakarta}, there was 
a governor general assisted by a director general with a powerful position. In 
Java, the administrative affairs were under direct control of the governor 
general. The Sultanates of Bantam and Cirebon were supervised by residents 
representing the governor general. The Commissioner of Native Affairs 
administered the remaining area including the lands of the former Jacatra plus 
the greater part of the Preanger lands (Walker 1968: 24-26). 
Under Herman Willem Daendels' rule as the Governor General in 1808, an 
administrative reform was conducted to re-establish discipline and to halt the 
corruption among the administrative officials. The positions of governor and of 
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the Commissioner of Native Affairs were abolished. In Batavia, the post of 
director general was replaced with four administrative and a Chamber of 
Accounts. Responsibility for the residents of Yogyakarta and Surakarta was 
supposed to lay with the governor general, not to the governor anymore. 
Daendels was also audacious to put the sultans under the residents. Nine 
prefectures were created under the directly-administered area of Java. 
Instruction was made in detail and a fixed salary was given in order to 
encourage more professional and efficient work performance in the office 
(Walker 1968: 24-26). 
When the English occupied Java in 1811, a number of administrative reforms 
were also introduced by Thomas Stamford Raffles. Netherlands India were 
divided into four commands: Malacca, the Moluccas, Benkulen and Java. Each 
region was directed by a lieutenant governor - Raffles himself was lieutenant 
governor of Java in 1811-1816 and of Benkulen in 1818-1824. The nine 
prefectures established by Daendels were increased to sixteen prefectures due · 
to some areas being incorporated into the central administrative structure such 
as Kedu which was formerly under the Susuhunan Surakarta. The names of the 
prefectures were also replaced with residencies under Raffles (Walker 1968: 43-
51). 
In 1817, the Dutch returned to Netherlands India. The administration system of 
Raffles was maintained but the Dutch flavour was added. In 1834, a growing 
administrative separation from the Netherlands occurred. In the Netherlands 
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India, the Dutch colonial government reasserted the dual nature of 
administrative structure. A Governor General replaced the post of 
Commissioner General. The Governor General was appointed by a company's 
director in Amsterdam and became the supreme executive authority in the 
colony (Cribb 1994: 3). 
Further, the basic rule of the Netherlands India was 'gecentraliseerd geregeerd 
land' (areas ruled centralistically). The Netherlands India Government Code of 
1854 (Regeeringsreglement van 1854)52 held on to centralistic principles of rule 
(Niessen 1999: 45). The colonial government established administrative regions 
that were used by the central government to control its resources politically. For 
example, according to Reglement S 1855/2, Java was divided into several 
administrative gewest that were further divided into afdeeling, distric and 
onderdistric (Gie 1993: 15). According to Koesoemahatmadja (1979), the 
Netherlands India was divided into two different administrative regions. The 
Dutch colonial government used two paths in structuring its administration. 
Gewesten, afdelingen and onder afdelingen were under the ruler of European 
pangreh praja. They were Resident, Assistant Resident and Controller 
respectively. Beside Yogyakarta and Surakarta, there were 21 residents that 
had to be accountable directly to the Governor General. The regions of onder 
afdeling were divided into districten. Further, districtens were divided into onder 
districten. They were ruled by Bupati, Wedana and Assistant Wedana respectively, 
who were all indigenous Indonesians (Sujamto 1984: 128). 
52 Concerning the Policy of the Government of the Netherlands India. 
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Figure 4.1. shows the administration structure in the Netherlands India after 
1830. The Governor General as the highest ruler controlled the administration 
of all governors, commissioners, and residents. At the local level, the structure 
was split into two paths. On one side, there were the resident, assistant resident 
and controller who were Binnenlands Bestuur, whereas on the other, there were 
the regent, patih, wedana, asisstant wedana, camat and lurah who were Inlands 
Bestuur. Inlands Bestuur were mostly indigenous aristocracy. 
Intensive demands from Dutch people for an ethical policys3 for giving up the 
strongly centralised government were prevalent at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Eventually, a Decentralisation Law (Decentralisatiewet) was issued in 
1903. The characteristics of the Decentralisation law were as follows: 
1. The establishment of regions with their own money to finance their needs 
that were run by raad (parliament) became possible. 
2. Regions that were eligible, with the establishment of ordonnantie, would be 
provided with money separated from the state treasury. 
3. Members of local raad were partly appointed due to their position in the 
government, and partly were elected. For gementeeraad, since 1917 all 
members were elected. 
4. The period of incumbency of the raads was 6 years, and from 1925 and on it 
was four years. 
53 The Ethical policy was proposed in 1900s by Van de Venter (a Dutch parliament member from the 
Labour Party) who suggested the Dutch Government be concerned with the welfare of the people in the 
Netherlands India. This proposal led to the establishment of schools for Indonesian people. 
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5. Local raad had the authority to settle local veroreningen (local regulations) 
dealing with local interests that had not been addressed by central 
government rules. 
6. The supervision of the regions including ratification, postponement or 
cancellation of the regional governments' decision was in the hands of the 
Governor General of the Dutch India. This officer had the right to run any 
matters neglected by the local raad. (Gie 1993: 16-17). 
Unfortunately, the decentralisatiewet above was unsatisfactory. Beside the 
limitation of budget given to the regions, the law also limited the transfer of 
authority. The law had also weaknesses because the council was not elected 
democratically, but was appointed from within the government itself. 
Moreover, the chairman of the council was appointed from the central 
government. Legge (1963: 6) mentioned that this move was aimed to ensure 
greater efficiency rather than greater autonomy. 
These weaknesses led to an increase in demands for reform. For example, 
through S No. 114 of 1917 issued in 1917, the establishment of a Volksraad · 
(parliament) was allowed; in 1918, indigenous officers (lnlandsche 
bestuurambtenaren) were granted more authority by the government. 
Eventually, in 1922, a new Administrative Reform Act (Wet op de 
Bestuurshervorming) was issued. It was aimed at creating autonomous units 
with legislative and administrative control over their own affairs and 
emphasising the increased participation in the affairs of state by the indigenous 
population (Gie 1993: 17; Schiller 1955: 85-86). 
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Figure 4.1. The Structure of Administration in the Netherlands India After 1830 
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4.2.4. The Japanese Interregnum 1942-1945 
The Dutch surrendered unconditionally to Japan on March 9, 1942. According 
to Cribb (1994), the Japanese policies after their success in occupying Indonesia 
were to devastate Western influence and to mobilise Indonesians in the interest 
of a Japanese victory. Their policies were aimed at restructuring and redirecting 
the Indonesian economy so that it could sustain Japan' s war endeavour to 
become the leader of one Great Asia and for long-term economic supremacy. 
During the Japanese occupation, there were only a few changes in terms of the 
governmental structure. Most of the existing governmental structures were 
kept in so far as they were not contradictory with the Japanese rules. This was 
followed by the dismissal of the entire European administrative corps. 
Extreme centralisation and the elimination of representative bodies 
became the Japanese objective in order, it can be assumed, to exercise 
tighter· control over the organs of local government and to allow the 
deployment of as few Japanese officials as necessary for the 
supervision of civil government (Walker 1968: 111) 
Efforts of the Japanese to assert control over the Indonesian people were· 
reflected in the model of administration. The Japanese model of administration 
applied in Indonesia was different from that of the Dutch. The Japanese did not 
apply two paths of administration as established by the Dutch. According to 
Law No 27 /1942, Java was divided into several Syuu (Karesidenan). Syuu was 
then divided into Ken (Kabupaten) and Si (Kotapraja/Kotamadya). The positions of 
Governor and Assistant Resident were abolished (see Figure 4.2.). However, the 
strata of administration were also hierarchically separated between the 
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Japanese and the indigenous people. From Syuu-Tjoo (Karesidenan) up to Saiko 
Siki Kan (Governor General) were in the hands of Japanese people. Indigenous 
people were only positioned at Ken-Tjoo (Kabupaten) and the lower ranks. 
During the Japanese occupation, the concept of decentralisation was vaguely 
applied. Formally, the Regentschaps Ordonnantie and Stadsgemeente Ordonnantie 
were still continued. However, in both the regions, the regional houses of 
people's representatives were abolished. The authority of the regional houses 
of people's representative was vested in Ken-Tjoo (Bupati) and Si-Tjoo 
(Walikota). This single system of government operated until September 1943 
(Sujamto 1984: 132-135) 
Approaching the time of Japan's defeat, the position of Resident was filled by 
indigenous people. Also, Regional People's Representatives were established. 
However, the authority of the Regional People's Representative was restricted. 
These members were only allowed to listen to speeches and advice released by 
the Japanese Government and to conduct the command of the Japanese highest 
ruler (Sujamto 1984: 135). 
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Figure 4.2. The Structure of Government During the Japanese Colonial 
Government 
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4.3. Decentralisation in the Post Independence Era 
4.3.1. Law No. 1/1945: The First Indonesian Law Concerning 
Decentralisation 
Indonesia declared its independence on August 17, 1945. Just shortly after 
independence, the Committee for the Preparation of the Independence of 
Indonesia (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekilan Indonesia, PPKI) declared the 1945 
Constitution and appointed Soekarno and Mohamad Hatta as the President and 
the Vice President, respectively. The 1945 Constitution was prepared by the 
Investigative Board for the Preparation Efforts of the Independence of 
Indonesia (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekilan Indonesia, 
BPUPKI) from May 28, 1945. According to Soekarno in his speech on August 
18, 1945, the Constitution was still temporary, but in the future it would be 
amended (Marzuki 1999). 
Related to the implementation of the 1945 Constitution, Article II of the 
transitional rule of the 1945 Constitution stipulated that the existing institutions. 
could be continued until new institutions were established. In relation to Article 
No 18 of the Constitution, PPKI stipulated several decisions: (1) the territory of 
Indonesia would be divided into eight provinces, each of which would be 
headed by a governor (West Java, Central Java, East Java, Sumatra, Borneo, 
Celebes, Maluku and Little Sunda); Provinces would be divided into 
Karesidenan headed by a resident; (2) Governor and Resident were to be assisted 
by the Regional National Committee (Komite Nasional Daerah/KND); (3) the 
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status of Kooti would be continued; and (4) the status of City Government 
(Pemerintahan Kota/Staatgementee) would be continued (Marbun 1994: 11). 
The above rules show that the government structure introduced by the Dutch 
and the subsequent Japanese government was still being continued. This is 
understandable since this was a time when the nation building of Indonesia 
started. Many matters that were very urgent had to be debated by the founding 
fathers. The criteria for the Indonesian President, supposed to be included in 
the constitution, were the subject of a very long debate. Two different 
arguments between the nationalists and the islamists over whether the 
president should be indigenous person and moslem were ended by an 
agreement by moslems not to put 'moslem' in the criteria for the Indonesian 
president. 
Under the Cabinet of Sjahrir I, the government established Law No. 1/1945 
issued on November 23, 1945 which was the first law concerning regional 
government in post-independent Indonesia (Lubis 1975). This law was very 
brief and general, comprising only six Articles, because it was drafted very 
quickly. Based on this law, KND would be established -except in Surakarta and 
Yogyakarta (Gie 1993)54_inKaresidenan, autonomous Kota, Kabupaten and other 
regions that were deemed to be necessary by the Minister of Home Affairs 
54 During the Dutch Colonial Government, there were 4 zeljbesturende landschappen (self-governing 
lands): Kasultanan Yogyakarta and Pakulaman (both in Yogyakarta) and Kesunanan Surakarta and 
Mangkunegaran (both in Surakarta). Kesultanan Yogyakarta and Kesunanan Surakarta were tied with a 
long-term contract, whereas Pakualaman and Mangkunegaran were tied with a short-term contract. The 
last contracts with Kesultanan Yogyakarta, Kesunanan Surakarta, Pakualaman and Mangkunegaran were 
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(Article 1). Following Law No. 1/1945, the KND was adopted in Java and 
Madura. There were 17 Karesidenans, 18 autonomous Kotas and 67 autonomous 
Kabupatens. 
The status of KND was changed to become Regional People's Representative 
Council ( Badan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, BPRD), a part of the regional 
government. As part of the regional government, KND was also headed by the 
regional head. To run daily government affairs, up to five KND members were 
chosen as the Executive Board (Badan Eksekutift. The remaining members of 
KND were supposed not to be involved in daily activities but to make regional 
regulations. 
The Cabinet of Sjahrir I, II, III were in power from November 14, 1945 to July 3, 
1947. When the Cabinet Sjahrir II replaced the Cabinet Sjahrir I in March 1946, 
they completed 'the arrangement of regional governments based on people's 
sovereignty' (Lubis 1975: 12). According to Law No. 1/1945, there were two 
levels of autonomous regions: ka,residenan and ka,bupaten/kota. The chairman of 
KND was then assigned to the vice-legislative and executive bodies. The role of 
regional head under Law No. 1/1945 was dualistic, representing the interests of 
the central government on the one hand, and having to manage the aspirations 
of the regions on the other. The principle of decentralisation under Law No. 
based on rules No. S 1941/47, No. S 1939/614, No. S 1941/577, and No. S 1940/543 respectively (Gie 
1993: 79). 
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1/1945 was 'autonomy based on people's sovereignty' where regional 
governments had the right to manage their own affairs as long as it was not in 
contradiction with rules and laws from higher level governing bodies. The 
money needed to run regional government affairs was provided by the regional 
government itself. Therefore, regional governments could extract their own 
taxes and levies. 
Due to having no formal elucidation, this law was in fact vague and confusing. 
The problems experienced during the implementation led the Minister of Home 
Affairs, Mr Hermani, to issue a written elucidation of each Article in the law. 
For example, it was explained that the membership of BPRD was at most 100 
people in the Karesidenan and 60 in the Kota or Kabupaten. 
Law No. 1/1945 provided for some exceptions for Yogyakarta and Surakarta. In · 
Yogyakarta, the Central Government provided Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX 
and Sri Paku Alam VIII with a charter appointing them to be Kepala Kasultanan 
(Kasultanan head) of Yogyakarta and Kepala Daerah (region' s head) of 
Pakualaman respectively. It is noted that Yogyakarta is special due to its role in 
the struggle to oust the Dutch colonial government. Yogyakarta was always 
supportive of the Republic of Indonesia, instead of being coopted by the 
colonial government. The charter was sent by President Sukarno through his 
state ministers Mr Sartono and Mr Maramis. On September 5, 1945, Sri Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono IX declared Yogyakarta as a special region within the 
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Republic of Indonesia. In his declaration, he mentioned that he had direct 
accountability to the President of the Republic of Indonesia (Gie, 1993: 63-64). 
In contrast to Yogyakarta, the situation in Surakarta after the proclamation of 
Indonesia was very tense. In fact the President also provided the Monarchy of 
Surakarta with the same charter as Sri Susuhunan Paku Buwono XII and 
Mangkunegoro VIII. In September 1945, KND was established in Surakarta. 
Raden Panji Suroso was appointed to be High Commissioner of the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia placed in Surakarta. The directorium 
government was established based on the agreement between the Badan Pekerja 
(Working Committee) of KND and the High Commissioner. The Directorium 
government was headed by the High Commissioner and had 9 members, 
comprising 5 from KND and 4 representatives determined by Sri Paku Buwono 
XII and Mangkunegoro VIII (Gie 1993: 79-80). 
However, the Mangkunegaran did not agree with this model of government. 
Therefore, the Directorium government did not work. This situation led to 
various conflicts among people inside the government who were not satisfied 
with the behaviour of the elites within the kingdom as well as those outside the 
bureaucracy. Further, a number of regions such as Karanganyar, Klaten, 
Boyolali, and Sragen became separated from the Mangkunegaran government. 
On July 15, 1946, Government Decision No. 16 was issued to deal with the 
situation; It decreed that: (1) the post of High Commissioner in Surakarta was 
abolished; (2) temporarily, Kesunanan Surakarta and Mangkunegaran were 
102 
under one karesidenan that was headed by a resident; (3) within Karesidenen 
Surakarta, a region would be established called Kota Surakarta headed by 
Walikota; (4) The Surakarta Resident was assigned to be the vice state treasurer 
for the Karesidenan Surakarta; and (5) The Karesidenan Surakarta Government 
was under direct control of the Central Government (Gie, 1993: 79-80). 
Law No 1/1945 indicated that the application of autonomy was not uniform all 
over the archipelago. The role of the assembly was not big enough for it to be 
considered autonomous since it was only directed toward running house-
keeping functions. The lesser organs of government were restricted to dealing 
with matters indicated specifically in the law and had no right to legislate in 
relation to those not included in the law. 
4.3.2. Law No. 22/1948 and Law No. 44/1950 on the State of East 
Indonesia (Negara Indonesia Timur): Decentralisation during 
Regional Rebellion 
Law No.22 of 1948 was issued on July 10, 1948 in Yogyakarta. Mr R.P. Soeroso 
chaired the committee that drafted the law for the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
There was very little debate over this law among the 47 members of the 
Working Committee of the Central National Committee Indonesia (Komite 
Nasional Indonesia Pusat, KNIP) (Walker 1968: 145). This law was more 
comprehensive than the previous one since it consisted of 47 Articles. The focus 
of regional governments in Law No. 1/1945 was on 'people's sovereignty' 
whereas that in Law No. 22/1948 was on 'democratic regional governments'. 
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This lawas also intended to abolish the dualismss in the regional 
governmentsystem. The new law firmly stated that the institution of pamong 
praja would be abolished gradually (Syafrudin 1991: 26-27). 
Prior to the issuance of Law No. 22/1948, representatives of the Dutch 
government came and tried to establish rule over Indonesia again directly. A 
series of conferences was conducted between 1946 and 1949, leading to the 
establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Republik 
Indonesia Serika.t, RIS). In 1949, six states were established: the State of East 
Indonesia, the State of East Sumatra, the State of Madura, the State of 
Pasundan, the State of South Sumatra and the State of East Java. 
After Law No. 22/1948 came Law No. 44/1950 on the East Indonesian States 
(Negara Indonesia Timur, NIT). This was mostly a copy of the former. The NIT 
Law was the basis of decentralisation in Sulawesi, Maluku and Lesser Sunda. 
The East Indonesian State contained the ruling organs, consisting of: (1) a 
Government (Regering, Pemerintah), that is the President with the Ministry; (2) a 
Temporary Representative Assembly; and (3) a Temporary Senate (Voorlopige, 
Senat Sementara) (Schiller 1955: 150). 
As stipulated in Law No 22/1948, regional government consisted of the 
Regional House of People's Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, 
DPRD) and the Regional Government Board (Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah, 
ss Dualism means the existence of both regional government and central government agencies, called 
pangreh praja (in 1946, the name was changed to pamongpraja). 
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DPD). The Regional Head represented the central government in the region and 
became the member and chairman of DPD. DPD running of daily governmental 
affairs was established based on proportional representation reflecting the 
factions in the house of representatives. The chairman and vice chairman of the 
DPRD were elected by and from the members of the DPRD. 
In some respects, it is clear that efforts of democratising regional government 
were conducted by separating the position of the DPD and the DPRD chairman. 
Under Law No. 22/1948, the highest authority in the regions was DPRD and 
DPD, where both had to work collegially. This was to abolish the powerful 
region chairman established in the previous law where the region's head was 
one organ separated from the DPRD and DPD. DPRD elected some candidates 
to the Kepala Daerah who would then be appointed by the central government. 
Although the central government was the main decision-maker in determining 
Kepala Daerah, the DPRD had a strong position; it could terminate the Kepala 
Daerah through a DPRD decision. Kepala daerah is the organ of the region. DPD . 
was accountable to DPRD (Marbun 1994: 29) 
According to Law No 22/1948, there were three levels of autonomous regions: 
province, kabupaten/kota besar and desa/kota kecil (formal autonomy). At the 
provincial and kabupaten/kota level, autonomous authority as well as 
medebewind/ co-administration authority were established. 
Unfortunately, this law was not well implemented due to the Madiun affair of 
September 1948 when the Communist Party engaged in a political coup. The 
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situation was becoming worse due to the Dutch military aggression to rule 
Indonesia again, making it difficult to implement the law. Moreover, most 
party politicians were not much concerned with the complexities of the 
structure of regional government. Instead, they supported democratisation of 
the political process under Mohammad Hatta's government program (Walker 
1968: 145). 
During the early 1950s, a number of rebellions broke out in various regions 
outside Java. They were Dewan Gajah, Dewan Garuda, Dewan Banteng, and 
Permesta. Their existence was due to dissatisfaction with the management style 
shown by Jakarta, a style that was very centralistic. They urged the central 
I 
government to change its policy, to give as wide as possible autonomy to the 
regions. The central government responded to the demands by issuing a new 
law issued in January 1957. The new law stipulated, for example, the election of 
DPRD and Kepala Daerah. Unfortunately, this new law came into existence too 
late and could not prevent the rebellions (Alfian 1989). 
4.3.3. Law No 111957: Decentralisation under Liberal Democracy 
Criticism of the basic law on local administration No. 22/1948 came from the 
parties in the national Parliament. It was criticised for not being applied to all of 
Indonesia and for creating dualism in local government. The Parliament 
demanded a new law in which the central government would provide 
definitive devolved functions to the local units. The then Prime Minister, 
Sukiman, realised that unless Law 22/1948 was comprehensively revised, the 
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decentralisation program could not be carried out. In August 1953, the Ali-
Arifin Cabinet took office and then it promised to finish a new draft law within 
three months (Walker 1968: 188-189). 
Before being accepted, Law No. 1/1957 was the subject of a very long debate in 
the Parliament. Hazairin, the Minister of Home Affairs of the Ali-Arifin cabinet, 
issued a draft law setting up the lowest level autonomous regions, supra-village 
units called sadat. These would not be uniform throughout the country since 
these units were to be based on the adat structure of the communities. The draft 
also stipulated that a region's head should be an official of the central 
government. However, the Parliament rejected the draft and Hazairin was then 
replaced by Sunarjo. 
Although the cabinet changed very quickly from the Ali-Arifin cabinet to the 
Burhanuddin Harahap and then to the Ali-Roem-ldham, Sunarjo was still 
retained to serve as the Minister of Home Affairs, enabling him to continue the 
preparation of the decentralisation bill. He introduced a new draft in 1956, 
allowing for a popularly-elected region head but imposing a Government 
Commissioner to conduct general supervision and to coordinate activities of the 
regions at different levels. However, the notion of a Government Commissioner 
was rejected by the Parliament due to its perceived status as 'a spy of the 
central government'. After changing some points on January 17, 1957, the Law 
No. 1/1957 was passed to replace Law No. 22 for Java, Sumatra and 
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Kalimantan; also, the Negara Indonesia Timur Law No. 44/1950 was passed for 
East Indonesia (Walker 1968: 190-192). 
The new Law No. 1/1957 comprised 9 chapters and 76 Articles. The principle of 
Law No. 1/1957 provided regions with power over all affairs except those of 
the central government that had been detailed in the law. Under Law No. 
1/1957, regional government was very democratic. In this regard, DPRD was 
elected by the people. DPRD was to elect the DPD and Regional Head. DPD 
was accountable to DPRD (Lubis 1975: 65)56. Law No. 1of1957 instituted three 
autonomous regions: Daerah Tingkat I (including Kotaraya Jakarta Raya), Daerah 
Tingkat II including Kotapraja and Daerah Tingkat III. 
Although Law No. 1/1957 was regarded as representing the greatest 
achievement of the democratisation and decentralisation, the law was never 
fully implemented due to the Demokrasi Terpimpin (the Guided Democracy) of 
Soekarno sweeping it away. The era of democratic regional governments ended 
and was replaced by an era of supervision of the central government to regional 
governments (Lubis 1975: 63). According to Legge (1963), the PRRI (in West 
Sumatra) and Permesta (in South Sulawesi) rebellions led the central 
government to react very strongly over regional government. Under the 
Guided Democracy, the previous goal of decentralisation directed toward 
56 In Article 6 it was stated that due to its position, a regional head became both the chairman and member 
ofDPRD. 
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democratisation was far from realised. Due to the worsening rebellions, Law 
No. 1/1957 providing the opportunity to elect DPRD and Kepala Daerah was 
abolished by a Presidential Decree issued in September 1959. The central 
government once again took over control of the regions by appointing Kepala 
Daerah (Harvey 1989: 200). 
4.3.4. Law No. 18/1965: Decentralisation under Guided Democracy 
Law No. 18 of 1965 was a huge law. As a basic law on regional government it 
comprised 90 Articles. The draft was prepared by a team chaired by R.P. 
Soeroso. On January 20-24, 1963, he presented the draft in a conference 
attended by governors from all over Indonesia in Sala. Inputs received from the 
conference were adopted in the next draft that was to be submitted to DPR. The 
regional head's position would be changed. The draft was agreed and then 
was issued on September 1, 1965. This law was applied during the Guided 
Democracy era when political stability and efficiency in the regional 
governmental were the main priority (Lubis 1975: 68-70). 
The fundamental changes introduced in the new law were to abolish the dual 
functions of Kepala Daerah as head of DPRDS7. However, there was a shift in the 
role of the two parties, and Regional Head became more powerful than DPRD. 
The law stipulated that regional government consist of Regional Head and 
57 Law No. 18/1965 fundamentally changed the dual position ofregional head as regional head and 
chairman ofDPRD (Lubis 1975: 70). 
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Regional House of Representatives (Article 5 (1)). Kepala daerah was appointed--
from the candidates proposed by the DPRD --by the President for the heads of 
regions in level I and by the Minister of Home Affairs for the heads of regions 
in level II. (2); and Kepala daerah conducted the politics of government and was 
accountable to President through the Minister of Home Affair (Article 5 (1)) 
(Lubis 1975: 69-70). The candidates for region head were proposed by DPRD, 
and comprised a combination of those who were elected and of those who 
were appointed. However, in practice, no member was ever appointed based 
on an election. In terms of representation, DPRD was only allowed to stand up 
for regional interests under Kepala daerah's c ontrol (Hoessein 1996: 11). 
As stipulated in Law No. 18/1965, the principle of autonomy was based on 
several levels of government. They were Propinsi and or Kotaraya as Daerah 
Tingkat I, Kabupaten and or Kotamadya as Daerah Tingkat II and Kecamatan and 
or Kotapraja as Daerah Tingkat III. The content of regional autonomy introduced 
in Law No. 18/1965 was real and referred to the widest possible autonomy. 
Further, according to Law No 18 of 1965, Regional governments consisted of 
the Region's head and the DPRD. The Region's head conducted the central 
government policy and was accountable to the President through the Minister 
of Home Affairs. In conducting daily government affairs, the region's head 
was assisted by vice region heads and a Daily Government Council (Badan 
Pemerintah Harian, BPH). The DPRD leader was accountable to the Region's 
head (Article 8). 
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This law placed regional governments as the centralised leadership, as 
demanded by the principles of Guided Democracy. However, an attempted 
coup by the Communist Party in 1965 caused the situation to become chaotic. 
Eventually, this law was not implemented. 
4.3.5. Law No. 5 of 1974: Half-Hearted Implementation 
Law No. 5 of 1974 was promulgated on July 23, 1974. This law was a 
'correction' of Law No. 18 of 1965 due to the change in regime from the Old 
Order Government to the New Order Government. The 1965 Communist Party 
coup had led to political fragmentation and instability. However, the spirit of 
political stabilisation was still maintained in the new law. After taking over 
power from Soekarnoss, Suharto then concentrated on establishing national 
stability and promoting economic development. Suharto was able to control the 
People's Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) to produce TAP 
(decision/ketetapan) MPR No. IV /MPR/1973 concerning the Principal 
Guidance of State Direction (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) and TAP· 
No. V /MPR/1973 concerning Review of MPRS Decisions (Peninjauan produk 
yang berupa Ketetapan-Ketetapan MPRS RU. TAP MPR No. IV /MPR/1973 
contained the principle of a 'real and responsible autonomy', replacing 'the 
widest possible measure of regional autonomy' considered too restricted for 
the encouragement of nation-wide-development (Niessen 1999: 81). 
58 A mandate from Sukarno was issued on March 11, 1966 called SUPERSEMAR (Surat Perintah 
Sebe/as Maret). Some observers say that the testament had a link to the September 30Movement where 
the arrangement of the letter was made by Soekarno under pressure from three generals who came to 
Soekamo's palace. See Asvi Warman Adam, http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersemar, printed on 
February 01, 2005. 
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Suharto was also able to drive political parties by simplifying the party system. 
In 1973, the nine political parties, excluding the Functional Group (Golongan 
Karya, Golkar), were merged into two political parties: the United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) consisting of the former Muslim 
parties; and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDV 
combining the former nationalist and Christian parties. This merger placed 
Golkar as the most solid party on the one hand, and the other two weaker 
parties on the other, due to the fragile coalition among the diverse ideological 
streams. within individual parties. This not only led to Golkar achieving victory, 
it also enabled the government to intervene and to install leadership candidates 
from the two parties supportive of the government (Pratikno 1996: 32). 
To maintain political stability, in almost every region the region's head was in 
the hands of military personnel. Both provincial and district governments were 
controlled by military personnel. In 1973, there were 22 governors coming from 
the military, whereas only 4 were from non-military background. Although· 
there was no official record regarding the number of Bupati from the military, it 
could be expected that there were plenty (Samego et al. 1998: 106). 
Law No. 5/1974 was one of the many instruments to consolidate the political 
condition. One of the most important aspects of the new law was the change of 
principle from 'autonomy as wide as possible' ruled in the previous Law No. 
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18/1965 to 'real and responsible autonomy,59 as had been mandated by TAP 
MPR No. IV /MPR/197360. 
There were five principles that were applied in Law No. 5 of 1974: (1) the 
implementation of delivery of autonomy to the regions was to support the 
people's struggle, in order to strengthen the Unitary State and to enhance the 
welfare of all Indonesians; (2) the delivery of autonomy was to be based on 
'real and responsible autonomy'; (3) the decentralisation principle was to be 
implemented together with the deconcentration principle as well as with the 
possibility of the implementation of tugas pembantuan/medebewind (co-
administration); (4) the delivery of autonomy to the regions was to prioritise the 
harmonisation aspect with the goal of efficiency, beside the democratisation 
aspect; and (5) the objective of the delivery of autonomy to the regions was to 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency in running government in the regions, 
especially in the implementation of development and the delivery of services to 
the public as well as to increase political stability and nation building (Sujamto. 
1990). 
59 'Real' means that the delivery of autonomy to the regions must be based on factors, calculations, 
actions or policies that can really guarantee the regions will manage their own affairs. 'Responsible' 
means that the delivery of autonomy to the regions has to be suited to its goal, that is to facilitate 
development of the whole country, and that that is not contradictory with the directions, and that it is 
suitable with the political direction and nation building, and that guarantees the harmonisation between 
the central and regional governments (general elucidation of Law No. 511974) 
60 Ketetapan MPR No. IVIMPR/1973 tentang Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (The Principal Guidance 
on the State Direction). 
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The principles of the law stimulated a debate in the parliament during which 
the principles were regarded by some members as authoritarian. In the general 
plenary on June 8, 1974, the PPP questioned the focus on deconcentration and 
on the existence of territorial head's representing the central government's 
interests. Those were supposed to have been abolished since they tended 
towards centralisation. The PPP proposed instead to focus on decentralisation, 
reflecting the content of TAP MPR No. IV /MPR/1973. However, the 
Government maintained the formula by keeping within the idea of 
democratisation (not to give power to local elites) since; at that time, the 
government faced difficulties after quelling the communist rebellion. By 
posting local government officials chosen by the central government, regional 
government could be controlled easily. To ensure this, Suharto preferred to 
post military personnel in regional governments to guarantee national stability. 
Moreover, in maintaining national stability, the Government also restructured 
the existing political parties. Political parties were simplified into only three. 
parties, where Golkar as the hegemonic party could control the other two 
parties. Political parties were also not allowed to make political branches and 
were separated from their constituents by creating the floating mass. Golkar, 
which called itself a non party, could have political branches that could reach to 
constituents directly at the local community level. Also, the Government 
arranged the relationship between the executive and legislative body in a 
harmonious way. The legislative body was not allowed to criticise the executive 
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policy. All proposals had to be ratified by the local legislative. In fact, in terms 
of the relationship between the Region Head and the House of Representative, 
there was no significant change between the period of Law No. 22/1948 and 
the period of Law No. 5 of 1974. Law No. 5 of 1974 stipulated that 'The 
Regional Government consists of the Head of the Region and the Regional 
House of Representatives' (Article 13). This is similar to Article 5 (1) of Law 
No. 18 of 1965. However, regarding the characteristics of leadership, two 
different styles had now appeared. Law No. 22 of 1948 and Law No. 1of1957 
followed a collegial leadership whereas the Government Regulation No. 6 of 
1959, Law No. 18of1965 and Law No. 5of1974 now followed a sole leadership 
(Penguasa Tunggal) model. 
Although Law No. 5 of 1974 positioned the Region Head and the Regional 
House of Representative on an equal level, in practice, the position of the 
DPRD was weak vis-a-vis the Region's Head. This was due to the process of 
election and appointment of the DPRD chairman; there had to be consultation · 
and agreement by the Region Head (Utomo 1996: 135). Moreover, the DPRD 
had no final decision in terms of the Region Head election. The DPRD elected 
from 3 to 5 candidates who would be proposed to the Central Government, that 
would finally choose one of the candidates. Candidates who won a majority at 
the regional level were not necessarily appointed to be the region's head. It 
was very common that the second winner was finally chosen by the central 
government to become region's head. 
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The law acknowledged that autonomy was granted to Level I and Level II 
governments, although the PPP and the PDIP proposed that Level III 
governments should also have autonomy. However, the previous experience of 
rebellion in various regions made the central government focus autonomy on 
level II governments. This was to avoid the possibility of rebellion at the 
provincial level. This was mentioned in Article 11 of Law No. 5/1974 that 'the 
stress of Autonomy in the Region should be put on the Region of the second 
level'. 
However, two different views prevailed on the relationship between the Level I 
and the Level II regions. Sujamto (1990) mentions that the Dati II (Level II) is 
not subordinate to the Dati I. Although Article 3 (1) of Law No. 5/1974 
mentioned that 'in the framework of the implementation of the 
decentralisation principle shall be organised and established Regions of the first 
Level and Regions of the second Level', the word 'disusun' (or 
organised/ established) does not necessarily mean vertical or subordinate . 
relations. However, in Article 1 (b), it is clearly stated that in the vertical 
relationship between the two Regions: 'Decentralisation is a transfer of services 
of Administration from the Government or from an upper Regional 
Government to a lower Regional Government to become Regional services'. 
Article 8 of Law No. 5 of 1974 says that 'Additional transfer of government 
services to the Regions shall be stipulated by Government Regulation' 
(Sujamto 1990: 70) 
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There was some controversy related to Law No 5/1974. First, in practice, what 
was questioned by the PPP in the plenary session became a reality. No clear 
distinction was made between the three principles (decentralisation, 
deconcentration and co-administration) in their application. The functions 
administered by the regional offices of the Central Government (K.anwil in the 
provinces and Kandep in the lower level regions) overlapped with those of the 
regional government offices (Dinas) (Devas 1997: 355). It has been suggested by 
Morfit (1986: 74), due to the unclear distinction between these principles, the 
totality of central-local relations is best described as co-administration. 
Rohdewohld (1995: 84) concludes that Indonesian decentralisation based on 
Law No. 5/1974 was more akin to administrative delegation, than to political 
devolution. The second controversy was that the law was only implemented 
half-heartedly by the central government. The law provided blank cheques for 
the government to make the implementing regulations. However a number of 
government regulations that were supposed to be the instruments for 
implementing the law were never issued. Third, the law focused more on 
efficiency than on democracy. For the sake of political stability, the Central 
Government used the law to maintain its power. The positions of governor and 
mayor /regent became the extensions of the central government. Instead of 
being accountable to the local community, they were first and foremost 
accountable to the Central Government. 
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The following Figure 4.3., adapted from Devas (1989) and Mokhsen (2003), 
exhibits the structure of government in the New Order Era (under Law 5/1974). 
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Figure 4.3. The Structure of Government in the New Order Era (Under Law 
5/1974) 
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Source: Adapted from Mokhsen, N., 2003. Decentralisation in the Post New Order Era of 
Indonesia, 2003 and and Devas, N., 1989. Financing Local government in Indonesia, Ohio 
University, Ohio. 
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Table 4.1. Comparison between Law No. 5/1974, No. 22/1999 and the First and Second Draft Revision of Law No.22/1999 
Law No. 5/1974 Law No. 22/1999 Draft Revision of Law No. Another Draft Revision of 
22/1999 Law No. 22/1999 
Title Law Number 5/1974 Law Number 22/1999 Law Number .... (No number) Law Number .... (Nonumber) 
Concerning Basic Principles Regarding Regional Concerning the Amendment to Concerning the Amendment 
of Administration in the Governance Law Number 22/1999 to Law Number 22/1999 
Region. Regarding Regional Governance Regarding Regional 
Governance 
Principles Real and Responsible Wide, Real and Autonomy that is 
Autonomy (General Responsible Autonomy comprehensive and is based on 
Elucidation) (General Elucidation) basic principles of democracy, 
equity and justice (General 
'""-, elucidation No.2) 
Application Autonomy was applied in Autonomy is applied in Autonomy and deconcentration 
the Regions Level I and II Kabupaten and Kota, are applied with a hierarchical 
(Article 3 (1). whereas in the provinces mechanism from the province to 
Deconcentration was deconcentration and the Kabupaten and Ko ta 
applied in Provinces, decentralisation applied (Integrated Prefectoral System) 
Kabupaten/ Kotamdaya and (Article 4 (1) (General Elucidation 10) 
Kecamatan (sub-district) 
(Article 72) 
Election DPRD elected candidates DPRD elected the DPRD elected the Province The Province heads and 
for Province heads and Province heads and heads and District/City heads. District/City heads will be 
District/City heads that District/City heads. elected directly by the people. 
would be appointed by 
President and Minister of 
Home Affairs 
Source: Adapted from Jawa Pos, 'Perbandingan Mendasar UU Pemerintahan di daerah dengan Revisi: Provinsi dan Kab/Kota Tak Lagi 
Sejajar (Comparison between Law on Regional Government and the Revisions: the Province and District/City not to be equal)', Jawa Pos 
February 18, 2002. 
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4.3.6. Law No. 22 and Law of 1999: Radical Changes in the Era of 
Reformasi 
President Suharto was toppled on May 21, 1998 after ruling Indonesia through 
an authoritarian regime for about 32 years. The successor of Suharto was Prof. 
Dr. B.J. Habibie, the German-trained Minister of Research and Technology who 
had been a cabinet member under the Suharto government since 1978. Under 
President Habibie, demands for political reform still continued and he 
responded to the demands very quickly, including issuing a new law on 
regional governance. 
Law No 22/1999 was prepared by a team chaired by Professor Ryaas Rasyid, 
who was the Rector of Government Science Institute (Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan, 
IIP) and the Director General of General Government and Regional Autonomy 
(Direktur fenderal Pemerintahan Umum dan Otonomi Daerah, Dirjen PVOD) in the 
Department of Home Affairs. The team drafted a law that has made far-
reaching changes in Indonesia's political laws. When President Habibie was 
replaced by President Abdurrahman Wahid, Ryass Rasyid was appointed to 
lead a new state ministry. He became the State Minister for Regional Autonomy 
in 1999-2001 to be responsible for preparing the implementation of regional 
autonomy. 
The framework of Law No. 22/1999 is very different from that of Law No. 
5/1974. The definition of decentralisation in Law No. 22/1999 is stated in 
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Article 1 {f), as 'the delegation of the governance authorities from the 
Government to autonomous Regions'. Unlike Law No. 5/1974, this new law 
declares district/municipal governments as autonomous regions that are not 
hierarchically subordinate to the provincial government {Article 4(2)). The 
transfer of authorities would be directly from the central government to 
district/municipalities without being filtered by the provincial government. 
This new law has radically changed the relationship between the 
district/ municipal government and the provincial as well as the central 
government (Turner et al. 2003). 
Article 7 of this law also stipulated that all functions except those reserved for 
the central government were to be decentralised to the regions. All 
governmental functions related to domestic affairs were devolved to regional 
governments except for monetary and fiscal policy, security affairs, foreign 
policy, justice, religious affairs and other strategic and national policies.61 
Law No. 22/1999 abolished the levels of regional government previously 
acknowledged in Law No. 5/1974. The titles of 'Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I or 
Regional Government Level I' and Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat II or Regional 
Government Level II' were replaced with 'Pemerintah Propinsi or Provincial 
Government' and 'P emerintah Kabupaten/Kota or District/City Government' 
61 This included 'policies on national planning and control of national development at a macro level, 
policies on funds for fiscal balance, policies on the state administrative system and state economic 
institutions, policies on the development and the empowerment of human resources, policies on the 
efficient use of natural resources along with strategic high technology, conservation and national 
standardisation'. 
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respectively. This is stated in Article 4 (1) of Law No. 22/1999: 'in the context of 
the implementation of the decentralisation principle, Provincial Regions, 
Regency Regions and Municipal Regions shall be formed and authorised to 
govern and administer the interests of the local people according to their own 
initiatives based on the people's aspirations '. 
In terms of the structure of regional government, the model acknowledged by 
Law No. 5/1974 was replaced. First, there was a separation of power between 
regional government and the DPRD. The new law stipulates that 'Regional 
Government shall consist of the Head of Region and other regional apparatus' 
(Article 14 (2)); it functions as regional executive institution. The DPRD 
functions as regional legislative function. Second, there has been a shift of 
position of the DPRD vis-a-vis the regional head. It is stated in Article 16 (2) 
that 'DPRD as Regional Legislative Board shall have equal position and shall 
become a partner of Regional Government'. However, other Articles show that 
the position of the DPRD is higher than that of the regional head. It is said in· 
Article 18 (1) that DPRD shall elect Regional Heads: that could be interpreted 
as implying that DPRD is not equal to but is higher than regional head. The 
contradiction is clearer if Article 16 (2) is compared to Article 44, 45 and 46, in 
that DPRD has the right to request a report of accountability to regional head 
(Mawardi 2002: 7). 
The main problem related to the DPRD is that the people do not directly elect 
the members of the DPRD, but their parties elect them. In this regard, the 
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people elect the party, which then determines what percentage of the 
parliamentary cake each party will get. Further, party leaders will determine 
who will be put into the parliament (Rasyid 2003: 65). 
Law No 25/1999 has also introduced a new arrangement for fiscal balance 
between the central government and the regional governments. Article 3 of the 
law states that 'sources of the regional revenues in the implementation of 
decentralisation shall be: a. original regional revenue; b. balance funds; c. 
regional loans; and d. other legal revenues'. What is new in this law is the 
introduction of balance funds. 
Further, Article 7 (1) confirms that 'The General Allocation Fund is at least 25 
per cent from Domestic Revenue which has been stipulated in State Budget'. 
For the distribution of the General Allocation Fund, 10 per cent is for the 
Province whereas 90 per cent is for the District/City as stipulated in Article 7 
(1) (Law No 25/1999 Article 7 (2)). 
4.3.6.1. Early Stages of Decentralisation Implementation 
According to Bell (2001:11), the transfer of power is clear under the law, but the 
details need government regulations. Literally, hundreds of other laws and 
regulations are still needed to make the law effective. At the moment, under 
Law No. 22/1999 it is perceived that the decentralisation law belongs to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. Other departments still refer to their own older laws. 
It is unavoidable that conflicts between regional governments and several 
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departments have occurred during the early s1ges of implementation. For 
example, several district governments have tried to gain extra revenue from 
foreign companies operating mining activities in their territory by changing 
contract agreements arbitrarily without consulting the foreign contractors or the 
central government. This has created insecurity among foreign contractors 
regarding law certainties in Indonesia where they are operating their business 
activities (Tjejep 2002). 
Up to March 2002, the Government of Indonesia had produced 21 laws, 34 
government regulations and 12 Presidential decrees just to implement the 
decentralisation policy. There were 2,034,177 personnel of the central 
government devolved to be the responsibility of regional government. In 2001, 
81.5 trillion rupiahs were given to regional governments as a balance fund, but 
in 2002 this amount increased to 94.53 trillion. The balance fund ( dana 
perimbangan) provided in 2001 was more than 5 per cent of the produk domestik 
bruto (PDB)/gross domestic product (GDP) whereas that in 2000 was only 3 per· 
cent of the PDB (Mawardi 2002: 10). 
The laws related to the establishment of new special autonomy are Law No. 
21/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province and Law No. 18/2001 on 
Special Autonomy for the Nangroe Aceh Darussalaam Province. These laws 
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were offered as alternative ways of running the government in the two areas 
that have been characterised by separatist movement62. 
The new law on regional governance has not only provided regional 
governments with more power, but also opportunities for elites in the regions 
to secure high positions in the government structure. These regional elites 
forced the central government to set up new provinces and municipalities or 
districts to accommodate them in the government structure at the regional 
level. Several mass mobilisations of people have been conducted to force the 
government to adopt their demands63. In this respect, the Government has 
issued several new laws related to the establishment of new provinces64• In 
2000, 31 new district and 2 municipal governments were established. In 2002, 3 
new municipal governments and 16 new district governments followed, in 
various provinces. On January 28, 2003, the Indonesian parliament passed ten 
new laws establishing 25 local government areas65. In the case of Irian Jaya, the 
Government issued Presidential Instruction (lnstruksi President, Inpres) No.· 
1 /2003 on the Acceleration of the Implementation of the Establishment of the 
Central Irian Jaya Province and of the West Irian Jaya Province. 
62 In Aceh the separatist movement is Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM. (Independent Aceh Movement) and 
in Papua it is called Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM (Independent Papua Organisation) 
63 In the case of Riau, on January 24, 2002, around 1,000 people went to the DPR building in Jakarta to 
force the DPR to establish a new province separate from the Riau Province, the Kepulauan Riau Province 
(Kompas, January 25, 2002). 
64 Law No. 38/2000 on the Establishment of the Gorontalo Province; Law No. 6/2000 on the 
Establishment of the North Maluku Province; and Law No. 5/2000 on the Amendment of Law No. 
45/1999 on the Establishment of the Central Irian Jaya Province and of the West Irian Jaya Province. 
65 See Decentralisation News, GTZSfDM, Issue No. 40, February 7, 2003. 
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In terms of the transfer of authority, the Government has passed Government 
Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah, PP) No. 25/2000 concerning Government 
Authority and the Provincial Authority and Autonomous Region in May 2000. 
This PP was crucial as it would become the framework through which local 
governments would exercise their authority (Mokhsen 2003). However, PP No. 
25 /2000 has been constrained by several departments intending to slow the 
delivery of authority to district and city governments. Some authorities were 
taken back by the central government. For example, the authority over land 
administration was to be retained by the central government66. Some 
departments also determined the stages of delivery of authority without 
consulting with local governments (Rasyid 2002: 10) 
In fact, there are some weaknesses in terms of the position of the 
Decentralisation Law and of the Sectoral Law. Some departments are still 
referring to the laws concerning sectoral issues, whereas regional governments 
are only holding to the Decentralisation Law. Several conflicts have emerged. 
due to these different interpretations. For instance, Article 11 (2) of Law No. 
22/1999 provides district and city government with the authority to handle 
capital investment; however, Article 28 of Law No. 1/1967 provided the central 
government with foreign capital investment. Also, Article 11 (2) of Law No. 
66 Presidential Decision No. 10/2001 on the Implementation of Regional Autonomy in Land Affairs 
(Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah di Bidang Pertanahan) 
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22/1999 mentions that the authority to manage land affairs is given to district 
and city governments, but on the other hand, Article 1 of Presidential Decision 
(Keppres) No. 10/2001 is to adopt again the PP, decision, instruction and circular 
letter of the Minister for Agrarian Affairs to the head of Badan Pertanahan 
Nasional (Agency for National Land).67 
Conflict over the law concerning personnel affairs has also occurred. According 
to 'Law No. 43/1999, the appointment and promotion of personnel is divided 
into three levels of government: echelon I is under the authority of the central 
government; echelon II is under the provincial government; and echelon III is 
under the district/ city government. This contradicts Law No. 22/1999 giving 
district and city governments authority to appoint and promote echelon II. In 
many cases, many district/ city heads have established various institutions to 
open new vacancies. Consequently, the personnel structure at district/ city 
government has become fat. Cases have been reported where promotion of 
some people has occurred several times within one year, due to the needs for 
filling the new positions created by the regional government.68 In fact, the 
regulation only allows someone to be promoted at least two years after the 
previous promotion. This has not only led to an inefficient structure of 
government in the region but also created a burden on the regions which have 
67 See 'Protes Dinafikan, Pusat Kian Ngotot Revisi VU Otda: Akhiri Dewan-Kepala daerah Saling 
Jatuhkan (Protest Ignored, the Central Government to fight for revision of the law of local autonomy: to 
finish local parliament-regional beads conflicts)', Jawa Pos, April 8, 2002. 
68 See 'Menghambat Karir Pejabat Berprestasi' (To slow the career of achieving government officials), 
Interview with Soenarjo, the Head of Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Kepangkatan (Baperjangkat), 
Jawa Timur, Jawa Pos, May 9, 2002. 
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to provide more money, facilities and additional salary according to the level of 
position.69 
The Government also amended Law No. 18/1997 on Regional Taxes and Levies 
by issuing Law No. 34/2000. This amendment provides the district and 
municipal governments with new tax sources that can support the 
implementation of decentralisation. Some taxes that previously belonged to the 
provincial government were transferred to the district/ municipal government. 
The share of tax between the central and district government has also been 
rearranged through the new law. The issuance of Law No. 34/2000 was 
followed by the operational regulations. PP No. 65/2001 and PP No. 66/2001 
were issued. They are on Regional Taxes and Regional Levies, respectively. 
In terms of the structure of the administration of regional government, the 
Central Government has passed PP No. 84/2000, stipulating a limited number 
of local agencies that can be established in the regions. This PP has created 
controversy as it does not allow for consideration of workload and level of 
responsibility. For example, the PP stipulates a uniform echelon structure for all 
regional governments, meaning that a Dinas head in a small city I district is in 
the same echelon as those in a big city, but the latter have much wider scope 
and level of complexity of their workload7o. 
69 See 'Menggugat Pangkat Naga Bonar di Zaman Otonomi, Setahun Dipromosikan Tiga Kali (To protest 
the 'Naga Bonar position' in the era of local autonomy, one year promoted three times)', Jawa Pos, May 
9,2002 
70 See 'Structure of Regional Government Administration Under Debate', Decentralisation News, Issue 
No. 40, GTZSfDM, February 7, 2003. Just an example for this debate is by comparing a Dinas head in 
Suarabaya city, which is the second largest city oflndonesia having more than 2.6 population and GDP of 
Rp 41,400 billion, with Sabang city having 24,000 population and Rp 110 billion. 
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Figure 4.4. shows the government structure based on Law No 22/ 1999. 
I 
Figure 4.4. The Structure of Government in the Reformasi Era 
(Under Law 22/1999) 
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4.3.6.2. First Proposal of Revisions of Law No. 2211999: Pulling up the Power 
Less than one-year after the promulgation of the law No. 22/1999 anxieties 
were being voiced about the impact of the law. A team to revise the law was set 
up by the Ministry of Home Affairs by appointing Bhenyamin Hoessein to chair 
the revision of the law. 
President Megawati herself tended to give confusing comments on the existing 
law. She said that revision had to be done due to the poor implementation of 
the law. In relation to this comment, many argued that the poor 
implementation had been caused by the government, because it had not 
produced the implementing regulations. At the same time, she mentioned that 
the philosophy behind the current law was not correct, and revision would 
improve the overall concept of regional autonomy71. Unfortunately, the concept 
offered in the draft revision also resulted in a lot of questions related to the 
concept of delivering autonomy to the region. 
Inevitably, the intention of the Government to revise the law has brought about 
a controversial debate. The second draft revision of Law No. 22/1999 contained 
several articles which appear to be leading to recentralisation. A number of 
principles in the draft revision were totally different from those in the existing 
law. Due to so many changes being made, the draft was called a 'new law' 
rather than an 'amended law'. 
71 Megawati's speech delivered in the seminar 'Setahun Implementasi Kebijakan Otonomi Daerah (One 
Year' Implementation of the Local Autonomy) focused on the philosophy underlying Law No.22/1999, 
Yogyakarta, March 13, 2002. 
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The first controversial issue was over the integration of power between the 
Kepala Daerah and DPRD. In the draft revision, it was stated that to harmonise 
with the national system of government as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution 
and referring to local government theories, the regional government system in 
Indonesia should not have adopted the division into legislative, executive and 
judicative. Therefore, the term Regional Legislative Body (Badan Legislatif 
Daerah) and Regional Executive Body (Badan Eksekutif Daerah) were assumed to 
be improper. The division of power into trias politica would not be applied by 
the draft revision. In this regard, the Kepala Daerah was the highest ruler at the 
regional level, implying that the DPRD was subordinate to the Kepala Daerah. 
This is contrary to the terms of the existing law. 
The second controversial issue was the power of the Government vis-a-vis the 
DPRD. The right held by the Government to abolish the Regional House of 
People's Representatives is regarded as being more authoritarian than the 
New Order regime. Elucidation of Article 5 (1): 'In the NKRI, the existence of. 
the regions are under and depend on the Government. In this regard, the 
Government not only has the right to establish but also to abolish according to 
the criteria that shall be stipulated with regulations'. Those who are for 
autonomy criticised it saying that the Central Government was not supposed to 
have the right to dismiss DPRD. They said that the dismissal of DPRD is under 
the authority of the constitution and not that of the Government. 
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Hierarchical autonomy was another controversial issue in the draft revision. 
The relationship between the provinces and the districts/ cities would not be 
equal, but would be hierarchical. Like Law No. 5/1974, the draft revision 
introduced an idea where autonomy would be given to the provincial 
governments first and then be delivered to district and city governments. In this 
regard, the delivery of autonomy to the district/ city government would 
depend on the political will of the provincial government. 
The issues above led to resistance to the revised law by district/ city 
governments as well as DPRD. The Minister of Home Affairs responded to this 
by postponing the revision. 
4.3.6.3. Second Proposal of Revision of Law No. 2211999: Introducing Direct 
Election of Head and Deputy Head of the Regions 
In the middle of 2003, the discourse about revision of the law reappeared in the 
public debate. Regional governments had a different response on the revisions. 
In 2001, they generally rejected tehm; but in 2003, they accepted the revisions .. 
In November 2003, the Team chaired by Oentarto Sindung Mawardi72 was 
supposed to finish the draft and the Minister of Home Affairs would then 
surrender it shortly to the DPR. The new draft received several inputs from the 
academics and practitioners who had been involved in the existing Law No. 
22/1999, including the main thinker, Ryaas Rasyid. Overall, the new law would 
72 He is the Director General of General Government, the Department of Home Affairs. 
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comprise 152 Articles whereas the old law consists of only 134 Articles73. It was 
expected that the new law would be issued in 200474• 
During the debate, it was revealed that in the upcoming revision of Law 
22/1999, direct election will be introduced in the regions by lhe Minister of 
Home Affairs. This is very urgent since the oligarchy of political parties has 
been very apparent due to indirect election, which has enabled political parties 
to become too powerful. This direct election follows the direct election model of 
the President and Vice-President which was ratified and was to be 
implemented in 200475. Moreover, the draft law related to the hierarchy and the 
position of the MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD (Susunan dan Kedudukan, Susduk) 
has been ratified by the DPR on July 9, 2003. This law has abolished the 
DPRD' s right to elect the regional head and vice head (governor/vice 
governor, district head/ district vice head, city head/ city vice head). 
Consequently, the DPRD cannot terrriinate the region's head.76 
Referring to the Susduk Law, the revision of Law No. 22/1999 is directed 
toward a direct election that also provides an opportunity for individuals to 
compete in the election of regional head/vice head. However, individuals who 
have no affiliation with political parties have to obtain at least 1 % of votes of the 
73 See 'Depdagri Tuntaskan Draft Final Revisi UU Nomor 2211999 (The Ministry Home Affairs to Finish 
the Final Draft of Revision of Law No 22/1999)', Jawa Pos, November 6, 2003. 
74 The new law No 32/2004 on regional administration was issued in September 2004. 
75 The general elections for legislative members and for presidency were conducted on April 5 and July 5, 
2004 respectively. 
76 See 'Rumusan RUU Susduk DPRD Tidak Be1Wenang Lagi Pilih Kepala Daerah (The Formulation of 
the Draft Law of Hierarchy and Position of Local Assembly not to give Authority to Elect Region Head)' 
Kompas, July 19, 2003. 
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regional election. However, when they want to contest in the local elections, 
they still have to use a political party as a vehicle for competition. Individuals 
can be intellectuals, traditional leaders, religion leaders or public servants77. 
A major question appearing in the debate was whether the direct election of 
Governors, Bupatis and Mayors would be held in 2003 or later. In this regard, 
there were supposed to be elections for 13 governors for the remaining period 
of 2003 and 2 governors for the 2004 election. At district and city levels, 
elections for 97 bupatis and mayors were due in 2003 and 50 in 200478. However, 
it did not happen. These elections will be conducted in June 2005. 
Other issues were related to authority and institutional aspects, personnel 
affairs, and financial matters. Authority was to be devolved to the regions, 
based on three criteria: externality, accountability and efficiency. Personnel 
aspects are related to the issue of putra daerah (son of the region) that has 
hampered the promotion of people coming from outside the region. The 
personnel aspects in the draft revision are expected to cope with problems of 
employee transfer from one region to another. Financial matters will use the 
principle of 'money follows the function'. The more functions the local 
government does the more money the central government will provide. 
77 See 'Revisi UU No 2211999 tentang Pemerintah Daerah, Ca/on lndependen Bisa Jadi Ca/on Kepala 
Daerah (Revision of Law No 22/1999 on Regional Government, Independent Candidates Can Become a 
Region Head)', Kompas, September 12, 2003. 
78 See 'Revisi UU No 2211999 tentang Pemerintah Daerah, Calon Independen Bisa Jadi Ca/on Kepala 
Daerah (Revision of Law No 22/1999 on Regional Government, Independent Candidates Can Become a 
Region Head)', Kompas, September 12, 2003. 
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However, the revision of the law cannot escape criticism. According to 
Djohermansyah Djohan, most arguments used by the central government for 
the revision were based on its own perceptions of the implementation of the 
law rather than on the substance. He said that the Ministry of Horne Affairs 
was intending to revise the law due to some negative implications that regions 
do not understand the concept of autonomy nor its implementation. Also, 
according to him, the argument of the Ministry of Home Affairs to revise the 
law to avoid some interest groups wilfully causing chaos in Indonesia is not 
acceptable79. 
Although the Minister of Home Affairs has been ready with the above ideas 
and promised to submit the draft to the DPR, the Team established by the 
Minister of Home Affairs has to compete with the DPR that will put forward a 
different proposal. The DPR has agreed to use its initiative right to revise the 
law without involving the executive. There were 282 out of 500 parliament 
members who signed the agreement to use the initiative right, although fewer. 
than 100 members were seriously involved in the discussion which followed. 
According to the vice chairman of DPR, Tosari Widjaja, the decision was based 
on the number of people signing the agreement, not based on the attendanceso. 
79 Djohennansyah Djohan is an academic from IIP (Institute of Governmental Science). See 'Depdagri 
Tuntaskan Draf Final Revisi UU Nomor 2211999 (Depdagri to finish the final draft ofrevision of Law No 
22/1999)', Jawa Pos, November 06, 2003. 
80 See 'Dewan-Depdagri Beradu Cepat Merevisi UU Nomor 2211999 (Parliament and Ministry of Home 
Affairs to Compete to revise Law No. 22/1999)', Jawa Pos, November 13, 2003. 
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4.3.6.4. The Final Amendment of Law No. 2211999: Law No. 3212004 
After long discussions relating to revising Law No. 22/1999 involving various 
groups of society, Law No. 32/2004 was issued on 29 September 2004 to revise 
the existing Law No. 22/1999. Some principles such as the authority of the 
Central Government were not changed. The responsibilities of the Central 
Government are: foreign policy; defense; security; judicial; national monetary 
and finance; and religious affairs. However, there were some changes 
introduced in the new law. 
First, in terms of the position of DPRD, the new law has changed significantly. 
Article 40 of Law No 32/2004 states that 'DPRD is the regional house of 
representatives and it has the position as the element of regional government 
administration.' This is very different from the position of DPRD as referred to 
in Article 14 of Law No. 22/1999. Article 14 (1) states clearly that the 'Regional 
People's Representative Assembly as the Regional Legislative Institution and 
the Regional Government as the regional Executive Institution shall be. 
established in Regions'. In addition to this, Article 14 (2) states that 'Regional 
Government shall consist of the Head of Region and the regional apparatus'. 
Looking at the new law, it seems that the position of DPRD is similar with that 
stated in Law No. 5/1974. Law No 32/2004 Article 3 (1) says that 'The regional 
administration as referred to Article 2 paragraph 3 shall include: 
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a. Provincial administration comprising provincial regional government 
and provincial Regional House of Representatives (DPRD); 
b. District/City administration comprising district regional government and 
district/city Regional House of representatives (DPRD)'. 
Similar to the new law, Article 13 (1) of Law No. 5/1974 also states that 'The 
Regional Government consists of the Head of the Regions and the Regional 
House of Representatives'. This has created speculation over whether the new 
law would lead to a recentralization where the regional house of 
representatives would have the power vis-a- vis the regional executives. 
The second change relates to the election model for Heads of Regions. Although 
it is not stated specifically, the adoption of Law No. 32/2004 has given the 
opportunity for regional governments to set up direct regional election. In this 
respect, Article 56 (1) of Law mentions that 'The regional heads and deputy 
regional heads shall be democratically elected in one pair of candidates through 
direct, general, free, secret, honest and fair manners'. Unfortunately, this direct· 
election has not given support for individuals to compete as they have to be 
supported by political parties. Article 56 (2) saying that 'the pair of candidates 
as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be submitted by political parties or 
combined political parties' shows that there has to be a political vehicle for 
independent individuals. 
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Compared to the previous laws, it is clear that Law No. 32/2004 has promised 
good things for more democratic local governments. In Law No. 22/1999, the 
election of heads of regions was different from that in Law No. 5/1974. Article 
16 (1) of Law No. 1974 says that 'The Head of Region of the second level shall 
be nominated and elected by the Regional House of Representative from at 
least 3 (three) and at most 5 (five) candidates, which has been discussed and 
agreed together between the Leadership of the Regional House of 
Representative/Leadership of the Factions with the Governor Head of 
Region'. Further, in Article 16 (2), it is stated that 'Result of elections as 
intended in paragraph 1 of this article shall be proposed by the Regional House 
of Representative concerned to the Minister of Interior through the Governor 
Head of Region from at least 2 Candidates of which one of them should be 
appointed'. 
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4.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have discussed how the content of decentralisation policies 
changed according to the political situation in Indonesia. The duration of each 
decentralisation law in Indonesia was generally very short, except for Law No. 
5/1974. However, Law No. 5/1974 that was in force for around 25 years was 
meaningless in terms of its implementation. After more than two decades, the 
government regulations that were supposed to follow the law have not yet been 
issued by the central government. 
From the late colonial era to the early independence time, continuing into the 
reformasi era, it can be seen that the progress of the decentralisation policy in 
Indonesia is not linear. Centralisation and decentralisation have moved from 
one side to another and back again. The flavour of decentralisation has also 
been a tug-of-war between the notion of efficiency I effectiveness and of 
democratisation. The former relates to the interests of the central government in 
retaining its power and producing a contrary model, of centralisation. In Law 
No. 5/1974, the position of a region's head is dualistic, representing the central 
government in the region rather than the region's own aspirations. Regional 
houses of representatives are generally put under the control of the region's 
head. In terms of democratisation, the regional governments demand more 
power-sharing from the central government. The region's head is elected by 
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the regional house of representative and there is a clear separation of power 
between the region's head and the regional house of representative. 
Law No. 22/1999 is very radical in terms of several measures compared to the 
previous laws. The first is that the authority devolved to the district 
governments is very wide. Second, the non-hierarchical relationship between 
the district/ city government vis-a-vis the provincial government is also not 
found in the laws promulgated before. Third, the direct devolution from the 
central government to the district/ city governments has been a new experiment 
in regional autonomy in Indonesia. Fourth, the regional house of representative 
is powerful in controlling the region's head. Those characteristics show that 
decentralisation has been not only administrative, but also political. This has 
actually reduced the intervention of the central and provincial government in 
the district/ city government. 
The first draft revision of Law No. 22/1999 provoked a highly controversial 
debate since it was very clear that the central government intended to retain its 
power. The second draft revision has brought about two speculations. On the 
one hand, the direct election of a region's head would improve the 
governmental system at regional level through which the oligarchy of political 
parties would be replaced in a democratic election. On the other hand, the 
hidden agenda of the central government to retain control over regional 
government would make decentralisation go backwards. In this regard, the 
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direction of the new law would be the recentralisation of power, back into the 
hands of the central government. 
In general, from a legalistic approach, issues relating decentralisation to its 
impacts on the business sector did not exist in any law. Debates over responses 
of business people to decentralisation have only appeared recently in 
conjunction with the promulgation of Law No. 22 and 25 of 1999. 
The following chapter will discuss the implementation of the new laws in 
Sidoatjo. Focus will be on what policy has been created by the local government 
of Sidoatjo in responding to the new authority provided by the central 
government. In depicting the case of Sidoatjo, an analysis of the financial 
implications after decentralisation will be provided to better understand why 
the Sidoatjo government has adopted such policies. 
142 
Chapter Five 
DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT IN SIDOARJO 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the implementation of 
decentralisation in Sidoarjo since 1995. It focuses on how decentralisation 
affects the structure of local agencies as well as of local financing within the 
local government of Sidoarjo. Discussion will be related to how dependent the 
local government still is on the central government, even though authorities 
have been surrendered. The next discussion will be focused on the 
implementation of local autonomy in 1995 where Sidoarjo was one of the 26 
districts selected to be pilot areas for transferring functions ( urusan) from the 
central and provincial government. Further, the implementation of local 
autonomy begun in 2001 will be widely discussed. The chapter provides a 
setting for the following chapters that are concerned with the impacts of 
decentralisation on the business sector. 
5.2. Sidoarjo under Decentralisation Pilot Project in 1995 
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In 1995, the Indonesian government declared 'pilot areas' (daerah percontohan) 
for decentralisation. It was based on Government Regulation No. 8/1995 on the 
Delivery of Some Governmental Functions to 26 Pilot Project Level II Local 
Government (Tentang Penyerahan Sebagian urusan Pemerintahan Kepada 26 (Dua 
Puluh Enam) Daerah Tingkat II Percontohan)81, This followed the previous 
Government Regulation No. 45/1992 on the Implementation of Local 
Autonomy with its emphasis on the level II Local Government (Tentang 
Penyelenggaraan Otonomi Daerah dengan Titik Berat pad.a Daerah Tingkat II). Up to 
1997, only 60 per cent of the regulations necessary for the implementation of 
the Law No.5/1974 had been issued. The pilot project was to apply the section 
11 of Law No. 5 of 1974 where the district was the stress of local autonomy. This 
regulation was issued 21 years after the issuance of the law. It was stated in 
Article 11 (1): 'The stress of autonomy in the Region should be put on the 
Region of the second level'. The 26 districts represented about a tenth of all 
local governments, where each province was represented by one district. By 
this experiment, it was expected that in the next few years local autonomy 
would cover all local governments. 
The following table shows the districts assigned by the central government to 
be pilot areas of decentralisation based on Government Regulation No. 8/1995. 
The criteria for areas selected were actually based on the capacity of the local 
81 This pilot project was based on Home Minister Decree No. 105of1994 concerning the Implementation 
of Local Autonomy Pilot Project at Second Level Government, where Sidoarjo represented East Java 
Province and on Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 concerning the Transfer of Certain Government 
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governments compared to others in the same province. A study conducted by 
the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Gadjah Mada University (Fisipol 
UGM 1992) in collaboration with the Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan 
Departemen Dalam Negeri (Research and Development Board, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs), producing the score of every single district may be the basis of 
the selection . 
Table 5.1. Selected Local Government Pilot Project 
No. Names of Provinces Names of Districts 
1. Daerah Istimewa Aceh Aceh Utara 
2. Daerah Tingkat I Sumatra Utara Simalungun 
3. Daerah Tingkat I Sumatra Barat TanahDatar 
4. Daerah Tingkat I Riau Kam par 
5. Daerah Tingkat I Jambi Batanghari 
6. Daerah Tingkat I Sumatra Selatan MuaraEnim 
7. Daerah Tingkat I Lampung Lampung Tengah 
8. Daerah Tingkat I Bengkulu Bengkulu Selatan 
9. Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Barat Bandung 
10. Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Tengah Ban yum.as 
11. Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta Sleman 
12. Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur Sidoarjo 
13. Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Barat Sambas 
Affairs to 26 Sample regions Level II (Penyerahan Sebagian Urusan Pemerintah Kepada 26 Daerah 
Tingkat II Percontohan) 
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14. Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Tengah Kotawaringin Timur 
15. Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Selatan Tanah Laut 
16. Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Timur Kutai 
17. Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Utara Minahasa 
18. Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Tengah Donggala 
19. Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan Gow a 
20. Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Tenggara Kendari 
21. Daerah Tingkat I Bali · Badung 
22. Daerah Tingkat I Nusa Tenggara Barat Lombok Tengah 
23. Daerah Tingkat I Nusa Tenggara Timur Timor Tengah Selatan 
24. Daerah Tingkat I Timor Timur Aileu 
25. Daerah Tingkat I Maluku Maluku Tengah 
26. Daerah Tingkat I lrian Jaya Sorong 
Source: Government Regulation No. 8/1995. 
Under this scheme, 'all vertical line agencies, both from the technical 
departments in the District Governments (Kandep) as well as from the 
Provincial Governments (Cabang Dinas) have to be abolished, their tasks and 
functions, their personnel, their budgets and their assets have to be transferred 
to the apparatus of the autonomous district governments' (Yusuf, 1997: 3). 
Nationally, sectoral transfers were uniform. However, transfers from the first 
regional level were various; they depended on the importance of the sectors in 
the districts. For example, the transfers from the central government to district 
governments consisted of agricultural sub-sectors (food crops, animal 
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husbandry and cash crops), fisheries, transmigration, village development, civil 
records, social welfare, cooperatives and small business development, health, 
education, industry, mining, and employment. Therefore, the degree of 
autonomy provided through the pilot project was various (Beier 1997). 
In late 1994, the Ministry of Home Affairs (Menteri Dalam Negeri/Mendagri) and 
the Minister of Administrative Reform (Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur 
Negara/MENPAN) negotiated with other ministries about the conversion of the 
deconcentrated units of the central and provincial governments to units under 
the direction of the district head. The negotiation was to define the set of tasks 
of the sectoral ministries that had to be transferred to the pilot district 
governments. The responses were mixed: most ministries and provincial 
governors were supportive and cooperative, and some were reluctant. Some 
departments tried to maintain their presence in the district, some others just 
wanted to reduce the scope of the transfer of functions and some provincial 
governments sought to maintain some kind and level of income sources (Yusuf· 
1997). According to Beier (1997), before the pilot project, most districts had 
fewer than ten local agencies. However, with the transfer of functions, most 
now had more than 20 agencies. 
According to Devas (1997), the experiment of local autonomy in 1995 seemed to 
have little significance in stepping towards decentralisation. He argued that the 
Central Government had not really transferred substantial functions. On the 
other hand, quite small types of activities were transferred such as trade, 
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employment, cooperatives, and minor elements of health and education 
services. For example, the transfer from the central government in the field of 
education consisted of six functions (comprising 44 tasks), village development 
six functions (36 tasks), fisheries 13 function (36 tasks), employment ten 
functions. In the case of transfer of functions and tasks in Badung District of 
Bali, there were 165 functions (353 tasks) that had been transferred from both 
the central and provincial government (Beier 1997). Major activities were still 
retained by the central and provincial governments. Abolishing organisations 
of the central and provincial governments and merging them at the local level 
included transfer of personnel, budgets, assets and responsibilities. In terms of 
the amounts of money, the transfer of functions to the 26 local governments 
only involved around Rp 120 billion. This was less than 2 per cent of the total 
SDO (Sumbangan Daerah Otonom or Subsidy for Local Autonomy) grant to local 
government as a whole (Casson 2001: 359; Devas 1997). 
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Figure 5.1. Composition of Total Public Sector Outlays in District, 
Province and National G>vemment in Indonesia (1994, 1996, 2002) 
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If the data between 1994 and 1996 are compared, the composition has not 
changed significantly. In 1994, the percentage -composition of outlays for 
district, province and national governments was 10.67 per cent (Rp9.44 trillion), 
10.98 per cent (Rp9.71 trillion), and 78.34 per cent (Rp69.28 trillion; excluding 
inter-governmental transfers) respectively. In 1996, the composition changed 
very little to 13.31 per cent or Rp12.98 trillion (total district), 11.60 per cent or 
Rpll.31 trillion (total province) and 75.07 per cent or Rp73.19 trillion (total· 
national). With the government consisting of around 300 districts, 27 provinces 
and the national government, it is clear that the national/ central government 
was still dominating the budget. The changing policy of managing 
governmental affairs through the pilot projects of decentralisation had changed 
little in terms of financial domination. 
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The composition of total public sector outlays changed significantly just after 
the implementation of local autonomy introduced by Laws No. 22 and No. 25 of 
1999 that were in 2001. In 2002, the composition was 26.65 per cent or Rp84.24 
trillion (total district), 9.45 per cent or Rp30.06 trillion (total province) and 64.04 
per cent or 203.53 trillion (national/ central government) (see Figure 5.1). In this 
respect, domination of the national/ central government over the budget had 
decreased. The total percentage of district government outlays increased from 
13.31 per cent to 26.65 per cent (100 per cent increase). 
5.2.1. Restructuring Local Agencies 
Shortly after Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 was passed on April 21, 
1995, the Sidoarjo Government issued District Head Decision No. 15of1995 on 
the Technical Team of the Pilot Project of Local Autonomy of Sidoarjo 
Government (Tim Teknis Percontohan Otonomi Daerah Tingkat II dalam Lingkungan 
Pemerintah Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Sidoarjo). This team was to prepare the 
implementation of the pilot project. The preparation included the collection of · 
data on the existing condition of Sidoarjo before the delivery of new functions 
(urusan) as well as on the prospective condition of Sidoarjo and the possibility 
of receiving new functions from both the central and provincial government. 
The existing functions in Sidoarjo consisted of deconcentrated, decentralised 
and co-administrative (medebewind) functions.s2 They were as follows: 
82 Kantor Departmen (Kandep) represents the central government agency at the district/city level. Kantor 
Wilayah (Kanwil) is the central government agency at the provincial level. Dinas Kabupaten is 
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deconcentrated functions from the Department of Home Affairs (five 
functions); deconcentrated functions from the East Java Province (five 
functions); deconcentrated functions from the central government ministries 
out of the Department of Home Affairs (17 functions); decentralised functions 
(12 functions), and co-administrative (medebewind) functions (three functions) 
(Yusuf 1996: 86-87). 
district/city government-owned agency. Cabang Dinas (Branch of Dinas) is the provincial government-
owned agency located in district/city government. Kantor is an office belonging to the central 
government. 
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Table 5.2. Deconcentrated Functions from the Department of Home Affairs 
to Sidoarjo Local Government 
No Functions Implementing Agency 
1. Rural Community Development Kantor Pembangunan Desa 
2. Nation Building Development BP7 
3. Monitoring and Controlling lnspektorat Wilayah Kabupaten 
4. Mass and Political Organisations Kantor Sosial dan Politik 
5. Community Security and Order Kantor Markas Wilayah Pertahanan 
Sipil 
Source: Yusuf, A., 1996. Peranan Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat II Sidoarjo Dalam 
Rangka Mempersiapkan Pelaksanaan Titik Berat Otonomi Pada daerah Tingkat II, 
Studi Tentang Penyerahan Urusan Dalam Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Daerah Pada 
Daerah Tingkat II (The Role of the Sidoatjo Local Government Level II in 
Preparing the Implementation of Local Autonomy at the Level II Government, 
A Study of the Delivery of Functions in the Pilot Project of Autonomy}, Sekolah 
Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi, Bandung: 86. 
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Table 5.3. Deconcentrated Functions from the East Java Provincial 
Government to Sidoarjo Local Government 
No. Functions Implementing Agency 
1. Labour Branch of Dinas Perburuhan 
2. Public Works Branch of Dinas Pekerjaan 
Umum Cipta Kary a (Human 
Settlement Affairs) 
Branch of Dinas Pekerjaan 
Umum Bina Marga 
(Infrastructure Affairs) 
Branch of Dinas Pekerjaan 
Um um Pengairan (Irrigation 
Affairs) 
3. Revenue Branch of Dinas Pendapatan 
West Sidoarjo 
Branch of Dinas Pendapatan East 
Sidoarjo 
4. Road and Traffic Affairs Branch of Dinas LLAJR 
5. Social Branch of Dinas Sosial 
Source: Yusuf, A., 1996. Peranan Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat II Sidoarjo Dalam 
Rangka Mempersiapkan Pelaksanaan Titik Berat Otonomi Pada daerah Tingkat II, 
Studi Tentang Penyerahan Urusan Dalam Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Daerah Pada 
Daerah Tingkat II (The Role of the Sidoarjo Local Government Level II in 
Preparing the Implementation of Local Autonomy at the Level Il Government, 
A Study of the Delivery of Functions in the Pilot Project of Autonomy), Sekolah 
Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi, Bandung: 86 
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Table S.S. Decentralised Functions from the Central and East Java Provincial 
Government to Sidoarjo Local Government 
No. Functions Implementing Agency 
1. Public Works 
2. Health 
3. Park Cleaning and Maintenance 
4. Revenue 
5. Markets 
6. Agriculture 
7. Plantations 
8. Cattle 
9. Fisheries 
10. Education and Culture 
11. Local Government-Owned 
Enterprises 
12. Health Services 
Dinas Pekerjaan Umum 
Dinas Kesehatan 
Dinas Kebersihan dan Pertamanan 
Dinas Pendapatan 
Dinas Pasar 
Dinas Pertanian Tanaman Pangan 
Dinas Perkebunan 
Dinas Peternakan 
Dinas Perikanan 
Dinas Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan 
PDAM Delta Tirta (Water 
Company) 
Apotik Delta Husada 
Percetakan Delta Grafika 
RSUD 
Source: Yusuf, A., 1996. Peranan Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat II Sidoarjo Dalam 
Rangka Mempersiapkan Pelaksanaan Titik Berat Otonomi Pada daerah Tingkat II, 
Studi Tentang Penyerahan Urusan Dalam Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Daerah Pada 
Daerah Tingkat II (The Role of the Sidoarjo Local Government Level II in 
Preparing the Implementation of Local Autonomy at the Level II Government, 
A Study of the Delivery of Function$ in the Pilot Project of Autonomy), Sekolah 
Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi, Bandung: 87 
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Table 5.6. Co-Administrative (Medebewind) Functions in Sidoarjo Local 
Government 
No. Functions Implementing Agency 
1. Civil Registration and Services Kantor Catatan Sipil 
2. Small-Scale Business Credit and Bagian Perekonomian 
Assistance Kandep Koperasi 
3. Presidential Instruction Projects 
(Inpres Projects) 
• IPJK 
• IPJP 
• Inpres Dati II 
• Inpres SD /MI 
• Inpres Kesehatan 
• Inpres Bantuan Desa 
• IDT 
VinasPUV 
VinasPUV 
Bagian Penyusunan Program 
Vinas PUV dan Vinas Vikbud 
Vinas Kesehatan 
Kantor Bangdes 
Kantor Bangdes 
Source: Yusuf, A., 19%. Peranan Pemerintah Vaerah Tingkat II Sidoarjo Valam 
Rangka Mempersiapkan Pelaksanaan Titik Berat Otonomi Pada daerah Tingkat II, 
Studi Tentang Penyerahan Urusan Valam Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Vaerah Pada 
Vaerah Tingkat II (The Role of the Sidoarjo Local Government Level II in 
Preparing the Implementation of Local Autonomy at the Level II Government, 
A Study of the Delivery of Functions in the Pilot Project of Autonomy}, Sekolah 
Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi, Bandung: 88 
According to the explanation of Article 6 of Government Regulation No .. 
8/1995, the delivery of functions to local government includes personnel. 
However, the transfer of personnel of Kantor Departemen (Kandep) was divided 
into two. Those who had Grade (Golongan)B3 II-d and below would be 
transferred to become local government personnel (pegawai daerah), whereas 
83 Golongan (Grade) in the Indonesian public service consists ofl-a to 1-d; II-a to 11-d; III-a to IIId and 
IV-a to IV-e. Public servants having a primary school certificate at the first appointment will have Grade 
I-a; Senior High School Certificate with Grade II-a; Bachelor Degree with Grade 11-b and Sarjana 
(honours) Degree with III-a. Normally, each public servant is promoted by one grade automatically every 
four years. 
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those who had Grade III-a and above would remain as central government 
personnel assisting (pegawai diperbantukan) local government. 
In the case of Sidoarjo, the number of personnel of local government before the 
pilot project and after was as follows: 
Table 5.7. Comparison of Personnel Before and After Pilot Project and 
Number of Transfers from the Central Government and Provincial 
Government in Sidoarjo Local Government 
No. Type Before Pilot Number Total 
Project (1994) Transferred 
(1995) 
1. Grade I 898 329 1,227 
2. Grade II 1,907 3,205 5,112 
3. Grade III 493 3,052 3,545 
4. Grade IV 11 20 31 
Total 3,309 6,606 9,915 
Source: Pemerintah Kabupaten Sidoarjo, 2002. Sidoarjo in Figures 2002. 
Table 5.7 shows that the total personnel of the Sidoarjo Local Government was 
9,915 people. However, since the new personnel in Grades III and IV consisting 
of 3,052 and 20, respectively, still belonged to the central government, the total 
local government personnel comprised only 6,843 people. In this regard, the 
central government personnel (in Kandep) were under the control of the central 
government. The central government could still post them to Jakarta or other 
areas across Indonesia. There was no difference in terms of the level of salary 
between the central, provincial and local government personnel. 
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The transfer of personnel came from two types of government level. First, 
Kantor departemen or kandep84 (local offices of the central government ministries) 
carrying out the deconcentrated functions at the second level were transferred 
to local governments. These kandeps were previously responsible to the central 
government rather than to the head of the district in which they operated their 
activities. This was due to their status of personnel administration that was part 
of the central government apparatus. Second, Cabang Dinas Tingkat I (branch 
offices of provincial agencies existing at the district level) were also transferred 
to local governments. 
Considering the existing and prospective conditions of Sidoarjo, the technical 
team arranged local drafting of regulations on the creation of local agencies, as 
a consequence of the transfer of functions. It could be creating new agencies or 
restructuring the existing agencies, depending on whether there had or had not 
been agencies needed to run the new functions transferred. At that time, 25 
local regulation drafts were prepared by the team. However, only 22 were 
followed up by local regulations since the functions of religious affairs under 
the Kandep of Religion and the functions of information under the Kandep of 
Information were still retained by the central government; and a local 
regulation for traditional markets was not done due to there having been no 
changes in the previous local regulations governing the same matter. 
84 Kandep (Kantor Departemen) is local office of the central government at the district level whereas 
Kanwil (Kantor Wilayah) is local office of the central government ministries at the provincial level. 
Dinas Kabupaten is local government service belonged to district government whereas Dinas Propinsi is 
provincial government service. Cabang Dinas Propinsi is provincial government service working at the 
district level. 
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Table 5.8. Proposals of Local Agencies Prepared by the Technical Team in 
Sidoarjo 
No. Names of Agency 
1. Local Agency for Revenue 
2. Local Agency for Education and Culture 
3. Local Agency for Health 
4. Local Agency for Agriculture 
5. Local Agency for Fishery 
6. Local Agency for Cattle 
7. Local Agency for Plantation 
8. Local Agency for Public Works (Dinas Bina Marga for Infrastructure 
Affairs and Dinas Cipta Karya for Human Settlement Affairs) 
9. Local Agency for Public Works (Dinas Pengairan for Irrigation Affairs) 
10. Local Agency for Traffic and Road Vehicle (LLAJR) 
11. Local Agency for Transmigration 
12. Local Agency for Tourism 
13. Local Agency for Industry 
14. Local Agency for Social Welfare 
15. Local Agency for Labour Force 
16. Local Agency for Exploration 
17. Local Agency for Cooperative 
18. Local Agency for Information 
19. Local Agency for Religion 
20. Local Agency for Trade 
21. Local Agency for Population and Civil Registration 
22. Local Agency for Social and Political Affairs 
23. Local Agency for Rural Community Development 
24. Local Agency for Traditional Market 
25. Local Agency for Park Cleaning and Maintenance 
Source: Yusuf, A., 1996. Peranan Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat II Sidoarjo Dalam Rangka 
Mempersiapkan Pelaksanaan Titik Berat Otonomi Pada daerah Tingkat II, Studi Tentang 
Penyerahan Urusan Dalam Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Daerah Pada Daerah Tingkat II 
(The Role of the Sidoarjo Local Government Level II in Preparing the Implementation 
of Local Autonomy at the Level II Government, A Study of the Delivery of Functions 
in the Pilot Project of Autonomy), Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi, Bandung: 93. 
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Although every single rule for the transfer was already on paper, tensions 
between different layers of government still occurred. For example, some 
functions under Dinas Lalu-Lintas Angkutan ]alan Raya (Local Agency for Traffic 
and Road Vehicles) such as for vehicle checks (uji kir kendaraan), route permits 
(ijin trayek) and public weighbridges (jembatan timbang) were still retained by 
the provincial government. Those functions were categorised as 'wet 
functions' (urusan basah) since they could produce huge amounts of money for 
local government and individual officials.as For local government, local 
autonomy was assumed to be a burden as the transfer of functions was still 
selective, and based on the source of income of the giver. 
5.2.2. Restructuring Sources of Local Income 
5.2.2.1. Sources of Local Government Income Before Pilot Project 
Law No 5/1974 provided the basis for local governments to implement local 
autonomy. However, the basis of local taxes and levies was still governed 
under Undang-Undang Darurat (Emergency Law) No. 11/1957 Tentang Peraturan · 
Umum Pajak Daerah (On General Regulation on Local Taxes) and Undang-
Undang Darurat No. 12/1957 Tentang Peraturan Umum Retribusi Daerah (On 
General Regulation on Local Levies). The law on state taxes that can be 
delivered to local government as well as the law on basic principles of local 
85 See, 'Soedjito: Urusan DLLAJ harus tuntas bu/an depan (Soedjito: functions of DLLAJ must be 
finished next month)', Surya, January 20, 1996,. See also, 'Otonomi Daerah Tingkat II Dilepas Setengah 
Hati (Local autonomy were given half-heartedly), Surabaya Post, February l, 1996. Interviews were also 
conducted with some officials in Sidoarjo in March 2002. 
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taxes and levies related to Articles 56 and 58 of Law No. 5/1974 had not been 
issued. 
In running local government, there are three sources of income (Koswara 2001: 
184): 
1. Local original income (Pendapatan Asli Daerah) 
2. Government subsidy (Pendapatan yang berasal dari pemberian pemerintah) 
3. Other legal incomes (Lain-lain pendapatan yang sah). 
Local original income consisted of local taxes (pajak daerah), local levies (retribusi 
daerah), and local government owned-company profits (laba perusahaan daerah), 
and other legal income. 
5.2.2.1.1. Local Original Income (Pendapatan Asli Daerah or PAD) 
5.2.2.1.1.1. Local Taxes Before Pilot Project 
According to UU Darurat (Emergency Law) No. 11/1957, there were 37 local 
taxes that had been devolved to local government (Koswara 2001). However, in 
Sidoarjo there were only 14 local taxes adopted, as follows: 
1. Tax on Livestock Animal Slaughtering (Pajak Penyembelihan Ternak) 
2. :rax on Development I (Pajak Pembangunan I) 
3. Tax on Radio (Pajak Radio) 
4. Tax on Foreigners (Pajak Bangsa Asing) 
5. Tax on Public Entertainment (Pajak Hiburan) 
6. \ :rax on Advertisement (Pajak Reklame) 
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7. Tax on Dogs (Pajak Anjing) 
8. Tax on Sale on Alcoholic Drinks (Pajak Minuman Keras) 
9. Tax on Non-Motor Vehicles (Pajak Kendaran Bukan Bermotor) 
10. Tax on Company Registration (Pajak Pendaftaran Perusahaan) 
11. Tax on Video Rental (Pajak Persewaan Video) 
12. Tax on Public Street Lighting (Pajak Penerangan Jalan Umum) 
13. Tax on Swallow Bird' s Nest (Pajak Sarang Burung Walet) 
14. Tax on Public Street Lighting for Non-PLN (Pajak Penerangan Jalan Umum 
Non-PLN) 
Among the local taxes transferred to local government, only seven local taxes 
had made significant contribution to local income. The other local taxes were 
not efficient since their potential was too small. The potential local taxes were: 
Pajak Hiburan (Tax on Entertainment), Pajak Pembangunan I (Tax on 
Development I), Pajak Penerangan Jalan (Tax on Public Lighting), Pajak 
Pendaftaran Perusahaan (Tax on Company Registration), Pajak Reklame (Tax on 
Advertisement), Pajak Potong Hewan (Tax on Animal Slaughtering) dan Pajak 
Bangsa Asing (Tax on Foreign People). 
According to Koswara (2001: 190), the contribution of local taxes to local income 
of local government did not change. In 1988 and 1990, the total income in 
Indonesia from local taxes was only Rp104.4 billion and 158.6 billion a year 
respectively. This means that every local government level II only received 
about Rp370.5 million in 1988 and Rp543 million in 1990. Compared to the 
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national average, Sidoarjo government received 145 per cent more (Rp 
784,825,000) in 1990. 
5.2.2.1.1.2. Local Levies Before Pilot Project 
All over Indonesia, there were about 137 kinds of local levies applied in local 
government level II. A levy is different from a tax because a levy is income 
received by local government based on services it provides directly to 
individual persons or corporations. The name of the levy can vary from one 
region to another. The most significant amount of levies came from the levy on 
markets, the levy on hospitals and health centres, levy on building permits, the 
levy on bus and taxi terminals and the levy on permits for agriculture and 
forest products. 
Overall, the income from levies in Indonesia amounted to Rp222.4 billion in 
1988 and 334.6 billion in 1990 (Koswara 2001: 192). The average amount of 
levies in every district was 767 million and 1,145.8 million rupiahs in 1988 and 
1990 respectively. In the case of Sidoarjo, the local income from levies was· 
Rp5,545,424,000 in 1990 (484 per cent compared to the national average in the 
same year). In 1990/1991, the average national contribution of local levies to the 
total local budget was 56.2 per cent, whereas in Sidoarjo was 79 per cent. This 
revenue came from 28 types of levies applied by the Sidoarjo local government. 
The highest income in 1996/1997 from the levies was from: hospital services, 
temporary building permits, traditional markets, bridge dispensation. In 
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1996/1997, hospital services contributed 40 per cent to the total levies, whereas 
the other three levies were 21 per cent, 12 per cent, and 7 per cent, respectively. 
5.2.2.2.1.3. Local Government-Owned Enterprise Profits 
The profits obtained from the activities of local government enterprises are 
further important sources of income for local government. Law No. 5 of 1974 
gives the opportunity for local governments to establish profit-making 
enterprises. However, the law that was used for the basis for the operation of 
local government enterprises was Law No. 5of1962. The new law has not been 
issued up to now. 
In most local governments, the role of local government enterprises was still 
small as can be seen from their contribution to local government revenue. In 
1990/1991, the national average income of local government enterprises was Rp 
268,000,000 per year. Sidoarjo's income from local government enterprises was 
lower than the national average, at Rp153,750,000 in the same year. Sidoarjo 
runs several enterprises: Delta Tirta (clean water company), Delta Grafika 
(printing company) and Delta Husada (pharmaceutical company). In 2001, 
Sidoarjo established a new Bank Perkreditan Rakyat or BPR (credit institution) 
that had previously served public servants. Total income of local government 
enterprises in Sidoarjo in 2001 was Rpl,880,000,000 comprising the water 
company (Rp900,000,000), the printing company (Rp55,000,000) and the 
financial institution (Rp925,000,000) (Pemerintah Kabupaten Sidoarjo 2002). 
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5.2.2.1.2. Government Subsidies Before Pilot Project 
Government subsidies consist of Sumbangan Daerah Otonom /SDO (Subsidies for 
Local Autonomy) and Bantuan Pembangunan (Development Grant). According 
to Devas (1997: 204), SDO provided more than 40 per cent of local government 
routine expenditure through which 95 per cent of the SDO was to pay for staff. 
The contribution of SDO increased dramatically where the percentage of SDO 
over local government expenditure was 69.97 per cent nationally in 1988/1989. 
In 1993I1994, Sidoarjo received SDO from the central government of 
Rp5,435,165,000, meaning that the proportion of SOO to routine expenditure 
was 34 per cent in 1993/1994. As much as 98 per cent of the SOO was used to 
pay local government salaries: RpS,321,914,000 in 1993/1994 (Sadan Statistik 
Sidoarjo 2002). 
Subsidies used for non-salary expenditure were divided into two: bantuan 
(assistance) and ganjaran (grant). There were four kinds of uses of the bantuan: 
(1) government primary schools; (2) local government-owned hospitals; (3) the. 
development of local tourism; and (4) the development of local mining 
exploration. Grants obtained by local government were used for: (1) social and 
political activities; (2) civil defence; (3) Ideological Upgrading; (4) youth and 
scouts; (5) operational costs of vice district head; (6) village assembly 
development; (7) environmental degradation; (8) local financial administration 
improvement; (9) agricultural counselling unit; and (10) operational costs of 
sub-district governments (Koswara 2001: 202). 
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Bantuan Pembangunan that was popularly called Bantuan Instruksi Presiden or 
Inpres (President Instruction Grant) comprised bantuan umum (block grant) and 
bantuan khusus (specific grant) (Koswara 2001). Principally, the objective of 
bantuan pembangunan was different from that Law No. 32 of 1956 on the 
Balance of Finance between the Central and Local Governments (Tentang 
Perimbangan Keuangan antara Pusat dan Daerah) that emphasised the principles 
of sharing of financial sources and of delivering some of the state's income to 
local governments. Bantuan pembangunan focused on the transfer of grants to 
local governments based on the division of tasks and responsibilities between 
the central and local governments covering decentralisation, deconcentration 
and co-administration (medebewind). 
5.2.2.1.3. Other Legal Sources of Income 
Local governments can obtain other legal sources of income through borrowing 
either from domestic or international financial institutions. However, no local 
governments had any borrowing (Koswara 2001). 
5.2.2.2. Reform of Local Taxes and Levies During Pilot Project 
Just two years after the implementation of the pilot project of autonomy, the 
Government of Indonesia issued a law that changed the existing law related to 
local taxes and levies. Law No. 18of1997 on Local Taxes and Levies issued on 
May 23, 1997 was intended to reform local taxes and levies toward a simple, 
just, effective and efficient system enabling people's participation in the 
development process. This law abolished several taxes taken by district 
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governments, reducing them from 14 to 6 kinds of taxes. It is true that several 
taxes such as tax on radio, video rental, alcoholic drinks and dogs are not 
efficient any more since the operational costs are more expensive than the 
income. However, for local levies allowed under the previous law, the new law 
had led to a problem for local governments because it caused a decrease in local 
income. In the case of Sidoarjo, in 1995/96 income from tax on company 
registration and tax on animal slaughtering was quite high: Rp237.38 million 
and Rp70.37 million respectively (Pemerintah Kabupaten Sidoarjo 2002). 
Therefore, due to Law No. 18of1997, Sidoarjo lost 300 million rupiahs a year in 
value from the two taxes. 
Based on Law No. 18 of 1997, the tax on development I (Pajak Pembangunan I) 
was changed to a tax on hotels and restaurants; taxes on local natural resource 
exploitation · and taxes on the use of underground and surface water were 
introduced. Therefore, the types of tax of local government based on Law No. 
18of1997 were as follows: 
1. Tax on Hotels and Restaurants (Pajak Hotel dan Restoran) 
2. Tax on Public Entertainment (Pajak Hiburan) 
3. Tax on Advertisement (Pajak Reklame) 
4. Tax on Public Street Lighting (Pajak Penerangan f alan) 
5. Tax on Local Natural Resource Exploitation (Pajak Pengambilan dan 
Pengolahan Bahan Galian Golongan C) 
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6. Tax on Use of Underground and Surface Water (Pajak Pemanfaatan Air Bawah 
Tanah dan Air Permukaan) 
Government Regulation No. 20 of 1997 on Local Levies stipulates the levies 
allowed by the central government to local governments. The levy consists of 
general service levy (retribusi pelayanan umum) (Article 2), business service levy 
(retribusi pelayanan usaha) (Article 3) and permit service levy (retribusi pelayanan 
perijinan) (Article 4). The general service levy consists of 11 types of levy, 
whereas the business service levy and the permit service levy comprise 13 and 6 
types of levy, respectively. However, the Sidoarjo government after Law No. 18 
of 1997 still had 33 types of levy. 
5.3. Sidoarjo Under Law No. 22 and 25 of 1999 
Local autonomy based on Law No. 22 of 1999 and No. 25 of 1999 was enacted 
on January 1, 2001. This research was started on November 10, 2001, meaning 
that the new laws were less than one year old. However, during my research, 
the dynamics of change at the local level were quite obvious. 
In 2000, the central government had also released a new law related to local 
taxes and levies. The previous law No. 18/1997 was amended to adapt to the 
new law No. 22 and 25of1999. The kinds of tax by local government based on 
Law No. 34 of 2000 are as follows: 
1. Tax on Hotels (Pajak Hotel) 
2. Tax on Restaurants (Pajak Restoran) 
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3. Tax on Entertainment (PajakHiburan) 
4. Tax on Advertisement (Pajak Reklame) 
5. Tax on Public Street Lighting (Pajak Penerangan ]alan Umum) 
6. Tax on Local Natural Resources Exploitation (Pajak Galian Tambang 
Golongan C) 
7. Tax on Parking (Pajak Parkir) 
After year 2000, the Sidoarjo government had 31 groups of levies, consisting of 
a total of 42 types of levies. This means that after local autonomy, the number of 
levy has increased significantly from 33 to 40 different types. 
For local governments, all kinds of tax have been determined by the central 
government. It is probably difficult for local governments to introduce any new 
tax without consulting with the existing laws related to taxation. For example, 
the Agency of Local Revenue of Sidoarjo is not allowed to charge on catering 
activities since Article 1 (2.b) of Law No. 34 of 2000 states that the tax on 
restaurants excludes catering businessess6. This exclusion is aimed to avoid 
charging catering services provided by the airport authority. The only thing 
they can do to raise revenue is to introduce new levies. 
86 According to several respondents, catering businesses within the airport authority belong to people who 
are close to central government officials in Jakarta. The tax on golf courses belongs to Jakarta. 
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5.3.1. The Economic Burden of Decentralisation on Local 
Government 
Local autonomy is not only a blessing but also a burden that has to be handled 
by local governments. With local autonomy, the number of local government 
employee in Sidoarjo has increased from 3,996 to 6,843 in 1995 and to 13,257 in 
1999 (Visi 2002) The new employees come mostly from the department of 
education and department of health. They consist of teachers, doctors and 
nurses who previously belonged to the central government. 
The implication of the increase in the number of employees is that local 
government has had to increase its local budget. Figure 5.2 shows that in 1992, 
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah or APBD (local budget) of the Sidoarjo 
Pemda was around 31 billion rupiahs. In 1996, the total budget more than 
doubled, to 65 billion rupiahs. However, it has increased dramatically from 157 
billion rupiahs in 2000 to 287 billion rupiahs in 2001 and 438 billion rupiahs in 
200287• In 1999, the fiscal year was changed from April-March to January-. 
December. Therefore, the total budget for the year 2000 was for only 9 months 
(from April 1999 to December 1999), and comprised 158 billion rupiahs, lower 
than for the previous year (year 1999 was 172 billion). Thus, within ten years, 
the local budget of Sidoarjo has increased by 1,413 per cent, from 31 billion in 
1992 to 438 billion 2002. 
87 On August 28, 2003, the Sidoarjo local assembly ratified the change in the local budget from 529.45 
billion to 551.78 billion rupiahs. Unfortunately, detailed expenses and revenues were not mentioned in 
the report. See 'Dewan Setujui Perubahan APBD 2003 (Local Assembly agreed to the Changes of 2003 
Local Budget)', www.sidoarjo.go.id/berita/apbd 2003.php printed on September 7, 2003. 
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Figure 5.2. Sidoarjo Government Budget and Local Original Income 
(PAD) (1992-2002) 
(in billion rupiah) 
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Source: APBD Sidoarjo (Sidoarjo Budget}, various issues, 1992-2002. 
Since the implementation of Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999, local governments 
have had two different sources of revenue: local original local income (PAD) 
and decentralisation funds (dana perimbangan)BB. For original local income, the 
local government has to rely on local taxes and levies, whereas for 
decentralisation funds the local government has to have a good lobby with the 
central government. Decentralisation funds consist of tax and non-tax sharing 
from the central and provincial government as well as general allocation funds 
(DanaAlokasi Umum or DAU). The central government provides DAU to cover 
local government salaries. In 2002, the need for salaries of the Sidoarjo 
Government was Rp233.02 billion whereas the DAU was Rp266 billion, 
meaning that 88 per cent of the DAU was for public servants' salaries. 
88 Decentralisation Fund (Dana Perimbangan) consists of a share of tax revenue, non-tax natural 
resources share, general allocation fund (DAU: Dana Alokasi Umum), specific allocation fund (DAK: 
Dana Alokasi Khusus) and contingency fund. 
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In terms of local original income, the Sidoarjo Local Government has been very 
successful in expanding several sources. In 1992, local original income was only 
8.43 billion whereas in 2002 it reached 72.89 billion rupiahs. This means that in 
ten years there was an increase of 864.65 per cent. It was very obvious that 
during the early period of local autonomy implementation in 2000 the local 
original income was only Rp33,149,760,000, however, this grew to 
Rp53,509,219,400 in 2001 and Rp72,889,999,500 in 2002. Compared to other 
districts and cities in East Java, Sidoarjo is the second largest district in terms of 
local revenue after City Surabaya (208 billion rupiahs). In 2002, most districts 
and cities in East Java had a budget of less than 25 billion rupiahs. 
While the local government may have increased its local income, the gap 
between the total budget and the local income has widened. In 2001 and 2002, 
the gap was Rp227.69 billion and 365.90 billion, respectively. These differences 
have led to the dependence of the Sidoarjo Local Government on the central 
government funds (see Appendix 4). 
However, the increase in local budget has been spent mostly on routine 
expensess9. Figure 5.3. shows a tendency for the local government of Sidoarjo to 
absorb the local budget more for routine expenses than for development 
expenditure. In 1992, the difference between development and routine expenses 
was 58 per cent and 42 per cent whereas in 1996 the percentage was the same. 
89 Routine expenditure is the costs of maintaining ·the internal bureaucracy: salary, office equipment, 
maintenance, travelling costs. 
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In 1997, routine expenses were only 46.86 per cent whereas in 2002 they were 
76.27 per cent. In contrast, development expenses have decreased from 53.13 
per cent in 1997 to 23.72 per cent in 2002. In fact, the initial draft of the 2002 
local budget allocated only 13 per cent for development expenses9o. Looking at 
this broadly, only three local governments in 2001 allocated more than 50 per 
cent of their budget for development expenses: Kabupaten Sumenep (56.6 per 
cent), Kota Madiun (53 per cent), and Kota Batu (73.5 per cent). Most of the local 
governments in East Java allocated less than 30 per cent in fiscal year 2002. 
Even Bojonegoro district allocates 8.30 per cent (see Appendix 4). This is an 
indication that resources collected through taxes, levies and grants from the 
central government are mostly used for the internal needs of the bureaucracy. 
In 2002, total local budget is Rp438,787,626,770.00; 76 per cent of this (or 
Rp334,703,499,500.00) is for routine expenses and 60 per cent of the routine 
expenses (or Rp233,020,061,781.00) is for salaries. 
90 See Jawa Pos December 27, 2001 
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Figure 5.3.Comparison between Development and Routine Expenditure of ' 
Sidoarjo District Gwemment 
(19'J2-2002) 
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Source: APBD Sidoatjo, various issues, 1992-2002. 
However, the higher expenditure of local government on routine activities does 
not mean that the salaries of the local government personnel have increased. 
There is no difference in terms of salary between before and after autonomy 
since the salary structure is still uniform for all local government, except for 
certain remote areas where public servants have a salary loading due to the 
higher cost of living such as in West Papua. The exception has been local· 
assembly members who have received an increase in salary. The salary of local 
assembly members depends on the local government's original ·revenue. The 
more the local government's original income, the higher the local assembly 
members' sa laries. 
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Figure 5.4. shows the trend of local original income and development expenses 
compared to the total local budget. Both have decreased significantly, especially 
since 1998. The introduction of the decentralisation policy in 1999 seemed not to 
change the trend. An increase in the proportion of development expenses 
occurred in 2002 when it increased from 16 per cent in 2001 to 24 per cent in 
2002. According to a local pejabat (a person who hold a position) the initial 
budget allocation for development expenses was actually only 14 per cent, 
lower than that of the previous year. The local Legislative Assembly forced the 
executive to increase the proportion of the development expenses91. 
It is interesting to compare between what the Sidoatjo Government receives as 
PAD92 and what the East Java Province obtains from two kinds of taxes93 
coming from Sidoatjo district. According to the available data (Sidoatjo in 
Figures 2000), in 1994, the original income of the Sidoatjo Government from 
taxes and levies was similar to that of the East Java Province extracted from 
Sidoarjo. The local income was 12.72 billion rupiahs whereas the income taken. 
by the East Java Provincial Government from Sidoatjo was 12.88 billion. 
However, since 2000, the amount of money contributed by Sidoatjo to the East 
Java Province has been much higher than that going to the Sidoatjo 
Government. In 2001, the Sidoatjo Government and the East Java Province 
received Rp53,509,219,400.00 and Rp80,641,426,093.00 respectively. In 2002, the 
91 Interview with a local pejabat from the Local Planning Agency, April 25, 2002. 
92 PAD in Sidoarjo consists of six kinds of taxes, 22 kinds of levies, 3 kinds of local government-owned 
companies, income from 6 dinas, and six kinds of other revenues. 
93 Tax on motor vehicles and on transfer of motor vehicle ownership 
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difference was more significant since tax on underground and surface water 
use was transferred from the district to become a provincial tax. The difference 
between the district income and the provincial income from the same area is 
72.89 billion rupiahs and 91.7 billion rupiahs, respectively. In addition to this, 
the amount of tax taken from Sidoatjo by the central government is much 
greater. This income consists of income tax (individual and corporation) and 
value added tax94 (GST). In 1995/1996, Sidoatjo contributed Rp288.5 billion to 
the central government when the amount of PAD was only Rp20.11 billion9s, 
whereas in 2000 it was 1.5 -1.8 trillion rupiahs96 when PAD was only 33 billion 
rupiahs, that is 50 times the PAD. 
Figure 5.4. Percentage of Sidoarjo's Original District Income (PAD) 
and Development Expenses (DE) to Total Budget (TB) 
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Source: APBD Sidoarjo, (Sidoarjo Budget), various issues, 1992-2002. 
94 It is very difficult to obtain this kind of data from the regional office of taxation in Sidoarjo because 
they need a letter of authorisation from Jakarta. This data is cited from newspapers and is based on the 
statement of a Sidoarjo Government official. 
95 See 'PPh dan PPN KPP Sidoarjo lampau Target (PPh and PPN KPP Sidoarjo Beyond the Target)" 
Karya Darma, March 29, 1996. See also, 'PPN dan PPh Sidoarjo Mencapai Rp 285 miliar (PPN and PPh 
Sidoarjo reached Rp. 285 billion)', Surabaya Post, March 26, 1996. 
96 See Surabaya Post July 23, 2000 
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Figure 5.5.Comparison between Taxes and Levies taken 
by East Java Province and Sidoarjo District Government 
(1994-2002) 
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Although the increase in original income has been very dramatic, it does not 
mean that it makes a local government more autonomous. Through 
decentralisation and gaining local autonomy, Sidoatjo's local budget has 
increased and the original revenue has risen. However, at the same time, 
decentralisation funds given by the central government have also increased 
sharply. By comparing the increase in original revenues (PAD) and· 
decentralisation funds (DAU), it is very clear that Sidoatjo Local Government 
has actually become more dependent upon the central government. Figure 5.6. 
shows how much greater are the decentralisation funds compared to the local 
original income. 
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Figure 5.6. Comparison between Original Revenues (PAD) and 
Decentralisation Fund (DAU) in Sidoarjo 
(1992-2002) 
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Based on these figures, it can be said that although local autonomy has given 
power to local government, the tendency for local government to be more 
financially dependent upon the central government is obvious. 
5.3.2. Efforts of Local Government to Increase Local Income 
Through Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999, the local government of Sidoarjo has been· 
given more authority to govern its own affairs. Enthusiasm of the executive and 
legislative body for local autonomy has been translated into efforts to increase 
local income. The following discusses some of the actions that have been taken 
by Sidoarjo to increase local revenue. 
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5.3.2.1. Increasing the Rate of Existing Taxes and Levies 
On 22 November 2001, the Sidoatjo Local Assembly ratified six local tax and 
eighteen local levy regulations to replace the existing regulations ratified in 
1998. This change was due to the new Law No. 34 of 2000 on changes of Law 
No. 18 of 1997 related to local taxes and levies. It was also mentioned in each 
regulation that the existing regulations were not suited to the current 
conditions any more. 
All new regulations introduced new charges that were higher than the previous 
ones. For example, the tax on land and buildings more than doubled compared 
to the former charge. A manager of Kasogi Ltd97 (shoe export company) said 
that the calculation of the sale price of land as determined by the government is 
too high. The market price of the land was normally one hundred thousand 
rupiahs, but the government had valued it at more than three hundred 
thousand rupiahs. Another example is the levy on parking which increased 
from RpSOO to Rpl,000, that is, 100 per cent increase. The levy on disturbance. 
permits (hinder ordonantie) increased very dramatically from Rpll0,000 to a 
third of the total costs of having new permit9s. 
97 Interview with the administration manager of Kasogi, April 20, 2002. 
98 Detailed cases on tax and levy increases will be discussed in Chapter five. 
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5.3.2.2. Intensifying Tax & Levy Collection 
Privatizing tax and levy collection to private companies is another way for local 
government to try to increase the amount of money collected. CV Taisir and PT 
Starindo are two companies responsible for the collection of taxes and levies 
related to advertisements, restaurants, use of underground water, and public 
road parking. Another private company, CV Serba Tepat, is responsible for 
testing fire extinguishers. However, this privatisation is also controversial 
because the DPRD (local parliament) does not agree with it. They argue that it 
is difficult to control the real income obtained by the contractor. For example, 
the contribution of public road parking levy is very small compared to the 
number of vehicles parking everyday. Parking tickets are sometimes not given 
to the users, so that controls based on the number of parking tickets issued is 
not effective. 
5.3.2.3. uRecycl ing" Old Levies Banned by Central Government 
Local governments have their own ways of increasing income by various· 
means. One of them is to change the title of a levy that had been banned by the 
central government. The application of a local levy is more flexible than that of 
local taxes. Therefore, the local government usually takes the opportunity to 
increase local revenue from local levies. For example, a levy on entry to the bus 
terminal (peron) has been changed to be a levy on the use of bus terminal 
activities (Surya 1999) Catching fish in the sea is also allowed without paying 
fees to local government according to Law No. 34 of 2000. What Sidoarjo does 
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to obtain money from fish catching activities is to charge for the use of 
equipment for catching fish99• The other 'recycled' levy is dispensation of 
road use fees (for certain vehicles using district-owned roads) that had already 
been banned by Law No. 18 of 1997. The tax on swallows' nest that had been 
banned by Law No. 18 of 1997 will be reintroduced by the Sidoarjo local 
government by changing it to a levyioo. 
Case 5.1.: Recycling Levy on Peron 
Bus passengers entering to Bungurasih Terminal will be charged 
again. This levy is aimed at increasing local revenue. According to 
the head of local agency for revenue Mr Soewasis, 60 per cent of 
the Bungurasih Terminal's income comes from the levy on peron 
(bus terminal entry). Due to Law No. 18 of 1997 abolishing this 
kind of levy, the Bungurasih income decreased dramatically. 
From this peron levy, Bungurasih received more than 20 million 
rupiahs a month. Therefore, the Sidoarjo government is proposing 
to apply this kind of levy by introducing a new name: a levy on 
the use of bus terminal facilities101. 
5.3.2.4. Renegotiating Tax Sharing with Central and Provincial Governments 
Efforts to increase income have also been carried out by renegotiating with 
upper-level governments. Many kinds of taxes taken from Sidoarjo contribute a 
lot to the provincial government of East Java and to the central government in 
Jakarta. However, very few of them are returned to Sidoarjo. For example, 
value-added taxes and income taxes worth 1.5 - 1.8 billion rupiahs per year and 
non-tax revenue from foreign experts of about US$400,000 per year go to the 
99 See Surya l 999 
100 Interview with Sumorejo, an official local agency for revenue, March 20, 2002. 
101 See Surya 1999. 
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central government102. For the provincial government, renegotiating includes 
tax on motor vehicles, tax on transfer of motor vehicle ownership, and a levy on 
cold storage. 
The types of taxes that are being negotiated by the local government to obtain 
more tax share from the central and provincial governments are as follow: 
1. With Central Government: 
• Land and Building Taxes 
• Value Added Taxes 
• Individual Income Tax 
• Corporate Income Tax 
• Airport Tax 
• Non-Tax Revenue 
2. With Provincial Government: 
• Tax on Motor Vehicle Ownership Transfers 
• Tax on Motor Vehicles 
• Tax on Use of Underground and Surface Water 
• Levy on Cold Storage 
Case 5.2.: Tax Sharing with Upper Governments 
A member of the Commission B of Sidoarjo assembly Choirul 
Anam estimates that there are 1.2 to 1.8 trillion rupiahs a year 
from Sidoarjo taken by Surabaya City and Jakarta. This money 
comes from PPh (income tax) and PPn (value added tax). 
However, Sidoarjo has not obtained the money from these taxes 
102 Interview with a pejabat in Disnaker, March 11, 2002. See '30% PPN dan PPh Sidoarjo Diserap 
Pemkot Surabaya (30% of PPn and PPH Sidoarjo absorbed by City Surabaya Government)', Surabaya 
Post, July 23, 2000 
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except for waste from factories such as air and water pollution, 
and problems of labour such as strikes and unrest. If local 
government can have a share of 20 per cent, it will be at least 300 
billion rupiahs. Choirul has targeted tax sharing of 30 per cent for 
Sidoatjo. Moreover, more revenue will be received if local 
government also negotiates sharing of motor vehicle tax with 
provincial government. He also proposed to Sidoatjo Government 
to pass local regulation by which all vehicles owned by companies 
in Sidoatjo should re-register their vehicles in Sidoatjo103. 
5.3.2.5. Renegotiating Profit Sharing with Other Districts 
The Sidoatjo Government has joint ownership with the Government of 
Surabaya City of bus terminals in Bungurasih. To increase local original 
income, the Sidoatjo government is willing to share more of the profits from the 
terminal revenue. 
Case 5.3.: Profit Sharing of Bungurasih Terminal 
The Government of Surabaya City built a bus terminal in 
Bungurasih Sidoatjo. The land belongs to the Government of 
Sidoatjo whereas the management is in the hands of the 
Government of Surabaya City. However, the Government of 
Sidoatjo has no information about revenues received daily or 
monthly. In fact, when the agreement was made in 1982, there 
was a clear clause stating that there has to be transparency and 
openness in managing the bus terminal. In this respect, all staff 
employed in the terminal come from the Government of Surabaya 
City. When the Government of Sidoatjo placed several staff there 
for three months, there was suspicion of them. What the 
Government of Sidoatjo knows is that they receive a 30% share of 
the unknown total revenue. One of the Commission A members, 
Guntur Sulistyono, recommended that the local government make 
a special taskforce to discuss this issue. Another alternative is to 
change the existing cooperation model to be BOT (Build, 
Operation and Transfer)t04. 
103 See '30% PPN dan PPh Sidoarjo Diserap Pemkot Surabaya (30% of PPn and PPH Sidoarjo absorbed 
by City Surabaya Government)', Surabaya Post, July 23, 2000. 
104 See 'Manajemen Purabaya Dinilai Tak Transparan. Lagi, Sidoarjo Gugat Terminal Purabaya 
(Purabaya Management regarded as not transparent. Again, Sidoarjo Sue Purabaya Terminal)', Bangsa, 
August 11, 2000 and see also 'Sidoarjo persoalkan pengelolaan Bungur (Sidoarjo to Question the 
Management ofBungu)', Suara Indonesia, August 11, 2000 
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5.3.2.6. Renegotiating Profit Sharing with the Private Sector 
The Sidoarjo Pemda (local government) is planning to renegotiate profit sharing 
with other district governments as well as the private sector. With City 
Surabaya, Sidoarjo has share of revenue from bus terminals in the area of 
Sidoarjo. In this case, Sidoarjo is demanding City Surabaya have more 
transparency of management. With Angkasa Pura (a company that holds the 
management of the Juanda Airport), Sidoarjo is proposing a share of income in 
terms of, for example, airport tax, land and building tax, and parking levy. 
5.3.2.7. Developing Local Government-Owned Enterprises 
As of 2004, the Sidoarjo Pemda has four local government-owned enterprises: a 
water company, a printing company, a pharmaceutical company and a credit 
institution. Some of the companies' income contribute to local government as 
part of PAD. In Sidoarjo, the water company has been criticised by the local 
assembly due to its poor performance leading to a low contribution to the local 
budget. Efforts for improving the local government's water company have. 
been made. 
Case 5.4.: Water Company (PDAM) 
PDAM Delta Tirta is a water company owned by Sidoarjo Local 
Government. This company has to share its profit 45 per cent with 
the local government. In 2001, the target of revenue from this 
company was 600 billion rupiahs. In 2002, the target increased to 
900 billion rupiahs. To achieve the target, the company applied 
several strategies: first, increasing the cost of water; second, 
restructuring operational costs of the organisation. 
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In 2001, Delta Tirta was chaotic where there was vote of no 
confidence in the former leadership. Massive corruption and 
authoritarian behaviour were the main causes of the incident. 
Eventually, the president director of Delta Tirta resigned from the 
position. The director for general affairs was appointed to run the 
company until July 2002. 
When local autonomy was applied, local government had more 
power to manage the company. First, to determine the price rate 
of water, there had to be an approval from the provincial 
government, namely the governor. Now, it can be determined by 
local government with approval fromthe local assembly. Second, 
the president director was appointed by the governor, who 
installed a member of the military. Now, the local government 
head can appoint new president director by fair competition 
either from public servants or the private sector. For the new 
president director, there were 23 candidates, 7 of whom came 
from the private sectortos. 
The credit institution in Sidoatjo is relatively new. It was established in 1999 to 
serve local government employees. However, since 2001, the credit institution 
has been expanded to serve the general public. Although it is new, the 
contribution of the credit institution to the local original income reached 925 
million rupiahs in 2002, higher than the water company's contribution (900 
million rupiahs) or the printing company's (55 million rupiahs) (Pemerintah. 
Kabupaten Sidoatjo 2002). 
105 Interview with Mr Haryanto, General Affairs Manager, May 20, 2002 
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5.3.2.8. Issuing Municipal Bonds 
The district head of Sidoarjo is willing to issue municipal bonds as a source of 
finance for local government. This notion is uncommon in local government in 
Indonesia. The head argued that relying on local original income and the 
decentralisation fund is not sufficient for developing the local economy. In this 
respect, the issuance of municipal bonds is also allowed under by the new law 
of decentralisationt06. 
5.4. Conclusions 
Sidoarjo experienced the implementation of a pilot project for local autonomy 
in 1995 before the new law introduced in 1999 was impelemnted. In terms of 
organisational arrangement, this experience has helped Sidoarjo be one step 
ahead compared to other districts that were not selected to be pilot projects. 
The transfer of personnel and functions has been, to some extent, conducted 
since the pilot project was initiated. Together with the implementation of the 
pilot project, restructuring of local taxes and levies was introduced by the 
central government in 1997, making it difficult for local government to explore 
local income. 
106 Article 81 (1) of Law No. 22 of 1999 states: 'Regional Governments may obtain domestic and/ 
international loan for funding their governance activities with the approval ofDPRD'. 
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In the implementation of Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999, the local government of 
Sidoarjo received more authority since all functions were devolved to Local 
Government Level II. However, the case of Sidoarjo confirms that 
decentralisation does not automatically strengthen the local government to be 
independent over financial resources from the central government. With more 
jobs to do, the Sidoarjo government has not obtained enough resources to run 
its own affairs. 
The level of dependence for financial resources on the central government has 
actually deepened. This is very obvious in the local budget structure. The gap 
between local original income and total local budget has widened, bringing 
about the need for financial assistance from the central government. However, 
at the same time, the assistance from the central government to Sidoarjo and 
resources from Sidoarjo taken by the Provincial and Central government have 
risen since the implementation of local autonomy. 
In the early period of the implementation of local autonomy, there was also a 
tendency for local government to spend more of the local budget for routine 
expenses than for development expenses. This can be interpreted that the 
benefit of local autonomy is more to the bureaucracy than to the society. 
The difficulty of Sidoarjo local government to manage with its financial 
resources has led to efforts to increase local income through various 
regulations. Some regulations are directed to the central and provincial 
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government. However, some regulations are to exploit taxes and levies that 
have direct impacts on the private sector. It is very probable that, for the private 
sector, local autonomy can be a threat to its business rather than a blessing. 
The next three chapters will be focusing on the impact of decentralisation on the 
business sector policies and regulations passed by the Sidoarjo local 
government. Chapter six will discuss the impact of local regulations on the 
business sector. The chapter will analyse the way the local government 'gets 
around' the problems. Chapter seven will focus on corruption at the local level 
and its impacts on the business sector. Chapter eight will then describe and 
analyse the local government-business relationship. 
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Chapter Six 
DECENTRALISATION, LOCAL 
REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
THE BUSINESS SECTOR: 
Encouraging or Discouraging to Business 
People? 
6.1. Introduction 
Pajak dan retribusi daerah merupakan modal utama pelaksanaan 
otonomi daerah (Local taxes and levies are indispensable to the 
implementation of local autonomy)101 
Dengan otonomi daerah, Pemda Sidoarjo banyak memberikan 
kemudahan kepada pengusaha dalam urusan berbagai perijinan. Di 
sisi lain, penarikan berbagai pungutan pajak dan retribusi telah 
membebani kegiatan usaha. (By local autonomy, Sidoarjo local 
government has provided business people with facilitation of 
many licences. On the other hand, a number of taxes and 
levies have become a burden on the business people)1oa 
Chapter four discussed the history of decentralisation in Indonesia, especially 
during the post-independence, the New Order and the Reformasi eras. From this 
historical perspective, it has become very clear that tensions between the central 
government and local government have arisen time after time. Over a very long 
period of time, the central government dominated local governments. A similar 
pressure arose between executive and legislative bodies. In one period, the 
executive power dominates over the legislative body, and in another period, the 
107 Here is an example of the widespread misunderstanding of local autonomy where autonomy is merely 
interpreted as 'automoney', giving local governments to exploit local taxes and levies without 
considering their impacts on business activites. This is an advertisement promoted by Padang district 
aJiency for local revenue in West Sumatra. See SMERU News, January-February 2001. 
1 Summaries of interview with some business people in Sidoarjo. 
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situation is the opposite. Chapter five compared the implementation of 
decentralisation under Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 and under Laws 
No. 22 and 25 of 1999 in Sidoarjo. Chapter five also showed how 
decentralisation has affected financial and staffing matters at the local level, 
which in turn influences the local government in shaping local policies and 
regulations. 
This chapter discusses the impacts of decentralisation on agencies and local 
regulations related to the activities of the business sector. The following 
questions are posed: how has the local government restructured its agencies to 
serve business people? Has decentralisation produced a clear division of 
authority between the local agencies and the higher agencies as well as among 
local agencies? 
The chapter is also concerned with local regulations that are instruments 
through which local government manifests its role. By this it can be seen how 
local government actually plays its role in business activities. When power has 
been devolved, the local government is encouraged to attract investors to 
promote local economic development. On the other hand, the local government 
is also tempted to increase local revenue instantly by introducing local taxes 
and levies to handle the short-term problems of financing the local 
government's activities. With these two contradictory situations, what has the 
Sidoarjo local government done in introducing and implementing local 
regulations? Have the local regulations facilitated or inhibited business sector 
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activities? Has decentralisation improved public services related to the business 
sector activities? What do business people perceive about the impacts of 
decentralisation on local regulations? And how have the local regulations 
actually affected them? 
Therefore, this chapter aims to comprehend how the decentralisation policy 
works and affects local regulations related to business activities. Interviews 
with many business people have helped reach a deeper understanding of what 
the local government has really done and how this affects business activities. In 
general, the role of local government -undertaken by Dinas (local services)-
related to business activities is still limited by the central government. In the 
first part of the chapter, transfer of business regulations from the central 
government to local government will be explored. It will explore agencies at the 
local level which are responsible for the business sector's activities. Further, 
some cases related to the regulatory regime in Sidoarjo that affect the business 
sector are presented. They include the district head's decision on the creation-
of new local agencies integrating various licenses; the promotion of the growth 
pole triangle development; and local regulations of local taxes and levies. It is 
argued that those regulations are contradictory in relation to the efforts of 
attracting investors. After that, different types of responses of the business 
people related to local regulations issued by the local government of Sidoarjo 
will be discussed. Quantitative data supported by qualitative data will be used 
to show how decentralisation policy affects the business people in Sidoarjo. 
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6.2. Business Regulations: From the Central Government 
to Local Government 
During the early weeks of my research in Sidoarjo, I thought that in talking 
about the business sector, I would be referring only to the central government 
from which policies and regulations were issued. Regulations on investment, 
imports, exports, minimum wages or environmental standard are usually 
issued by the central government in Jakarta. Organisations policing these 
regulations are also part of the national government based in Jakarta, such as 
Department of Industry and Trade, Coordinating Board of Capital Investment, 
Department of Manpower, and Agency for Controlling Development Impacts 
on the Environment. During the centralisation era, at the provincial and district 
levels, the central government was represented by Kantor Wilayah (Kanwil) and 
Kantor Departemen (Kandep) respectively. Business people who wanted to have 
permits or licenses had to deal with Kandep, Kanwil or the Central Government. 
What I was thinking at that time was not in fact incorrect. Although power has 
been decentralised to Kabupaten (district) and Kota (city), the Minister of 
Investment/Chairman of Coordinating Agency for Capital Investment 
(Meninves/Kepala BKPM) is still holding several authorities. When Laws No. 22 
and 25 was issued in 1999, the Meninves/Kepala BKPM followed it up by issuing 
a decree No. 38/SK/1999 dated 6 October 1999, called the Manual and 
Procedure of Applying for Investment Established in the Framework of 
Domestic and Foreign Investment. Article 5 (1) of this decree lists the 
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authorities retained by the central government. They are: (a) approval for 
providing facilities of import duty exemption and facilities of taxes for capital 
goods import; (b) approval of providing import duty exemption facilities for 
importing material and/or auxiliary materials for 2 (two) years production 
according to the fixed capacity; (c) approval of providing income tax facilities 
born by the government for certain industries; (d) Limited Importer 
Identification Number (APIT); (e) the Decree of Expatriates Utilisation; (f) 
Decree of Work Permit for Expatriates; (g) Permanent Business License (IUT), 
Business License for Expansion and IUT renewal (Badan Penanaman Modal 
2002). 
Further, Article 5 (2) of the decree states that licenses of accomplishing 
investment issued by Kabupaten/Kota comprise: (a) license of location; (b) license 
for Upset Law (UUG/HOJ; (c) license for building establishment (IMB). Other 
ministries such as the Minister for Industry and Trade109 and the Minister for 
Land Affairsno also did similar things to retain or control several authorities.· 
Up to now, land affairs have been under the Bad.an Pertanahan Nasional or BPN 
(National Land Board). The BPN of Sidoatjo still belongs to the central 
109 Minister Decree No. 289/MPP/Kep/10/2001 on the Standardised Rule of Trade Permit Service 
Delivery (Ketentuan Standar Pemberian /zin Usaha Perdagangan, SIUP). 
110 Through Presidential Decree No. 10 of2001 on the Implementation of Local Autonomy in the area of 
Land Affairs (Tentang Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah di Bidang Pertanahan) issued in Jakarta on the 17 
of January 2001 by Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid, stating that the implementation of local autonomy on 
land affairs is based on the existing government regulation, decision, instruction and the Minister of Land 
Affairs' circular letter. 
192 
government and has not yet been devolved to local government. This is based 
on Presidential decree No. 10 of 2001 issued on January 17th on the 
implementation of local autonomy in the field of land affairs. However, the 
Presidential decree that is hierarchically under the national law has been 
contradictory with the principle of the current local autonomy policy. 
Although it is clearly stated in Article 11 of Law No. 22 of 1999 that district 
governments would receive the authority to handle public works, health, 
education and culture, communication, capital investment and so on, the 
central government was still reluctant for them to do so. Less than three months 
after the implementation of local autonomy, the central government tried to 
cancel the delivery of investment authority to local government and wanted to 
take back the investment authority. According to the district head of Sidoarjo, 
the central government does not want to lose its power. On the other hand, 
according to a provincial officer of Badan Penanaman Modal (Agency for Capital 
Investment at the Provincial Level), delivering capital investment authority to-
district government would create too many 'doors' for investors. The central 
government took the initiative to invite seven district heads to discuss this 
matter in Jakarta. The Menteri Dalam Negeri or Mendagri (Minister of Home 
Affairs) insisted that the seven districts were representative enough to justify 
the cancellation of the authority. However, the district heads invited rejected 
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the proposal of the central government.111 Up to now, the investment authority 
remains as it is. 
The conflict following the implementation of decentralisation has been very 
severe. This occurs not only between the central and local governments, but 
also among departments of the central government. According to the chairman 
of BKPM Theo F. Tomeon, BKPM was given the authority to handle investors. 
Based on Keputusan Presiden or Keppres (Presidential decree) No. 33/1981, there 
were 11 departments that had delegated their authorities to BKPM. However, 
as of the early 2005, some authorities have been withdrawn by the technical 
departments such as facility of entry and Value Added Tax (Pajak Pertambahan 
Nilai or PPN) by the Department of Finance (Departemen Keuangan) and the 
employment of expatriates by the Department of Manpower.112 
6.3. Fragmented Agencies Related to the Business Sector 
It is difficult in fact to identify which agency at the local level is responsible for· 
the business sector. Local government cannot properly be regarded as a unitary 
organisation when dealing with the business sector. Decentralisation of 
authority has abolished the dualism of organisation at the local level, such as 
the existence of Kandep Perdagangan/representative office of trade (representing 
111 Interview with the district head of Sidoarjo, Mr Win Hendrarso, November 12, 2001. 
112 See Jawa Pos, 'BKPM Tuntut Wewenang lebih' (BK.PM demands more authorities), April 19, 2002 
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the central government) and Dinas Perdagangan/local agency of trade 
(representing local government), but has not brought about a reduction in the 
complexity of the organisation as occurred at the national level. Agencies 
created by the local government to serve business people are still complex. To 
understand the complexities of local government, they are best regarded as a 
diverse collection of interests. These interests are marked by the divisions 
within and between agencies at the local level. In the case of Sidoarjo, there are 
at least five agencies administering activities of the business sector. 
1. Dinas Perindustrian dan Perdagangan (Local Agency for Industry and Trade) 
2. Dinas Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil dan Menengah (Local Agency for Cooperatives 
and Small and Medium Businesses) 
3. Dinas Tenaga Kerja (Local Agency for Manpower) 
4. Dinas Pendapatan Daerah (Local Agency for Local Revenue) 
5. Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Kabupaten (Board of Local Planning) 
These agencies were established and had existed before decentralisation. After· 
decentralisation, their authority has been stated in Peraturan Daerah or Perda 
(local regulation) No. 2 of 2001 dated on 30 March 2001, followed by Keputusan 
Bupati (District Head Decision) dated on 21 May 2001: No. 13/2001, No. 
14/2001, 18/2001, 11/2001 and 3/2001 respectively. However, there are also 
some overlapping and conflicting tasks between one dinas and another. 
A detailed picture of each agency follows, showing its roles and authorities at 
the local level. 
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6.3.1. Dinas Perindustrian dan Perdagangan (Local Agency for 
Industry and Trade) 
When I came to Sidoarjo to start collecting data, I headed for the Vinas 
Perindustrian dan Perdagangan or Disperindag113 of Sidoarjo. I asked them for 
information on the business sector in Sidoarjo such as lists of businesses and 
their addresses. I was shocked when a local officer showed. me only a copy of 
hand-written and two manually-typed lists of companies that was produced in 
1996. The lists contained only 60 companies, and they consisted of small, 
medium and big ones. In fact, as written in Perda (local regulation) No. 2 of 
2001, the functions of Disperindag are, for instance, to 'implement guidance of 
industry and trade', 'arrange plan and program implementation of industry 
and trade' and 'supervise and control permits'. Looking at these formal 
tasks, Disperindag should have had complete data on industry and trade in 
Sidoarjo. 
Later on I was told by some pejabat (people who hold an official position) and 
staff of Disperindag that now there are no business people coming to 
Disperindag. One can look into the Disperindag office and see many jobless 
people talking to each other. Some of the staff only come to the office 4 days a 
week. Some others only come to fill in the attendance book in the morning and 
afternoon before going home. Even though local autonomy was started in 
113 Before January 2001, Dinas Perindustrian and Dinas Perdagangan were separated. 
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Sidoarjo, Disperindag has not yet received any new authority from the central 
government. Some people are, however, still fortunate because they are 
involved in a project run by the Provincial Agency for Industry and Trade. 
Once a month they have to visit several companies to take samples of water 
from industrial waste to be checked. They receive around fifty thousand 
rupiahs a month for this kind of work. Below is an example of the work 
undertaken conducted by one of them: 
Case 6.1: Unclear Division of Tasks between District and 
Provincial Government 
Suwanda graduated from a technical secondary school. Previously he 
was on staff at Dinas Perindustrian (now Disperindag) in Sidoarjo 
district. Since 1999, he has been involved in a Program Kali Bersih or 
Proka.sih (Clean River Program) under the Dinas Perindustrian 
Propinsi. On the 18th of April I accompanied him to visit several 
companies in my car. Regularly, riding his old scooter, between the 
15th to 20th of the month he visits Tjiwi Kimia Ltd (paper company), 
Sumber Agung Ltd (yarn colouring company) and Subur Jaya Abadi 
Ltd (tomato and soybean sauce company). He always brings three 5-
litre jerry cans for samples. To reach Tjiwi Kimia from his office, it is 
40 kms. From Tjiwi Kimia to other two companies the distance is 
about 10 kms. He then goes to the laboratory in Surabaya city to 
surrender the samples. This is about 5 kms. From the laboratory to 
Dinas Perindustrian Propinsi is about 10 kms. Finally, from Dinas 
Perindustrian Propinsi to his office, the distance is 20 kms. He has to 
leave his office for a whole day for a job that does not relate to his 
current position. 
The story above shows that the division of tasks between the district and 
provincial dinas is still unclear. The program mentioned above is still being 
carried on by the Provincial Government of East Java although the people 
conducting it in the field come from the district government. In this regard, the 
provincial government is responsible for the payment for the staff doing the 
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activity. Another dinas in Kabupaten, Dinas Lingkungan Hidup (Local Agency for 
Environmental Affairs}, perceives that the task should be under its authority. So 
decentralisation has not yet solved this district-provincial task relationship. 
As can be seen from the authorities of Meninves/Kepala BKPM stated in decree 
No. 38/SK/1999, it is very obvious that Disperindag has not yet been given a 
significant role related to business activities at the local level. Also, export and 
import activities do not involve Disperindag except for issuing the 
recommendation letter for APIT (Anglea Pengenal Impor Terbatas or Limited 
Import Identification Number). Importers who intend to import materials must 
have an APIT that must be enclosed with their documents. The copy of the 
documents are cross-checked in the field by the Disperindag staff, to determine 
whether the data is correct or not. These cross-checked findings will be sent 
back to the provincial government. 
As a result of decentralisation and local autonomy, the role of Disperindag is 
therefore growing weak. On the one hand, no new authority has been delivered 
to it from the central or provincial government. On the other hand, Pemda (the 
popular name of local government) has taken on the authority for delivering 
business permits. All that is left in Disperindag is the authority for monitoring 
and pembinaan114 (guidance) of business activities. 
114 The term 'monitoring and pembinaan ' is an activity of supervision of companies such as recording 
data and checking licenses. 
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A former head of the Agency for Tradens said that when he was in charge of 
issuing one kind of permit at the Agency for Trade, there were more than fifty 
people submitting permit documents daily; he had to read all these before 
signing the documents. Another official116 said that at that time Disperindag was 
very busy dealing with people involved in business. Anywhere between 30 and 
40 people came and went from Disperindag every day. Therefore, she told me 
that she did not feel easy to undertaking pembinaan for business people. 
"When I ca me to a company, they respected me because they needed 
me.JVhen I asked them for data on production, it was not difficult to 
have it. I knew a lot of businessmen here, and they knew me, too. I 
used to ring them and it was not a problem, because we held their 
permits117 
An official of Disperindag told me that this authority has already been taken 
over. According to her, moving the authority from Disperindag to Dinas 
Perijinan dan Penanaman Modal (DPPM) has brought about a serious problem in 
dealing with business people. DPPM activities are only to deliver permits and 
they are not responsible for monitoring and pembinaan activities. On the other. 
hand, the authority of Disperindag has been limited, as shown by her narrative: 
"Since we do not hold the permit authority, we really don't 
have any gun when they do not give us data because who holds 
permits is DPPM. Now, nobody cares about Disperindag. Business 
people will only respect you if they need you"ns. 
115 Interview with Sugeng Hariadi, former head of Agency for Trade, on 12 February 2002 
116 Interview with Masita, section head of chemical and various industry, on 25 January 2002. 
117 Interview with Masita (January 25, February 3 and 4, 2004. 
118 Several interviews with Masita (January 25, February 3 and 4, 2004). 
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In terms of monitoring and pembinaan, no local agency has the responsibility to 
collect data on production or numbers of exports and imports. Due to lack of 
the authority, Disperindag then focuses only on small businesses by giving them 
training in management and small credit. For medium and large businesses, 
Disperindag staff cannot afford to do it because medium and large business 
people know better than them. Also, the small amount of borrowings from 
Disperindag means nothing to medium and large businesses. 
6.3.2. Dinas Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil dan Menengah (Local 
Agency for Cooperatives and Small and Medium Businesses) 
Diskop & UKM (Local Agency for Cooperatives and Small and Medium 
Businesses) is a poor agency. The building looks very old and is unimpressive. 
Holding a position in this agency is not prestigious compared to holding one in 
other agencies. People who hold a position in this agency are often perceived as 
'orang buangan' (an exiled person). The former head of the Board of Local 
Development Planning (Bappekab)119 has the position of head of Diskop & UKM. 
He was one of the district head candidates competing with the current district 
head. The current head of Diskop & UKM was formerly the head of Dinas 
Perdagangan. When a reorganisation was carried out in 2001, he was put in 
Diskop & UKM as a sub-agency head under the former head of Bappekab. 
119 Before chairing Bappekab, he chaired Dispenda (Local Agency for revenue). He was accused of being 
greedy by collecting money from the two agencies valued at more than Rp. 150 billion, Surabaya Post, 
glh August 2000. 
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He was put into such a low position for rejecting the presence of Indomaret 
supermarkets as he had voiced the opinion that they would drive out 
traditional markets. At that time he was the only local agency head holding a 
different opinion on the issue. However, after more than one and a half years, 
he was then assigned to chair the agency after the former head reached 
retirement age. 
The functions of Diskop & UKM are clearly stated in Article 13 (2) Perda No. 2 of 
2001 such as: to formulate and implement general policies on cooperatives, 
small and medium businesses; to ratify the legal status of cooperatives; to 
provide technical guidance; and to facilitate small credit and financial matters. 
However, there is a problem between Disperindag and Diskop & UKM over who 
is supposed to be responsible for giving small credit to small businesses. 
According to Disperindag people, Disperindag is responsible for pembinaan of 
small businesses, in which giving small credit to small businesses individually 
is included. They assume that Diskop & UKM is responsible only for the 
cooperatives, not businesses as individuals. Based on these two different 
perceptions, each always claims to have the rights to deliver small credit. 
Therefore, if there is a state-owned company that is concerned with developing 
small businesses by providing small credit, the two agencies will claim that 
each has the right to manage the money. Sucofindo and Semen Gresik Ltd, both 
state-owned companies, often offered huge amounts of money to small 
businesses. Due to the unclear division of tasks, the two companies went 
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directly to the small businesses without having permission to do so from local 
agencies. 
The magnitude of the role of this agency can be observed from the budget 
allocated by Pemda Sidoarjo to cooperatives and small businesses. According to 
the Sidoarjo statistics, the number of cooperatives fluctuated from 1996 to 2000. 
In 1996, there were only 373 cooperatives, whereas the number had nearly 
doubled to 617 in 1997, 647 in 1998, and 714 in 1999. However, in 2000, the 
number decreased to only 526 cooperatives. In terms of budget, projects for 
cooperatives development and small and medium businesses cost 225 million 
in 1999, 195 million in 2000, 205 million in 2001 and 390 million in 2002. It 
means that on the average each cooperative only received less than 500 
thousand rupiahs a year from the local government (Badan Statistik Sidoarjo 
2002). 
The budget cited above shows that the Diskop & UKM is less important than the 
others. The following account gives a better picture of the agency compared to 
other agencies. 
Case 6.2: Facilities Given to Diskop & UKM Compared with Other 
Agencies 
People working in the agency have only a small space. There is a 
wide gap in appearance between Diskop & UKM and Bappekab. The 
head of the Diskop & UKM was formerly the head of Bappekab. He 
now has a very small office even compared to those of his staff in 
Bappekab. The official cars provided by the local government for the 
Diskop & UKM are old-fashioned ones. 
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6.3.3. Dinas Tenaga Kerja (Local Agency for Manpower) 
Dinas Tenaga Kerja or Disnaker (Local Agency for Manpower) is the agency that 
has the most intensive contacts with the business sector. During working days, 
this agency is always full of people coming from companies. They are either 
owners, managers, or workers of a company. Those who come to Disnaker are 
usually facing serious problems of industrial relations between management 
and workers. 
According to Article 23 (2) Perda No. 2 of 2001, the functions of Disnaker are, for 
instance: to implement the authority of human resource affairs, to formulate 
programs for technical guidance related to job skills, and to supervise, monitor 
and control permits related to manpower. Based on the Perda, although Disnaker 
is concerned with the business sector, in practice, it relates only to: how the 
minimum wage rules are implemented, and what conditions are available in 
companies. 
In the case of Sidoarjo, the biggest problem that faces Disnaker is labour strikes. 
Most queries coming to Disnaker relate to protests. Based on an unofficial record 
from Disnaker, the frequency of labour strikes was very high especially in 1998, 
occurring 134 times a year. In 1999, the number fell to 28 times. It became 
higher again in 2000 (100 times). According to the Sidoarjo police, between 
January and December 2001, there were more than 165 days of labour protests. 
This means that there was one protest day every two days. However, this 
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calculation is based on number of days, not number of protests in a day. If it is 
counted based on number of protest, it will be more than triplet20. Labour 
unrest relates only to medium and big businesses that usually have hundreds 
or thousands of workers. 
There were several types of protest carried out by workers. First, they related to 
the minimum wages standard. Some companies paid their workers far below 
the minimum wage of Rp 453,000 per month for the Sidoarjo District. Some 
other companies already paid based on the standard, however, they also 
included upah lembur (overtime wages) as part of the minimum wage. Second, 
protests were related to workers' status. In t his case, although some companies 
already paid the workers based on the minimum wages standard, the status of 
the workers was still casual. One company worker I interviewed said that he 
had already worked for the same company for more than 10 years. However, 
his status was still a daily worker. According to him, this would enable 
companies to fire him without any compensation. Responses given by workers. 
and management in relation to what the Disnaker has done related to conflict 
between the two sides are different. Owners or managers said that Disnaker has 
already acted properly, however, workers claimed that Disnaker tended to be 
close to owners. Due to unresolved problems, conflicts were usually brought to 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or the DPRD (Local Assembly). In this case, 
120 Interview with Mr Sumarbowo, sub-agency head of industrial relations, Disnaker Sidoarjo. See also, 
Jawa Pos Radar Surabaya, 9 December 2001; 'Setahun, Diguncang 165 Unjuk Rasa' (One year shaked 
by 165 labour protests), Jawa Pos, 31December 2001. 
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responses given by the two sides were inverse. DPRD was assumed to be 
standing by the workers and against the management. This could be true since 
the head of Commission E relating to social welfare was a former labor activist. 
6.3.4. Dinas Pendapatan (Local Agency for Revenue) 
The function of Dinas Pendapatan/Dispenda (Local Agency for Revenue) does not 
directly relate to the business sector. However, what this dinas does will affect 
the business sector directly. This agency is responsible for collecting revenue 
from local resources. It is clearly stated in Article 7 (2) of Perda No. 2 of 2001 
that Dispenda is responsible for 'formulating technical policies, guidance and 
facilitation as well as technical coordination related to revenue' and 'planning, 
implementing, assessing, controlling, monitoring, evaluating and developing of 
local revenue'. The people working in this dinas are responsible for preparing 
the draft of Perda related to local taxes and levies before being ratified by the 
local assembly. All local government income obtained by each dinas will be 
surrendered to Dispenda. Also, Dispenda determines the targets for taxes and· 
levies. It is very usual that the achievement is higher than the target. For this 
success, incentives are given to people in Dispenda. Therefore, Dispenda is 
perceived as a dinas basah (wet agency) since those who work in this dinas can 
earn more money. 
People working in this agency are very active in finding loopholes in the law in 
order to create more local regulations on taxation and levies. They compare 
what other district governments have done in relation to local tax and levy 
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regulations. If they find that another district has new regulations approved by 
. the Minister of Home Affairs, they will visit the district to conduct a 
comparative study and then just imitate them. When I discussed this with 
several people from this agency, they were just waiting to see what would 
happen to some other districts that were making new regulations that had to be 
approved in Jakarta. 
This agency is responsible for providing business people with information on 
new taxes and levies. They often invite business people to come to Dispenda or 
they visit companies for dissemination of new regulations. Dispenda is also 
responsible for considering tax dispensations requested by companies in 
Sidoarjo. One official of Dispenda claimed that several business people had 
complained about their tax burden. They asked for tax reduction related to 
Pajak Penerangan Jalan or Tax on Road Lighting (a kind of electricity-use-related 
GST), HO permits or Land and Building Tax. 
6.3.5. Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Kabupaten (Board of 
Local Planning at District Level) 
Bappekab is the planning agency at the district level. This is the biggest agency 
as shown in the number of people employed. This is also the biggest in terms of 
power at the local level. People employed in Bappekab are regarded as having 
achieved a good career since Bappekab is the 'think tank' of the local 
government. Article 9 (2) Perda No. 3 of_ 2001 states that the functions of 
Bappekab are, for instance: 'to set up the basic development pattern of the 
district consisting of general, long term and five year development plans'; 'to 
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formulate the yearly development plan; formulate development programs 
either funded by the district itself or proposed to the provincial government or 
the central government'; 'to coordinate plans of various local agencies; set up 
local budget; and evaluate the implementation of the development'. 
As a local planning agency, Bappekab has the authority to put priorities and 
allocate all budgets proposed by the various local agencies. This agency has the 
authority to cut back or increase the local agencies' budget. Therefore, the 
amount and number of projects allocated in each local agency depend on how 
well they can negotiate with Bappekab. 
Also, as a coordinating agency at the local level, Bappekab is very powerful in 
determining decisions relating to investment. Information about city planning 
and land use planning is also available in the office of Bappekab. All big 
investors have to go through this agency to obtain an investment agreement 
letter. Important decisions have to be coordinated by this agency. 
Below is the case of Bappekab as a powerful agency at the local level. 
Case 6.3: The Power of Bappekab 
Bappekab is located in the centre of the office area of the Sidoarjo 
local government. The building consists of two levels and is just 
next to the main office of the Pemda. Many people are busy 
coming and going for several kinds of business with Bappekab 
staff. The city planning and the local budget are designed by this 
agency. It has its own photocopy shop and canteen providing 
services for people inside the agency or visitors. The staff 
members of Bappekab often work longer than the normal hours. 
They have more opportunities to pursue advanced study 
compared to those from other agencies. 
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Interviews with several local government officials and business people have 
provided a picture of changes in the local government agencies. First, 
unclear division of task between agencies at the district and provincial level 
still exists. Some authority is still retained at the provincial level. Second, 
posting people at the local level is also problematic. When two agencies are 
being merged, who will be the head the new agency, such as Disperindag. In 
this regard, the Disperindag left some problems both at top or medium level 
positions. Third, professionalism became an issue during the early 
decentralisation period in Sidoarjo. Promotion and posting at the local level 
often do not consider whether the position is proper or not. For instance, 
someone previously holding a position in the agency of communication and 
transportation dealing with transportation route permits, has now been put 
into the local agency for industry and trade to manage small industries. 
Before local autonomy, especially in the central government offices at the 
district level (Kandep), they would have been placed in a different Kandep. 
However, as the local Kandep become part of the local agency, someone can 
be placed in any local agency regardless of his/her expertise. 
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6.4. The Policy Regime Related to the Business Sector in 
Sidoarjo 
The following section will be focused on the regulatory regime at the local level. 
I focus only on the regulatory regime since this is the most common area of 
action for the local government of Sidoarjo. 
6.4.1. Regulatory Regime Attracting the Business Sector 
Before the local autonomy was put into effect on January 1, 2001, the Bupati of 
Sidoarjo had drawn up several new district regulations (Perda) to address 
regional autonomy. Shortly after the promulgation, the new Perda were 
surrendered to the local assembly to be ratified. Based on Government 
Regulation No. 25 of 2000 on the Authority of the Government and the Province 
as Autonomous Regions (Kewenangan Pemerintah dan Propinsi sebagai Daerah 
Otonom), the local assembly of Sidoarjo passed the local regulations (Perda) No. 
2 of 2001 on the Organisation and Work of Pemda dated March 21, 2001. This 
Perda was published in the local Gazette No. 2 of 2001 Seri C on April 26, 2001. 
In Sidoarjo, the number of local agencies was reduced in order to make the local 
government more efficient. 
6.4.1.1. District Head Decree No. 16 of 2001 on Dinas Perijinan dan Penanaman 
Modal (Local Agency for Permits and Capital Investment) 
One of the local agencies named in Perda No. 2 of 2001 is Vinas Perijinan dan 
Penanaman Modal (DPPM). On 21 May, 2001, the Perda was followed up by 
District Head decree No. 16 of 2001. This decree contains the implementing 
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directives for the Perda No. 2 of 2001 with special reference to the Dinas 
Perijinan dan Penanaman Modal. This Dinas was formed to integrate various 
licensing services that were formerly delivered by different agencies. The 
existing 5 Dinas discussed before are not supposed to have the authority to 
control licenses for the business sector. 
In Sidoarjo, Dinas Perijinan dan Penanaman Modal (DPPM) is the most 
prestigious agency, as seen by several indicators. First, the building is new, 
having recently been refurbished. The interior is very comfortable; all rooms 
have air conditioning. Second, in almost every single comer, people can see 
someone busy with a computer. I have not seen such a view in agencies like 
Disperindag and Diskop & UKM. Third, the uniform worn by the staff is different 
from that of other agencies. The staff members of DPPM dress well and wear 
neckties. The way they serve the visitors is also different. They are pro-active 
with customers, full of smiles and friendly. 
As stated clearly in Perda No. 2 of 2001, DPPM is responsible for administering 
business licenses. The tasks are: 'implementing the authority of capital 
investment', 'formulating plan, program, priority scale and strategy of capital 
investment', 'processing data and information and evaluating activities 
related to capital investment', 'processing licenses and coordinating various 
agencies related to capital investment' an d 'ratifying licenses'. 
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Being an autonomous local government, the Sidoarjo Pemda was willing to 
build a new one-stop-shopping policy under one agency. The DPPM merged 
about 16 types of permits that used to be delivered by different agencies. For 
instance, SIUP (Trade Business Licenses) previously held under Dinas 
Perdagangan (Local Agency for Trade) and IMB (Building Establishment 
License) by Dinas Cipta Karya (Local Agency for Public Works) are now under 
DPPM. Moreover, the new agency has published the exact time needed to serve 
every single permit. This can be used as a guide by business people to calculate 
the time they need to get the service. Before, this service was not clear and the 
service provider often held the licence for some time before delivering it to get 
personal benefits121. 
121 The service times given by the DPPM look unrealistic. However, for the local government, licenses 
and permits are an income function rather than control functions, meaning that the delivery of licenses is 
intended to raise income for the local government rather than to control who gets a license. 
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Table 6.1. Types of Permits under Dinas Perijinan dan Penanaman Modal 
No. Type of Permit Time Service 
1. Rekomendasi Lokasi (Recommendation for Location) 
2. Ijin Pengeringan (Dryness Permit) 
3. Surat Ijin Usaha Perdagangan (Trade Business Permit) 
4. Tanda Daftar Industri (Industry Registration Identification) 
7days 
7days 
3days 
4days 
5. Tanda Daftar Perusahaan (Company Registration 3 days 
Identification) 
6. 
7. 
Ijin Hotel (Hotel Permit) 
Ijin Pemondokan (Dormitory Permit) 
6days 
6days 
8. Surat Ijin Pengambilan Air Bawah Tanah Ijin (Underground 6 days 
Water Use Permit) 
9. 
10. 
12. 
13. 
Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan (Building Establishment Permit) 
Ijin Undang-Undang Gangguan (Disturbance Permit) 
Ijin Usaha Tetap (Permanent Business Permit) 
Ijin Usaha Industri (Industry Business Permit) 
7days 
7days 
7days 
7days 
14. Ijin Pembuangan Limbah Cair (Permits for Liquid Waste 7 days 
Disposal) 
15. Ijin Surat Persetujuan Penanaman Modal Asing (Foreign 7 days 
Investment Agreement Permits) 
16. Ijin Surat Persetujuan Penamaman Modal Dalam Negeri 7 days 
(Domestic Investment Agreement Permits) 
Source: Local Agency for Permits and Capital Investment, Sidoarjo, 2002. 
In fact, this DPPM is a metamorphosis of Unit Pelayanan Terpadu or UPT 
(Integrated Service Unit) that was set up before 1995. When Sidoarjo became 
one of the pilot project areas in 1995, the UPT changed its status to become 
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Kantor Pelayanan Perijinan Terpadu or KPPT (Integrated Permits Service Office). 
Since May 2001, the KPPT has changed its status to be a Dinas (local agency or 
service). 
What makes the difference between UPT, KPPT and Dinas? First, its power has 
changed from UPT (Unit), KPPT (Kantor) to Dinas. UPT is only a small unit with 
a few staff under the control of an office or a Kandep to handle technical matters. 
Before 1995, the UPT functioned as a door for entry and exit, and where the 
power was in the hands of Kandep as representative agencies of the central 
government at the local level. KPPT is an office that has more power compared 
to UPT. An office usually consists of an office head, a sub-division of secretariat, 
and some sections as implementing units. However, the powers of KPPT and 
UPT at that time were similar. If UPT was under the control of representative 
agencies of the central government, KPPT was under the control of other local 
agencies. A Dinas is more complex where it comprises: dinas head, a division of 
secretariat with several sub-divisions, several sub-dinases with several sections· 
in each sub-dinas. Second, by developing its status from UPT and KPPT to 
Dinas, the authority for issuing licenses or permits has been concentrated in one 
office. When it was as a UPT or a KPPT, customer proposals had to be 
approved by several agencies. Through Dinas, approval can be obtained from 
and determined by the Dinas itself. 
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Although it is very obvious that DPPM is the orily agency issuing licenses, 
certain licenses still need some requirements from other agencies. For example, 
to have a permanent business license, the applicant has to enclose a letter of 
recommendation or location license issued by Bappekab (local planning agency) 
or Badan Pertanahan Nasional (National Land Board) respectively. 
According to the agency head, Fathur Rozi, there are 14 kinds of licenses. He is 
thinking of creating only one license to make it easier for the business people to 
obtain permits. Moreover, Fathur Rozi is thinking of speeding up the response 
to give permits without waiting for the district head's instruction. So far, there 
has been an increase in terms of the amount of investment. In 1999, this was 21 
billion rupiahs and in 2000 it was 50 billion rupiahs. To business people, ahead 
of trust and security, the process of licensing is very important122. 
To support the service of licensing, the Sidoarjo government has made a great 
effort to achieve a high standard of public service as shown by the acceptance of 
an ISO 9001 certificate from Sucofindo. With this achievement, the license 
service has been internationally recognised.123 The Sidoarjo model of one-stop 
service is also recognised by the Asia Foundation as the best model of business 
service in Indonesia.124 Some local governments (North Kalimantan and Blitar) 
visited Sidoarjo to learn how the services are delivered.125 
122 See 'Perijinan Tanpa Menunggu Bupati' (Licenses without waiting for the district head), Jawa 
Pos,October 18, 2002. 
123 See 'Keter/ambatan Tingga/ 20 Persen' (Delays only 20 per cent left}, Jawa Pos, January 29, 2003. 
124 See http://www.sidoarjo.go.id/berita/asia-foundation.htm, printed on February 20, 2003. 
125 See http://www.sidoarjo.go.id/berita/dppm-siap.htm, printed on May 20, 2003 
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However, whether or not business people are interested in. investing their 
money is not influenced by a single factor alone, and DPPM is not the only 
agency determining the decisions of investors. Conflict between DPPM with 
other agencies such as Dispenda occurs very often. On the one hand, DPPM is 
responsible for inviting as many investors as possible and making their stay 
comfortable. On the other hand, Dispenda is assigned to collect as much money 
as possible. It is not easy, for example if DPPM wants to minimise the charges 
for its services, Dispenda is the agency responsible for determining the target. 
Each has its own target, and no other agencies can intervene. 
6.4.1.2. Promoting Growth-Pole Triangle Development and Tax Relief 
Another program intended to attract investors has been initiated by Sidoatjo 
Government by developing Siborian Growth-pole Triangle. SIBORIAN stands 
for Sidoarjo Subdistrict, Jabon Subdistrict, and By-Pass Krian. These three are 
industrial and trading areas that have been improved by the Government of 
Sidoatjo District. Each of them has industrial attractiveness and advantages .. 
They offer advantages for foreign investment and also domestic investment. It 
is near to the Provincial Capital City (Surabaya) which provides all of the 
facilities needed by industries, such as a large number of potential customers 
and all kinds of resources which are needed by industries. Juanda Airport and 
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Tanjung Perak Harbour also support industrial needs such as distribution 
access for domestic or international destinations.126 
The Siborian project has had a feasibility study done in 1993. However, there 
has been no progress either in inviting new investors from outside Sidoarjo to 
come to Siborian or encouraging the existing investors to expand their business 
·activities. Up to year 2001, the industrial zone of Siborian consisting of 1,000 
acres (Sidoarjo 200 acres, Jabon 600 acres and Krian 200 acres) has zero 
realisation (Badan Penanaman Modal Jawa Timur 2002). Therefore, after being 
elected as the Bupati of Sidoarjo, Win Hendarso reintroduced the idea of 
developing Siborian. In order to make it more attractive, the Pemda of Sidoarjo 
also offers facilities for permit, tax and levy relief up to 50 per cent to those who 
invest in Siborian.127 
The formation of DPPM and the development of the growth-pole triangle have 
been followed by other supporting programs. For example, to facilitate business 
people in obtaining license information, the Sidoarjo government has also 
provided a web-site that can be accessed from other countries. Together with 
the other five district or regional governments -Medan, Balikpapan, Jakarta, 
Bandung, and Makassar- President Megawati officially opened the pilot 
project on integrated e-govemment in conjunction with the launching of 'Portal 
Nasional' or the National Official Website by conducting a video conference on 
126 See http://www.sidoarjo.go.id, printed on May 3, 2003 
127 See 'Sidoarjo lzin Disederhanakan' (Sidoarjo Permits simplified), Jawa Pos, January 20, 2003. 
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the occasion of National Awakening Day of May 20, 2002.128 The East Java 
Governor attended the launching of the web-site of Sidoarjo called Delta Cyber 
Zone (DCZ). This web-site contains three main services: governmental affairs, 
education and small-medium business development. This web-site has been 
built based on the cooperation between the government of Sidoarjo and the 
Division V of PT Telkom129. This covers 14 kinds of license services. It was 
expected that by the end of 2003 all districts in East Java would have web-sites. 
Although Sidoarjo has made great efforts in promoting Sidoarjo to investors, it 
has not been successfully recognised by business people. Kamar Dagang dan 
Industry Indonesia or Kadin (Indonesian Chamber of Trade and Finance) 
announced· the ranking of 134 districts in terms of the seriousness of managing 
investment. In first position is Semarang. In east Java, there are four districts 
that are conducive to investment: Kota Kediri (No. 8), Kota Malang (No. 15), 
Kabupaten Sidoarjo (No. 17) and Kota Surabaya (No. 18).130 This rank shows that 
Sidoarjo has not attracted business people to expand their business activities . 
there . Table 6.2. shows that after decentralisation there have been no significant 
changes in the number of investors coming to Sidoarjo. On the contrary, the 
number of new investors coming after year 2000 was smaller than that of 
128 See Decentralisation News, GTZSfDM, 28, May 24, 2002. 
129 See 'Portal "£-Government" Pemkab Sidoarjo Diluncurkan' (Sidoarjo website launched), Jawa Pos, 
May 21, 2001. See also 'Sidoarjo optimis Delta Cyber Zone (DCZ) jalan Terus' (Sidoarjo optimistic 
Delta Cyber Zone goes ahead), Jawa Pos, September 24, 2002. 
130 See 'Empat Kota di Jatim Layak Investasi Versi KPPOD' (Four cities of East Java deserved for 
investment KPPOD version), Jawa Pos, January 20, 2003. 
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previous years. In 2001 and 2002, the new investors numbered only 5 and 2 
respectively (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2. Cumulative Agreement of Domestic and Foreign Investment 
from 1967 in Sidoarjo (1990-2002) 
Year Domestic Yearly Foreign Yearly 
Investment Increase Investment Increase 
Projects Projects 
1990 121 24 
1991 144 23 38 14 
1992 156 12 43 5 
1993 183 27 52 9 
1994 195 12 63 11 
1995 218 23 71 8 
1996 237 19 77 6 
1997 249 12 82 5 
1998 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1999 252 n.a 92 n.a 
2000 256 4 101 9 
2001 258 2 106 5 
2002 258 2 108 2 
Source: calculated from various sources obtained from interviews with an BPM officer 
in Surabaya, February 20, 2002. 
6.4.2. The Regulatory Regime Inhibiting the Business Sector: 
Exploiting Taxes and Levies 
With Law No. 18/1997131, the central government has in fact limited the local 
government to charge local taxes and levies. Some kinds of taxes and levies 
have been abolished to encourage the local economy. According to the central 
government, the previous local taxes and levies were not efficient and 
131 This law has been renewed with Law No. 34/2000 on the Changes of Law No. 18/1997 on local taxes 
and levies. 
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discouraged the local economy. When Laws No. 22 and 25 were issued, many 
local governments asked the central government to cancel Law No. 18/1997 to 
give more space for local governments to create new regulations on local taxes 
and levies. 
In the early months of the implementation of local autonomy, beside the 
regulations to attract investors, the Bupati of Sidoatjo also drew up new district 
regulations on taxes and levies; these are perceived to be hampering business 
activities in Sidoatjo. On November 21, 2001, 6 (six) Perda on local taxes and 18 
(eighteen) Perda on local levies were issued. The new regulations (Perda) were 
intended to generate local revenue for the region of Sidoatjo. To some extent, 
the content of the regulation is new. Some of the local taxes and levies are old, 
but the amount of the charge is new. 
Both the executive and legislative body have been very enthusiastic in 
promoting policy on local revenue by increasing local taxes and levies. For the 
executive, increase in the local income means an increase in the activity that will 
give benefit to them. For the legislative body members, if the local income 
increases, their salary will increase, too. 
There are now at least eight new local regulations related to the business 
sector132: 
132 Source: APBD Sidoarjo, (Sidoarjo Regional Budget) 2002 and Himpunan Perda tentang Retribusi 
Daerah Tahun 2001 (Compilation of Local Regulations on Levies Year 2001), Surabaya Post, May 14, 
1999) 
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• Levies on Inspection of fire extinguishers (Perda No. 19/2001). This includes 
levies on 'No S rooking' and 'No Entry' sig ns, sprinklers and alarms. 
• Levies on Building Establishment Permits (Perda No. 25 /2001) 
• Levies on Transport Route Permits (Perda No. 27 /2001) 
• Levies on Business Activity Permits (Perda No. 28/2001) 
• Levies on Inspection of and testing of fishery products and meat materials 
(Perda No. 29/2001) 
• Levies on Labour Services (Perda No. 31/2001). This includes levies on fork-
lifts that would be charged in 2003. 
• Taxes on Special Parking Areas (Perda No. 22/2001) 
• Levies on Terminals (Perda No. 21/2001) 
With the new regulations issued in Perda of 2001, the local government of 
Sidoarjo has targeted the increase in the local revenue. Looking at Table 6.2., it 
is obvious that the target of local government increased dramatically from year 
1999 to year 2002. Some types of tax are old, but some others are new. The. 
amended local regulations show the increase in the target of taxes and levies. 
For some new levies, the target has been determined whereas some others have 
not. 
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Table 6.3. Types of Local Taxes and Levies Related to the Business Sector 
No Types of Taxes and Year 1999 Year2002 Status 
Levies Target (Rupiah) Target (Rupiah) 
1. Tax on Hotel and 750,000,000.00 1,900,000,000.00 Amended Perda 
Restaurant 
2. Tax on Entertainment 155,000,000.00 350,000,000.00 Amended Perda 
3. Tax on Advertisement 350,000,000.00 800,000,000.00 Amended Perda 
4. Tax on Public Lighting 12,300,000,000.0 24,800,000,000.0 Amended Perda 
0 0 
5. Tax on Natural 00 Abolished 
Resources Exploitation 
(Category C) 
6. Tax on the use of 1,934,000,000.00 From 2002, it was taken 
Surface and by the provincial 
Underground Water government 
7. Tax on Public Road 134,325,000.00 Amended Perda 
Parking 
8. Levy on Terminal 1,463,100,000.00 2,500,000,000.00 Amended Perda 
9. Levy on Building 1,300,000,000.00 3,500,000,000.00 Amended Perda 
Establishment Permits 
10. Levy on Transportation 110,000,000.00 125,000,000.00 Amended Perda 
Route Permits 
11. Levy on Inspection of 250,000,000.00 New 
Fire Extinguisher 
12. Levy on Special Area 550,000,000.00 New 
Parking 
13. Levy on Labor Services 17,050,000.00 New 
14. Levy on Business Not available New 
Permits 
15. Levy on Inspection of Not available New 
Product Quality of 
Fishery and of Meats 
16. Levy on the use of Not available To be imposed in 2003 
Fork-lift 
17. Levy on Disturbance 1,750,000,000.00 Amended Perda 
Permits 
Source: Data from various local budgets of Sidoatjo, 1999-2002 
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6.5. Responses of the Business People to the Local 
Regulations 
During the early period of the implementation of decentralisation, the local 
government of Sidoatjo passed several local regulations. In 2002, Sidoatjo 
achieved the Autonomy Award given by The Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi. 
The achievement award was based on the criteria of 'strong initiative in public 
service improvement' 133. 
Based on the regulations issued by the local government, what has been the real 
response of the business sector? The following tables ( 6.4-6.11) show the 
response of the business people in relation to local government policy. To 
strengthen the argument based on the quantitative data from my survey, some 
cases drawn from in-depth interviews are also presented. 
Table 6.4. Impact of Local Autonomy on Business Pennit Facilitation Based 
on Company Size 
In the last twelve months, do 
you think that local Number of em:eloyee 
autonomy has had a positive <20 20-99 ~100 Total 
im:eact on :eermit facilitation? 
Yes 38 7 10 55 
(40.4%) (46.7%) (58.8%) (43.7%) 
No 17 7 6 30 
(18.1%) (46.7%) (35.3%) (23.8%) 
Don't know 39 1 1 41 
(41.5%) (6.7%) (5.9%) (32.5%) 
Total 94 15 17 126 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Data obtained from survey questionnaire, 2002 
133 In 2003, the greatest award has been given to Kediri district. 
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As can be seen from Table 6.3., the perception of business people is positive in 
terms of permit facilitation. There are 43.7 per cent saying 'yes', meaning that 
after decentralisation the permit facilitation is better. There are 23.8 per cent 
saying 'no' and 32.5 per cent saying 'don' t know'. The fact that the majority 
of the respondents said 'yes' is perhaps related to the existence of the new 
agency created by the Sidoarjo local government. However, if we look at the 
responses on the difference in the size of business, the response is a little bit 
different. For small business sectors, 41.5 per cent said 'don't know' because 
most of them had never had any dealing with permits to run their businesses. 
Some business people interviewed said that they did not have to go to several 
agencies to obtain permits. The procedure is now simpler compared to the 
previous procedure. In contrast, they also complained that the bureaucracy of 
licensing services is still not efficient. It takes too long to work on one permit. 
They also see some problems with the new agency vis-a-vis other agencies. 
These misgivings are justified since some cases have arisen where conflict. 
among agencies existed making the services given by DPPM less effective. 
Some business people are not satisfied with the services given by the local 
government. 
For example, Disperindag, having been weakened due to losing authority, se~s· 
that DPPM is not actually able to serve business people properly. All files 
related to previous permits are still in the office of Disperindag aird it is not easy 
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for DPPM to ask for the files. If there were a problem faced by a company, 
DPPM could not handle it because the file would still be in Disperindag. But, if 
the staff of Disperindag were asked to help solve this problem, they would reject 
it because this was none of their business any more. To such an agency as 
Disperindag, loss of power means loss of income from people receiving their 
services. It is therefore not advantageous for the staff of Disperindag just to 
surrender the files of permits to DPPM. 
Another problem is related to how DPPM issued the licenses. A pejabat in 
Disperindag134 showed me that Tanda Daftar Perusahaan or TDP (Company 
Registration Identification) issued by DPPM was still using Disperindag-
labelled paper but the paper was signed by the head of DPPM. According to 
him, this problem cannot simply be solved by changing the label on the paper. 
Further, licenses issued by DPPM still claim that they are 'valid for all over 
Indonesia'. This is ridiculous since local autonomy allows local governments 
to create their own regulations and ignores other local governments' 
regulations. Through local autonomy, no permits are valid 'all over Indonesia' 
anymore. 
As far as the authority of administering business data is concerned, it is difficult 
to obtain data on business development in Sidoarjo. Investors that enter into a 
joint venture will find difficulties in finding out who is responsible for business 
activities: Disperindag, DPPM, Disnaker or others? It is such a difficult 
134 Interview with Mohammad Thalib from Disperindag, January 20, 2002. 
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question. In fact, according to the Minister of Industry and Trade decision No. 
289/MPP/Kep/10/2001 on the Standard Rule of Business Permits (SIUP) 
Delivery, every medium and large company holding a business permit is 
obliged to report on its activities at least two times a year to Disperindag. There 
is a penalty for those who do not surrender data to the government. 
Table 6.5. Impact of Local Autonomy on Investment Promotion Based on 
In the last twelve months, do 
you think that local 
autonomy has had a positive 
impact on investment 
promotion? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Total 
Company Size · 
Number of employee 
<20 20-99 ~ 100 
25 
(26.6%) 
31 
(33.0%) 
38 
(40.4%) 
94 
(100%) 
6 
(40.0%) 
6 
(40.0%) 
3 
(20.0%) 
15 
(100%) 
3 
(17.6%) 
11 
(64.7%) 
3 
(17.6%) 
17 
(100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
Total 
34 
(27.0%) 
48 
(38.1%) 
44 
(34.9%) 
126 
(100%) 
In terms of investment promotion, only 27 per cent of respondents said that. 
decentralisation has positive impacts. Interestingly, 40 per cent of the medium 
businesses interviewed replied positively, whereas 64.7 per cent of the big 
businesses replied negatively. In fact, little has been done by the local 
government to promote Sidoarjo. For example, on February 5-10, 2001, the 
Sidoarjo government conducted an 'Open House' in the Pendopo Agung. It 
was directed toward inviting new investors to come to Sidoarjo. The 
participants included, for example, Telkom, PLN, Tjiwi Kimia, and Pemda 
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Sidoarjo. During this event, various activities . such as disseminating 
information on local potential and the process of licensing were introduced.135 
Unfortunately, this promotion was not interesting to many business people, 
and only a few business people participated. 
Promoting the business products of Sidoarjo has been done by the Local 
Agency for Tourism Sidoarjo by mounting an exhibition called 'Bulan Obral dan 
Promosi Sidoarjo' (The Months of Discount and Promotion of Sidoarjo) or BOSI. 
This event was expected to promote products of Sidoarjo. However, this 
activity was not supported by big businesses such as Maspion, Kasogi and 
Tjiwi Kimia~ The local government prepared 122 stands, however, there were 
still 24 empty ones left.136 Although BOSI is held yearly, only small businesses 
are interested in this kind of promotion. Promotion in overseas countries is 
usually organised by the central government, and not by the local government. 
Large businesses do not rely on the local government to participate in an 
overseas promotion. 
135 See 'Open House Jendela Sidoarjo Sepi' (Open House In Sidoarjo Quiet), Kompas, February 7, 2001. 
136 See 'Pameran BOS/ di Sidoarjo Terhalang Pengusaha Besar ', (BOSI Exhibition in Sidoarjo Inhibited 
by Big Businesses), Bhirawa,August 13, 1999. 
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Table 6.6. Impact of Local Autonomy on Tender Process Facilitation Based 
on Company Size 
In the last twelve months, 
do you think that local Number of employee Total 
autonomy has had a 
<20 20-99 ~100 positive impact on tender 
process facilitation? 
Yes 19 1 0 20 
(20.2%) (6.7%) (0.0%) (15.9%) 
No 35 7 10 52 
(37.2%). (46.7%) (58.8%) (41.3%) 
Don't know 40 7 7 54 
(42.6%) (46.7%) (41.2%) (42.9%) 
Total 94 15 17 126 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
Table 6.6. shows that 15.9 per cent of the respondents thought that 
decentralisation had had positive impacts on the tender process. Most of them 
thought that the tender process had had not changed (41.3 per cent) or 'did not 
know' (42.9 per cent). However, if we look at Table 6.7, most contractors said 
'yes' meaning that decentralisation has had a positive impact (55.2 per cent). 
In contrast, non-contractors, only a few said 'yes' (18.6 per cent). When I · 
interviewed some non-contractor businessmen, they said that their business 
activities do not relate to the local government. The procurement of materials 
by the local government does not involve business people who are not 
members of KADINDA. 
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Table 6.7. Impact of Local Autonomy on Tender Process Facilitation Based 
on Contractor and Non-Contractor 
In the last twelve 
months, do you think 
that local autonomy has 
had a positive impact on 
fair competition 
promotion? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Total 
TyPe of business 
Contractor Non-contractor 
15 5 
(57.1%) (5.2%) 
11 41 
(37.9%) (42.3%) 
3 51 
(10.3%) (52.6%) 
29 97 
(100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
Total 
20 
(15.9%) 
52 
(41.3%) 
54 
(42.9%) 
126 
(100%) 
A number of local contractors still see some problems related to the tender 
process of local government projects. The contractors demand that the local 
government disclose information about projects that will be tendered. On 
September 30, 2002 a number of local contractors protested about the process of 
procurement for an incinerator in the Local Agency for Waste Affairs (Dinas 
Kebersihan). They saw that the tender was not open, and in fact the value of the 
tender was not such small money. The total value was about 1.2 million 
rupiahst37, 
137 See 'Pengadaan Incinerator Tanpa Tender' (The Procurement of Incinerator without tendering), Jawa 
Pos, October I, 2002. 
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Related to the tender process is fair competition. Of the total, 30.4 per cent of 
the respondents said ' yes'; 36.8 per cent said 'no' and 32.3 per cent per cent 
said 'do not know'. In the three categories of business, there are no differences 
between small, medium and large businesses (Table 6.8). However, if we look 
at the impact based on contractor and non-contractor, the difference is very 
clear. Most contractors said that decentralisation had had impacts on fair 
competition (48.3 per cent}, whereas for non-contractors it was only 25.0 per 
cent (Table 6.9). For non-contractors, getting jobs from the local government is 
not easy. They have to gain KADINDA membership to be recognised as a 
supplier of the local government. 
Table 6.8. Impact of Local Autonomy on Fair Competition 
Promotion Based Company Size 
In the last twelve months, 
do you think that local 
autonomy has had a 
positive impact on fair 
competition promotion? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Total 
Number of employee 
<20 20-99 ~ 100 
28 
(29.8%) 
33 
(35.1%) 
33 
(35.1%) 
94 
(100%) 
5 
(33.3%) 
6 
(40.0%) 
4 
(26.7%) 
15 
(100%) 
5 
(31.3%) 
7 
(43.8%) 
4 
(25.0%) 
17 
(100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
Total 
38 
(30.4%) 
46 
(36.8%) 
41 
(32.3%) 
126 
(100%) 
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Table 6.9. Impact of Local Autonomy on Fair Competition Based on 
Contractor and Non-Contractor 
In the last twelve months, do 
you think that local 
autonomy has had a positive 
impact on fair competition 
promotion? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Total 
Type of business 
Contractor Non-contractor 
14 24 
(48.3%) (25.0%) 
8 38 
(27.6%) (39.6%) 
7 41 
(24.1%) (42.3%) 
29 97 
(100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
Total 
38 
(27.0%) 
48 
(38.1%) 
44 
(34.9%) 
126 
(100%) 
Table 6.10. Impact of Local Autonomy on Distribution Cost Reduction 
Based on Company Size 
In the last twelve months, 
do you think that local 
autonomy has had a 
positive impact on 
distribution cost 
reduction? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Total 
Number of employee 
<20 20-99 ~ 100 
14 1 3 
(14.9%) (6.7%) (17.6%) 
38 10 13 
(40.4%) (66.7%) (76.5%) 
42 4 1 
(44.7%) (26.7%) (5.9%) 
94 15 17 
(100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
Total 
18 
(14.3%) 
61 
(48.4%) 
47 
(37.3%) 
126 
(100%) 
In terms of distribution costs, most respondents interviewed were worried 
about increases in levies charged by local governments. There were 48.4 per 
cent of the respondents saying that local autonomy has had no positive impacts 
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on distribution cost reduction. There were only 14.3 per cent who said 'yes' to 
the positive impacts of local autonomy on the distribution cost reduction, 
whereas the other 37.3 per cent said 'do not know'. 
The responses above may be genuine; many local governments have charged 
vehicles travelling on the roads through their jurisdictions, and this can 
increase the costs of distribution. Competition among local governments to 
increase local revenue has led to an adoption of many such levies. This was 
experienced by the owner of Legong Bali Ltd. when he was sending their 
products to West Java. The truck was not only stopped in every district but also 
when it passed through different area of one province. This finding concurs 
with the findings of SMERU (2001) in several regions of Indonesia. 
Table 6.11. Impact of Local Autonomy on Taxes and Levies Reduction Based 
In the last twelve months, 
do you think that local 
autonomy has had a 
positive impact on taxes 
and levies reduction? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Total 
on Company Size · 
Number of employee 
<20 20-99 ~ 100 
8 
(8.5%) 
51 
(54.3%) 
35 
(37.2%) 
94 
(100%) 
1 
(6.7%) 
11 
(73.3%) 
3 
(20.0%) 
15 
(100%) 
2 
(12.5%) 
11 
(68.8%) 
3 
(18.8%) 
17 
(100%) 
Total 
11 
(8.8%) 
73 
(58.4%) 
41 
(32.8%) 
126 
(100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
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For most local governments, local taxes and levies have been the main target in 
their attempts to increase local revenue. There has been a misunderstanding 
among local government officials that they often interpret local autonomy as 
'auto money'. Increasing local taxes and levies have been the focus during the 
implementation of local autonomy. Therefore, local taxes and levies have the 
most significant impact on the business sector. Most business people have 
complained about the increase in this kind of charge. A majority, 58.4 per cent 
of the respondents, agreed that with decentralisation local taxes and levies have 
had a bad impact on the business sector. Only 8.8 per cent of the respondents 
felt that local taxes and levies have had positive impacts on the business sector. 
The responses are based on the fact that almost all local regulations related to 
local taxes and levies have been amended by local government. Below are some 
examples of the changes in Sidoarjo. 
6.5.1. Changes of Local Taxes and Levies 
6.5.1.1. Levy on Business Activity Permits 
Before decentralisation, business permits were issued by the [national] 
Department of Industry and Trade. At the district level, this department was at 
arms-length, through an agency that was called Kandep Perindustrian dan 
Perdagangan. Business permit issuance was also devolved when decentralisation 
was applied. Following Law No. 22 of 1999 on Local Government and 
Government Regulation No. 25 of 2000 on Local Authority as Autonomous 
Region, the Minister of Industry and Trade issued Decree No. 
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289/MPP/Kep/10/2001 on Standard Rule of Business Permit (SIUP) Delivery. 
This decree states that SIUP delivery authority is now in the hands of district 
head, that is the agency head or a unit responsible for trade affairs in the district 
area. 
In practice, local government in Sidoatjo has changed several rules related to 
SIUP. The changes are contradictory with the rule issued by the Minister of 
Industry and Trade. First, the SIUP permit was previously free of charge, now it 
is costly. The Minister of Industry and Trade decree issued in 2001 has in fact 
asserted that the cost to the business people for SIUP is zero rupiah. Further, the 
Minister of Industry and Trade sent a letter to every local government, stating 
that the local government was . allowed to charge SIUP, however1 the charge 
was only to substitute the cost of the application form paper (photocopy) 
(KepMenindag, 28/9 /2000)138. However, according to local regulation (No. 28 of 
2001), SIUP for small businesses is Rpl00,000.00 whereas for medium and big 
businesses it is Rp250,000.00 and RpS00,000.00, respectively. Beside the formal. 
cost, additional costs of services are also paid by business people.· Before 
decentralisation, SIUP was valid for the life of the business and all over 
Indonesia. After decentralisation, SIUP has to be renewed every three years by 
paying a third of the new application cost, and other SIUP coming from other 
138 According to Asrofi (from the Agency for Local Revenue), the fax sent by the Minister oflndustry 
and Trade is to abolish the charge of licensing taken up by the local government. 
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regions have to be registered with the Sidoarjo Government. It means also that 
to re-register in Sidoarjo the business has to pay the service charge. Ironically, 
SIUP issued by Sidoarjo Government still states that 'This SIUP is valid all over 
Indonesia". 
This new local regulation has been applied to business companies in Sidoarjo 
since November 21, 2001. The following presents some cases based on the 
experiences of several business people. 
Case 6.4. : Cost of Business Permit 
Jalur Rezeki Co. Ltd is a sandal company owned by an indigenous 
businessman. This company supplies big companies such as Carvil. It 
employs around 75 workers. Jalur Rezeki Co Ltd was built in 
Surabaya and then moved to Sidoarjo. When the company moved to 
Sidoarjo, the owner had to renew its SIUP since it was registered 
under Surabaya Government. Due to local autonomy, Sidoarjo 
Government asked the company to have a new SIUP issued by 
Sidoarjo Government. To get the new SIUP, this company -as a 
medium company- should pay only 250,000 rupiahs. However, the 
local government apparatus serving this SIUP asked for 750,000 
rupiahs from this company.139 
Other cases related to SIUP were also experienced by business people in. 
Tanggulangin. When I interviewed them, most of them have had no SIUP. They 
were reluctant to obtain business permits since they do not really need them 
unless they want a loan from a bank or financial assistance from the 
government. They know that to get the SIUP they have to spend some money. 
139 Interview with Ali, the owner of Jalur Rezeki Co. Ltd., February 19, 2002. 
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6.5.1.2. Levy on Generator Sets and Fire Extinguishers 
These two levies were in fact introduced a long time ago. However, the local 
government just applied them to business people shortly after decentralisation. 
In Sidoatjo, generator sets owned by a company are also charged a sort of GST 
(good and services tax) similar to that levied on the use of electricity produced 
by the state-owned company. Other districts have not yet introduced this kind 
of tax. If a company uses electricity produced by the state-owned company, 
they will be charged some 9 per cent of the total bill. If they produce electricity 
by using their own generator set, they will also be charged by the local 
government. 
Properties are taxed based on the number of fire extinguishers they own. For 
companies that want more apparatus to fight fires, they have to pay levies 
whereas companies that have no fire extinguisher do not have any 
responsibility to pay the tax. The companies I interviewed complained about 
this kind of levy. They are thinking of not having fire extinguisher since they. 
have to pay for every single fire extinguisher they have. It means that the social 
responsibility of the company has to be paid for at a high cost. This fire 
extinguisher levy is based on Pertia No. 19 /2001. In fact this is not a new Perda, 
however, the local government is going to put it into effect in 2002 to increase 
local revenue. 
Under the Perda No. 19/2001 concerning fire extinguishers, the use of alarms 
and sprinklers, the placing of 'No Smoking' and 'No Entry' signs will be 
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charged also by the local government. Many people also wondered why 
business people who are concerned with security and safety (by providing fire 
extinguisher, alarm, or security signs) have to be charged, whereas the other 
people who are not so concerned are free of the taxes and levies. 
6.5.1.3. Levy on Abattoirs 
This is not a new levy applied by the local government of Sidoatjo. However, 
the way the local government applies it to business people is regarded as 
ridiculous. 
Case 6.5: Double Charges Paid to District and Provincial 
Government 
Tjiomas Ltd is a company which exports packaged chicken to Japan. 
This company is situated in Wonoayu sub-district, Sidoatjo. In total, 
this company normally slaughters around 20,000 chickens every day. 
To do these jobs, there are around 500 employees working in this 
company. 
According to the marketing manager of Tjiomas, the Sidoatjo local 
government is demanding a levy of 100 Rupiahs for each chicken 
slaughtered. It means that there are double charges: 100 rupiahs to 
the provincial government and 100 rupiahs to the district 
government. Therefore, Tjiomas rejected this double charging. In fact, 
it says in Article 8.b.(4) of Perda No. 23/2001 that the charge applies 
only to chicken slaughtered in the abattoir, and Tjiomas does not use 
the abattoir. If Tjiomas has to pay 200 rupiahs per chicken, the cost 
could be 4,000,000 per day. It would be such a large amount of 
money in a month, around 100 million rupiahs. When Tjiomas asked 
to reduce the charge, a member of local parliament responded that 
the company was not responsible. The member of the local 
parliament said that 100 rupiah is very small, even the street beggar 
will not receive such a small amount of money. Tjiomas argued that 
it is not one chicken, but twenty thousand. The negotiation between 
the provincial and district government has come to the conclusion 
that the former will receive 80 rupiahs whereas the latter will receive 
20 rupiahs. 
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What can see from the case of Tjiomas is that the local government does not 
provide anything but takes money from the company. In fact, levies paid by 
a company have to relate to the services provided by the local government. 
In the case of Sidoarjo, the application of levies is not supported by the 
delivery of services. The same can be seen in case 6.7. 
6.5.1.4. Levy on Disturbance Law Permits 
According to several business people, due to the application of local autonomy, 
Sidoarjo local government has changed the HO (hinder ordonantie) regulation. 
HO is a permit for a company that must have approval from the people 
surrounding the company if there is going to be no serious disturbance in terms 
of voice, danger, pollution etc. According to local regulation No. 26 of 2001, the 
cost of·a HO permit depends on the area in which a company will be built. If 
the company area is far from a housing area the cost is cheaper than that for one 
closer to a housing area. This Perda has abolished the previous Perda No. 13 of 
1998 concerning the same matter. Principally, the contents of the two Perda are . 
the same. However, the local government wants to apply the regulations more 
seriously to increase local revenue. 
According to local government officials, the principle stated by central 
government regulation is that HO has to be renewed every five years. 
However, Sidoarjo local government has shortened the duration to three years 
in order to collect more revenue from this kind of permit. As a result, every 
company has to pay renewal costs every three years, not every five years. 
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Besides, before decentralisation, the cost of renewal was only Rpll0,000.00 
regardless of the size of the company. After decentralisation, renewal cost has 
increased dramatically, reaching 30 per cent of the total cost of a new 
application. In addition, the new regulation requires inspection by a team to 
make sure that there is no change in company size and capacity. The team 
consists of twelve people coming from various local agencies. These changes 
have become a burden for companies. 
Case 6.6.: Enormous Increase in Disturbance Permit Costs 
Tjiwi Kimia is a paper company supplying domestic and 
international markets. Tjiwi Kimia Ltd has more than 12 HO permits, 
meaning that every three months this company has to renew one 
permit. One permit costs at least a third of five million rupiahs. 
Moreover, this company also has to provide 'pocket money' for the 
team of at least fifty thousand rupiahs per person. Otherwise, the 
permit will not be issued. The total 'pocket money' can be six 
hundred thousand rupiahs. As a result, the increase in the payment 
of HO permits paid by Tjiwi Kimia Ltd. can be more than 1000 per 
cent140 since it has an area of 200 hectares employing more than 
13,000 workers. Other companies such as Nestle have now to pay 
Rp80 million for renewal, whereas Ispat lndo pays RplSO million.141 
The case above shows that companies have had a heavy burden imposed on 
them due to increases in the disturbance permit. The local government has 
used the moment of autonomy to take more money from business people. 
For business people, the increases have been perceived as extremely high 
and as bad for business activities. 
140 Interview with Sjaiful Adji, former official at Local Agency for Permits and Investment, January 20, 
2002. 
141 Interview with Supini from Local Agency for Permits and Investment, 12 May 2002. 
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6.5.1.5. Levy on Inspection on and Testing of Meat or Fish Product Quality 
Government Regulation No. 25 of 2000 has provided district governments with 
the authority to conduct an inspection on and testing of fishery and meat 
product quality. This used to be conducted by provincial governments. 
Therefore, all companies producing food using meat or fish are required to 
provide samples to be tested by local government. This includes organoleptic 
testing (smell, colour, and consistency), decay testing, and microbiology testing. 
According to Sidoatjo local government regulation (No. 29 of 2001), for up to 50 
kilograms of product, one sample is needed, and a different amount of sample 
is required if the amount of product is different. For example, a company 
producing 501-1,000 kilograms of product has to provide seven samples every 
day. The cost of testing sample varies from one product to another. 
The new regulation has severely affected companies manufacturing products 
made of meat and fish. My interview with the owner of a company is 
summarised below: 
Case 6.7.: Payments for Nothing 
Eloda Mitra Ltd. is a company belonging to an Indonesian Chinese, 
producing meatballs for export. This company was established in 
1976 and is located in Jl. Jenggolo No. 11 Sidoatjo. Initially, it was a 
company running chicken and cattle. After seven years, the company 
expanded its activities to the processing of fresh chicken and meats. 
In 1989, the company started producing sausages, ham and various 
manufactured meats with the trade-mark 'Bernardi'. 
According to the owner of the company, after decentralisation, the 
local government charged various fees for meat and chicken 
inspection. This company pays 10,000 rupiahs per sample. Based on 
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the amount of the product, the company has to pay 50,000 rupiahs 
per day or almost one and a half million rupiahs a month. However, 
this payment is for nothing, since the Sidoarjo Government has no 
adequate laboratory for the testing. What the local government then 
does is to ask the company to do its own testing but the levy has still 
to be paid to the local government. Mr. Yitno (the owner of Eloda 
Mitra) does not mind giving the levies to the local government if they 
do the job. According to him, the local government just wants the 
money without working. When it was under the authority of the 
provincial government, they did the job, although they took too long 
to provide the results.142 
The above example is evidence that the local government is only concerned 
with taking the money, but not with providing the service it is supposed to. 
The local government tended to focus on short-term targets through 
imposing local taxes and levies rather than on long-term targets through 
improving services that would encourage business activities. 
6.5.1.6. Taxes on Special Parking Area 
Business people who have special parking areas will be charged taxes by the 
local government. When I interviewed an officer from the Local Agency for 
Local Revenue, he said that this tax would be applied immediately. They had 
already done 'dissemination' to business people by collecting data on the 
number and size of parking areas owned by business companies in Sidoarjo. 
A number of business people have disagreed with this kind of tax since it will 
be a further burden to the business people. Ramayana, Artha Glory Buana and 
Kasogi are some companies that do not agree with this tax. From this special 
142 Interview with Mr Yitno, the owner of the company, 3 April 2002. 
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parking area tax, the local government expects an income of up to 
Rp550,000,000.00 a year. 
Looking at the various cases cited above, it is obvious that the local government 
is using the opportunity to increase local revenue. They charge business people 
without considering the implications of the high cost applied by the local 
government. One company can have impacts of several permit. For example, 
Tjiwi Kimia will experience the impacts of the increase in the business permit 
levy, the disturbance permits, the generator set and extinguisher levy, and 
various signs levy. Ramayana will be burdened by the business permit, the 
disturbance permit and the special parking taxes. Costs that will be paid by the 
big companies are very high. Most business people I interviewed said that they 
will face difficulty in paying workers according to the minimum standard 
unless local taxes and levies are minimised. For example, the enormous increase 
in the disturbance permit charge could be used for workers' wages. 
6.6. Conclusions 
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that to some extent 
decentralisation has affected the local government of Sidoatjo in relation to the 
services and local regulations related to the business sector. Various changes at 
the local level occurred during the early period of decentralisation 
implementation. Unfortunately, there is still a tug-of-war going on over 
business regulations between the central and local governments. Although the 
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new law has given the mandate to local governments to run all functions, the 
central government has tried to retain several functions by issuing some 
decrees that are contradictory with the new law. 
In operating the functions related to the business sector, various local service 
agencies still exist. In this regard, reforming organisations serving business 
activities has not been smooth. Fragmented agencies related to the business 
sector still exist. However, one very positive step has been taken to attract 
investors where the local government has simplify various agencies to one 
agency to serve business people. Unfortunately, the new agency is still weak in 
terms of capability since other local agencies whose authority was taken away 
do not voluntarily assist it. Conflicts of interest among them (such as between 
the local agency of industry and trade and DPPM) have created chaotic 
conditions in these services. 
The local government has faced the dilemma of shaping local regulations to 
develop its own local economy. The making of a one-stop-service policy, a 
growth pole triangle and providing tax relief have not been enough to attract 
new investors or to encourage the existing ones to expand since other 
regulations about taxes and levies have damaged the attraction of Sidoarjo to 
business people. Some local taxes and levies have been amended to increase the 
charges. New levies have been applied such as for fire extinguishers, alarms 
and security signs, business permits, and special parking. To business people, 
most of the levies imposed by the local government do not make sense. They 
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not only add cost to business activities but also are a disincentive to companies 
that provide such important things as fire extinguishers and alarms. Moreover, 
the local government often just needs the money, but does not provide the 
services. This happens in many cases such as the levy on inspection on testing 
of meat or fish product quality. This has led to the impression among business 
people that the local government to some extent has been predatory on 
business activities. 
The response of the business sector varies. In general, the responses of the 
business people to local regulations are not positive. Only the business permit 
facilitation is regarded as better than other regulations such as investment 
promotion, tender process facilitation and fair competition. The business permit 
facilitation is in line with the evaluation of the Asia Foundation and Sucofindo. 
In terms of size of business, there is a different response among small, medium 
and big businesses, although the difference is not highly significantly. Many of 
the small businesses' responses were 'do not know'. This probably means. 
they are not directly affected by the local government regulations. However, 
between contractors and non-contractors, there are big differences in terms of 
tender process facilitation and fair competition promotion. The former have 
benefited more by decentralisation than the latter. For contractors, 
decentralisation has made the tender process more open than before 
decentralisation. However, for non-contractors, decentralisation has not 
provided them with an opportunity to win jobs from the local government. 
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Responses of the business people to the impact of decentralisation on the 
distribution cost reduction and tax and levy reduction are negative. The three 
sizes of business-small, medium and big-showed similar responses in these 
matters. They all see that decentralisation has affected them very badly, and so 
that the local regulations have imposed more burdens on most companies in 
Sidoarjo. 
Overall, the impact·of decentralisation on local regulations has been perceived 
negatively by business people. It could be predicted that in the long run 
business people will be reluctant to invest their money in such an expensive 
area due to the high local taxes and levies. For local government, reforming 
license regulations should be done first, followed by other local regulations. 
Local taxes and levies on businesses should not be the main target when trying 
to increase local revenue. Investors should be made welcome by offering local 
regulations that facilitate business permits and that reduce local taxes and 
levies. Otherwise, business people will not be interested in expanding their. 
businesses in Sidoarjo. More seriously, the existing companies will probably 
move to other regions. 
The next chapter will discuss the effect of the decentralisation policy on 
corruption at the local level. The issue of corruption is important since business 
people have often become the target of extortion by various actors. 
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Chapter Seven 
DECENTRALISATION, CORRUPTION AND 
PRESSURE ON THE BUSINESS SECTOR: 
From the Executive, Legislative Body 
and Beyond143 
7.1. Introduction 
However, like an elephant, while it may be 
difficult to describe, corruption is generally not 
difficult to recognise when observed. 
(Tanzi, 1998: 564) 
The previous chapter discussed the impacts of decentralisation on local 
government regulations related to the business sector. During my fieldwork in 
Sidoarjo, the issue most frequently arising in relation to decentralisation was 
whether corruption decreases, remains the same or increases. This hot issue · 
was raised not only by the business community, NGO activists, and ordinary 
people, but also came from inside the bureaucracy and the local parliament. For 
many business people, talking about corruption was always emotional. 
Corruption has become a pressure on the business sector since it leads to a high 
143 Part of this chapter bas been presented at "The 3rc1 East-West Centre International Graduate Student 
Conference of Addressing Development Issues in Asia Pacific, 19-21February2004", Honolulu, Hawaii. 
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cost economy. Even when talking in front of a bureaucrat, business people 
were not reluctant to express their disappointment with the bureaucrats' 
behaviour. They often really showed their anger at the bureaucrats' greediness 
during my interviews with them. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the impacts of decentralisation on corruption at 
the local level. Various cases of corrupt practices perceived by the business 
people will be presented to understand how corruption affects them in their 
activities. This chapter concludes that in the case of Sidarjo, decentralisation 
does not necessarily reduce corruption at the local level. On the contrary, since 
decentralisation, corruption has been widespread not only in each sector of 
local governmental institutions and the local parliament but also in other 
institutions such as NGOs and journalism and among ordinary citizens. It is 
argued that in democratisation of decision making through decentralisation, 
corruption appears because of the increase in the number of 'voter players'. 
AU players such as bureaucrats, politicians, and community members, will use 
their authority to reap benefits in the political processes. The benefits can be 
obtained through legal or illegal activities. 
7.2. The Strengthened Role of Local Government and 
Opportunities for Corruption: As Employer, Tax and Levy 
Collector, and as Service Provider 
To start with, I would like to discuss the context of change at the local level. The 
extent of the role of local government in the decentralisation era underpins the 
expansion of opportunities for corruption. As will be seen later in this chapter, 
246 
the local government has become stronger in terms of its role as employer, tax 
and levy collector as well as public service provider. 
Goodpaster (2002) and Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997) have stated that 
decentralisation has provided more opportunities for local officials to increase 
their intervention in relation to business activities. The increased role of local 
government is shown by the following indicators: (1) an increase in the levels of 
taxation; (2) the increase in the levels of public spending; (3) the increase in 
regulations and controls on economic activities. 
In the case of Indonesia, the transfer of responsibility to the local government 
has also led to an increase in the regulation in the activities related to the 
business sector. It can be clearly observed from the role played by local 
government. 
7.2.1. Local Budget and Number of Projects Increase 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the increase in the intervention of local 
government can be seen from the increase in the amount of the local budget. In 
the context of Sidoarjo, during the last five years, the local government budget 
has increased dramatically. The increase has been almost six-fold during the 
five years. It was 569 per cent, from only 77.1 billion rupiahs in 1997 to 438.8 
billion rupiahs in 2002. 
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While a proportion the local budget increase was due to the central 
government's transfer of budget, local governments are now entitled to charge 
various taxes and levies that previously did not exist. Therefore, the number of 
tax and levy regulations created by local government is much greater than 
before. Consequently, the amount of taxes and levies taken by local government 
is also greater after decentralisation. Dramatic changes of tax and levy revenue 
occurred in Sidoarjo during the period 1999-2002, from about 36 billion rupiahs 
to 72 billion rupiahs. 
This has in turn brought about a sharp increase in the number of government 
projects offered to the private sector For example, comparing the amount of 
projects before and after decentralisation, the difference is very marked. In 
1999, the amount of money put into physical projects was Rp21,330,569,000.00; 
whereas in 2001 it was Rp38,595,669,400.00 and in 2002 was 
Rp39,390,094,500.00. This represents an increase of 81 per cent. In terms of the 
number of projects, a significant increase has occurred. Normally, prior to. 
decentralisation, the number of project was around 80 packages. Those 80 
packages of projects had to be 'distributed' to more than 200 local contractors. 
However, in 2001 and 2002, it became 176 and 171 packages respectively. 
The following table (Table 7.1) shows the allocation for construction projects by 
the Sidoarjo local government in 2002. 
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Table 7.1. Sidoarjo District Government Budget Allocation for 
Construction Projects in 2002 
Classification of 
Project Value 
Up toRp 100 
million 
> Rp 100 million to 
Rp 200 million 
> Rp 200 million to 
Rp 300 million 
>Rp300 million to 
Rp 400 million 
> Rp 400 million to 
Rp 500 million 
> Rp 500 million to 
Rp 600 million 
> Rp 600 million 
Total amount and 
number of project 
Total Value Number Average Value of Each 
(in rupiah) of Projects Project 
4,304,221,300.00 
6,449,389,000.00 
6,209 ,926,000.00 
4,815,000,000.00 
892,000,000.00 
1,729,825,000.00 
14,789,733,200.00 
39,190,094,500.00 
76 
41 
23 
13 
2 
3 
13 
171 
(in rupiah) 
56,634,490.79 
157,302,170.73 
269,996,782.61 
370,384,615.38 
446,000,000.00 
576,608,333.33 
1,137,671,784.62 
Source: Calculated from the 2002 Budget of the Sidoarjo District Government 
If bureaucracy is assumed to be an arena of corruption, the increase in the 
number of projects is equivalent to an increase in the opportunity for 
bureaucrats to adopt more corrupt practices. A tendering process is regarded as 
a source of corruption, in which almost every contractor will give kickback 
money to bureaucrats after being awarded a projectl« . The more the number 
of projects offered, the greater the number of corrupt practices may occur. 
144 Interviews with several contractors, January 25, 2002. 
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7.2.2. The Holder of Power in Business Licensing 
As far as local regulations on the business sector are concerned, the local 
government of Sidoarjo is now more powerful than before local autonomy. The 
role of BPM (Badan Penanaman Modal or Provincial Board of Regional Capital 
/ Investment) has been reduced. Business people willing to invest in Sidoarjo can 
go directly to Sidoarjo without obtaining an investment agreement permit from 
BPM in Surabaya (the provincial level). Before decentralisation, there were two 
investment agreement permits. The first investment agreement permit was 
issued by BPM, whereas the second one was issued by the district head. At that 
time, BPN (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) could issue a location/ site permit 
without waiting for the investment agreement permit from the district head 
(Dwiyanto et al. 2000). Both BPM and BPN are the central government's 
agencies representing the interests of Jakarta in the local areas. It was not too 
difficult for business people to bypass local authorities to obtain a location/site 
permit if they could handle the two agencies. 
In the Kanwil Depnaker (Provincial Level Representative Office of Manpower), 
21 different kinds of licenses were issuedt4s. These licenses will now be run by 
the local agency for manpower. In the Dinas Perika.nan (Local Agency for 
Fishing Affairs), responsibility for product inspection has been transferred from 
the provincial government. New license authority has been legalised by the 
local parliament to do inspection of fire extinguisher services. More licenses 
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have been transferred from other agencies such as trade and industry, agencies 
for civil registration, agency for public works and agency for environmental 
affairs. 
In terms of regulating activities related to building contractors, the power of the 
local government has become is greater since decentralisation. For building 
contractors or a company that wants to build a factory or housing, there exist 
very complicated processes for obtaining permits. 
1. Investment agreement permit 
2. Location permit 
3. Land releaset46 
4. Technical permit 
5. Land dryness permit147 
6. Road dispensation permitl4S 
7. HO permit149 
8. Building establishment permittso 
Investment agreement permit. This proposal contains the objective of the 
project, covering the area that would be built on. The investment agreement is a 
145 See Surat Edaran (Circular letter) from the Kanwil Departemen Tenaga Kerja Propinsi Jawa Timur, 
30 March 2000. 
146 Land release is usually conducted by buying land. 
147 Land dryness permit is a permit for changing land from agricultural use to building use. 
148 Road dispensation permit is the right to pass heavy vehicles by paying compensation money to rebuild 
the road. 
149 HO (Hinder Ordonantie) permit is an agreement from people surrounding the business activity. 
150 Building establishment permit is a letter from the public works agency. 
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permit for a proposal that is not against the General Town Plan or Rencana 
Umum Tata Ruang Kota (RUTRK). 
Location/site permit. This permit in reality overlaps with the investment 
agreement permit. Both the investment agreement permit and the location 
permit involve coordination of several agencies at the local level such as 
Bappekab (Local Planning Board), BPN, Dinas Pertanian (Local Agency for 
Agriculture), and Dinas Pekerjaan Umum (Local Agency for Public Works) 
before issuing the permits. 
Other permits. After obtaining the investment agreement and location permits, 
someone has to obtain the other technical permits such as land dryness permit, 
road dispensation permit, HO permit and building establishment permit. 
Manufacturing industries have to negotiate many other permits such as Surat 
Ijin Tetap (SIT or Permanent Permit Letter), Ijin Usaha Tetap (IUT /Permanent 
Business License), Surat Ijin Usaha Perdagangan (SIUP /Trade Permit Letter) and 
so on. 
7.3. Business People's Perceptions of the Extent of 
Corruption 
During my fieldwork in Sidoatjo, I found that in daily discussions many people 
were doubtful that corruption would be reduced by decentralisation in the 
short-term. It seems obvious that decentralisation has created 'raj a-raja kecil' or 
'little kings'. When Suharto still held power, the centre of corruption may 
have been not far from Suharto. Since power has been devolved to districts and 
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cities, there are now more than '350 new Suhartos' with huge power at the 
local level. Therefore, corruption has been distributed: many people call it 
'decentralised corruption'1s1. 
The first question I raised with business people was about corruption in 
general: has decentralisation decreased corruption at the local level? It is very 
common for each person to have his/her own definition of corruption. 
However, I felt it was important to raise corruption first in general terms. Of 
126 respondents to the survey carried out, 8.70 per cent said that 
decentralisation had reduced corruption at the local level. However, 44.40 per 
cent said that decentralisation had not reduced corruption. There were 46.80 
per cent of the respondents saying 'do not know' to what had happened since 
decentralisation (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2. Perception of Business People of the Impact 
of Decentralisation on Corruption Reduction 
Responses Frequency Percentage 
Yes 11 8.70 
No 56 44.40 
Do not know 59 46.80 
Total 126 100 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
Do all businesses have the same perception of the impact of decentralisation on 
corruption reduction? The data below shows that more than half of the small 
businesses said 'do not know' (53.2 per cent), and 37.2 per cent of them said 
'no'. This means that only around a third of the respondents (37.2 per cent) 
151 See comments of Andi Mallarangeng, 'Otonomi Daerah Ciptakan Raja Kecil (Autonomy to create 
little kings)', Kompas, February 19, 2000. 
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from small business perceived that decentralisation had reduced corruption. 
This is very different if compared to the responses from the medium and big 
businesses. There were 53.3 per cent of medium businesses and 76.5 per cent of 
big businesses saying 'no' (Table 7.3). This shows that the larger the business, 
the more negative the perception of the impact of decentralisation on 
corruption reduction. 
Table 7.3. Perception of Business People of the Impact of 
Decentralisation on Corruption Reduction Based on the Size of 
Company 
Responses Number of Employment 
<20 20-99 ~:100 Total 
Yes 9 2 0 11 
(9.6%) (13.3%) (0%) (8.7%) 
No 35 8 13 56 
(37.2%) (53.3%) (76.5%) (44.4%) 
Do not know 50 5 4 59 
(53.2%) (33.3%) (23.5%) (46.8%) 
Total 94 15 17 126 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
The responses obtained through the questionnaire are in line with that was 
obtained from in-depth interviews. Many business people said that 'corruption 
is worse', 'corruption is everywhere', and 'more illegal money'. As a 
manager of Kasogi said: 
'With local autonomy, it is more difficult because there is more illegal 
money to be paid to many people' .is2 
152 Interview with lbu Lies, the manager of personnel ofKSG Co. Ltd .. March 21,2002. 
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Similar responses came from many business people such as the public relations 
officer of a state-owned company operating in Sidoatjo, the manager of 
environmental affairs of TK Co. Ltd, and the owner of BDS Co. Ltd.153 
This can be compared with research conducted by FITRA (Forum Indonesia 
untuk Transparansi Anggaran or Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency) 
(Kholik 2002), which found that corruption in local government had 
mushroomed154. In the five regions where the research was conducted 
(Bandung, Surabaya, Jakarta, Pontianak and Medan), various terms, practices 
and proverbs related to corruption appear. Corruption is variously called 'uang 
pelicin' (oily money), 'uang pelancar' (success fee), 'uang siluman' (mysterious 
money), 'uang ktzraoke' (entertainment money), 'uang capek' (tired money), 
'uang sogok' (bribe money), 'uang komisi' (tip money) and so on. Those terms 
are examples of small corruption that involves low level bureaucrats. These 
relate to the delivery of public services such as obtaining a birth certificate, 
identity card, and driving license. For the big corruption, high level bureaucrats · 
are involved. Such corruption includes project allocation .kickbacks, bribery in 
personnel recruitment, and manipulation of social safety net funds. Bandung 
has reached the highest level so far in terms of practices of corruption. The 
findings for the survey are as follows (Kholik 2002: 105-119): 
153 Interview with Mr PBY ofTSC Ltd .. March 7, 2002 and with Mr H ofBDS Co.Ltd. 
154 See Jawa Pos, 'Korupsi di Bandung Tertinggi (Corruption in Bandung was the highest)', February 12, 
2002. 
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a. Medan: 33terms;16 practices; 40 proverbs 
b. Padang: 19 terms; 17 practices; 9 proverbs 
c. Jakarta: 53 terms; 17 practices; 6 proverbs 
d. Bandung: 8 terms; 33 practices; 9 proverbs 
e. Surabaya: 66 terms; 15 practices; 40 proverbs 
f. Makassar: 18 terms; 8 practices; 4 proverbs 
g. Pontianak: 7 terms; 15 practices; 14 proverbs. 
In terms of proverbs, in Sumatra Utara (North Sumatra), the abbreviation of 
Sumut (Sumatra Utara) has been translated to 'semua urusan mesti uang tunai 
(all affairs must be with cash money)' to show that when dealing with 
bureaucrats, one must always provide cash money. In Jakarta, it is very 
common for people to say: 'mencari uang haram saja susah, apalagi uang halal (it is 
very hard to get dirty money, much less clean money)'. Other proverbs aimed 
at corrupt bureaucrats come from Bandung: 'buburuh nyatu upah beas', 
meaning that bureaucrats have received a salary, but still ask money in. 
conducting their tasks; and from Surabaya: 'ngono yo ngono, ning ojo ngono' 
(you can be like that, but do not be like that) expressing the notion that getting 
money by corruption has to be done in a proper way. 
Taking the Sidoarjo case and FITRA's findings, similar responses are found in 
the national survey conducted by the Centre for Population Studies and Policy 
(2002). Of 586 respondents to the national survey, 222 (37.88 per cent) people 
said that decentralisation had reduced corruption. However, most respondents 
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(340 people or 58.02 per cent) said 'no', meaning that decentralisation had not 
reduced corruption. This shows that during the one year of implementation of 
local autonomy or decentralisation, business people experience that corruption 
at the local level still exists. 
7.3.1. Corruption in the Local Government 
Local government is the largest institution at the local level. According to local 
regulations No. 2/2001155 and No. 3/2001156, the Sidoatjo local government 
consists of 21 Dinas, 8 Badan and Kantor157. According to Hamilton-Hart (2001), 
corruption potentially occurs in all branches of government. Therefore, there 
are many sites of corruption in the local government. Each agency has the 
potential to be corrupt. The form of corruption varies: extortion, kickback, 
bribes, manipulation, and mark-up. 
While decentralisation has been perceived as a new condition that has had little 
impact on reducing corruption, business people do not see that decentralisation 
has been successful in reducing illegal money as part of public service delivery 
either. When asked specifically about the amount of illegal money paid to local 
government before and after decentralisation, the responses of the business 
people were as follows: 19.5 per cent said bigger after decentralisation; 
tss See Perda No. 2/2001 on Pembentukan dan Susunan Organisasi Dinas-Dinas Daerah Kabupaten 
Sidoarjo (On the formation of and arrangement for local technical organisations). 
156 See Perda No. 3/2001 on Pembentukan dan Susunan Organisasi Lembaga Teknis Daerah. 
157 Dinas is an implementing unit, whereas Badan and Kantor are supporting units 
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62.7 per cent same and 17.5 per cent smaller. Interestingly, the response of the 
big businesses was different that of the medium and small businesses. Only 1 
(5.9 per cent) of the big businesses said the illegal money was smaller after 
decentralisation, whereas 29.4 per cent of them said bigger. In contrast, the 
response of the small businesses was 16 per cent (bigger), 64.9 per cent (same) 
and 19.1 per cent (smaller) (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4. Perception of Impact of Decentralisation on the 
Amount of Illegal Money Paid to Local Government Before and 
After Decentralisation Based on the Size of Company 
Responses Number of Employee 
<20 20-99 ~100 Total 
Bigger 15 5 5 25 
(16.0%) (33.3%) (29.4%) (19.8%) 
Same 61 7 11 79 
(64.9%) (46.7%) (64.7%) (62.7%) 
Smaller 18 3 1 22 
(19.1%) (20.0%) (5.9%) (17.5%) 
Total 94 15 17 126 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
With their perception of corruption, most business people also perceive that 
local government's efforts to cope with corruption are not serious. Most· 
respondents said that the local government had not done anything seriously in 
fighting corruption. There were 28.60 per cent of the respondents saying 
'completely not serious', 29.40 per cent 'not serious' and 33.20 per cent 'less 
serious'. In general, more than 88 per cent regarded that local government had 
done little relating to corruption. Only 11.90 per cent of the respondents 
answered 'serious'; and none said 'more serious' or 'completely serious' 
(Table 7.5). 
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Table 7.5. Perception of Business People on Local 
Government's Effort s to Cope with Corruption Since 
Decentralisation? 
Frequency Percentage 
Completely not 36 28.60 
serious 
Not serious 37 29.40 
Less serious 38 33.20 
Serious 15 11.90 
More serious 0 0.00 
Completely serious 0 0.00 
Total 126 100.0 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
The statistical findings are confirmed by in-depth interviews with some 
business people. However, while most government-related contractors had not 
regarded corruption seriously, other types of businesses had perceived this 
differently. 
Case 7.1.: Kickback as a Normal Business 
GT graduated from teachers' training college and is now running a 
business as a government-related contractor. He has had experience 
with local government projects in Sidoatjo for years. He does not see 
that giving money to local government officials is a corrupt practice. 
According to him, contractors under GAPENSI depend on . local 
government projects; therefore, it is normal to contribute some of the 
profits to the officials who have given the project to them. 
BO is also a government-related contractor. He received his bachelor 
degree in management. He is now very active in the GAPENSI as an 
officer. In doing business with the local government projects, he 
always allocates some money for the local government officials. He 
said that it could be around 2.5 per cent of the total project value. 
Medium and big businesses have experienced different impacts compared to 
small businesses. When I interviewed small businesses, corruption conducted 
by the local government did not affect them. They are business people in 
Tanggulangin or in other areas. In contrast, almost all medium and big 
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businesses complained about corruption. The high level of corruption felt by 
medium and big businesses has exerted financial pressure that has affected the 
companies' expendit ure. 
For example, I interviewed Mr MHA, a manager of CTA Co. Ltd. --a real estate 
company in Sidoarjo. 
Case 7.2.: Extortive Corruption by Bureaucracy to a Private 
Building Contractor 
Mr MHA has had a lot of experience in dealing with local 
government officials to obtain permits. After decentralisation, there 
has been no significant change in terms of illegal costs of licensing. 
To build houses in a real estate area, he had to obtain several licenses 
from various agencies: investment agreement permit from the district 
head, location permit from BPN, land dispensation permit from DPU 
Bina Marga (Local Agency for Public Works relating to road 
development), IMB license from DPU Cipta Karya (Local Agency for 
Public Works relating to building development). In Bappekab, when 
the coordination meeting is held, it is very common that the 
applicant has to serve them by providing lunch and pocket money. 
In order to be successful in obtaining those permits, the team will 
offer to help him pass the permits. The team usually asks for 
between 250 to 600 rupiahs per square metre according to what type 
of house he wants to build. If he wants to build very simple houses 
(RSS, Rumah Sangat Sederhana), he will have to pay 250 rupiah per 
square metre. However, if he wants to build real estate types, he will 
have to pay 600 rupiahs per square metre. In that time, he built 
houses on three sites of 20 acres, 7 acres and 14 acres. In total, the 
area covered 41 acres or 410,000 square metres. Therefore, he had to 
pay between Rp102.50 million and Rp246.00 million to start up the 
project. Moreover, he still had to pay 50 million rupiahs to have IMB 
license for each area. In fact the real cost for having IMB is only 24 
million rupiahstss. 
Mr. MHA's experience happened also to SML, a very young businessman who 
inherited his business from his father. 
158 Interview with MHA of CT A Co. Ltd, on April 16, 2002. 
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Case 7.3.: Extortive Corruption by Bureaucracy to a Private 
Company 
SML is about twenty-five years old. He received his Bachelor degree 
in Economics from the University of Western Australia. He is now 
running LB Co. Ltd, a business of fish cracker manufacturing, in 
Sidoatjo. The company employs around 70 people. He told me that 
corruption in the government sector still persists. He had an 
experience when he made an investment of about seven hundred 
million rupiahs, he had to pay forty million rupiahs to have all 
permits before starting his business. He does not know how much 
are legal costs and how much are illegal ones to have the licences. 
He just knows that he had to spend about 5-7 per cent of the total 
investment as administrative costs. In addition to this, he also had to 
improve the condition of the roads surrounding his company, and to 
employ people from the area where his company works.159 
The target of extortion is not only private companies but also state-owned 
companies. Below is an example: 
Case 7.4.: Extortive Corruption by Bureaucracy to a State-Owned 
Company 
TSC Co. Ltd. is a state-owned company producing sugar. According 
to the public relations officer, since decentralisation there has been 
more illegal extortion from the local government. For example, the 
Agency for Irrigation (Dinas Pengairan) asked for Rp43,350,000 for 
cleaning and dredging the Kedungan river. Although there is a 
formal letter supporting financial aid from the head of the agency, 
this kind of aid cannot be justified. It is very clearly stated in the local 
budget of year 2002 under the project post No. 2P.03.2.01.003 that this 
project has been funded with Rp300 million. 
Another extortion that had to be paid by TSC Co. Ltd. was 
demanded from the Agency for Manpower asking for Rp42 millions 
to check boilers. According to Mr PBY, this is illegal since checking 
boilers is free of charge. A circulation letter (Surat Edaran) No. 
SE.01/5/W.12/2000 dated on March 30, 2002 forwarded to business 
people stated that due to many complaints from business people, the 
Department of Manpower listed 21 licenses that would now be 
obtained free of charge. However, in practice, a huge amount of 
money was needed to obtain such licenses. 
159 Interview with SML of LB Co. Ltd., on February 27, 2002. 
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Also, on February 19th, 2002, the TSC Co. Ltd. received a letter from 
the Agency for Plantations and Agriculture (Dinas Perkebunan dan 
Pertanian). The letter contains a detailed plan for a meeting involving 
various institutions such as banks, cooperatives, local agencies, sugar 
companies. The Agency for Plantation asked the TSC Co Ltd to 
provide a special lunch for the meeting. The total needed to fund for 
the lunch was Rp800,000.00. This is ridiculous since this kind of 
meeting is a routine activity that has to be held by the agency. As a 
routine expenditure, the fund has been allocated in the budget of the 
agency. 
Another form of corruption that often appears in the local government is 
kickback money. As an employer of physical development projects, the local 
government of Sidoarjo conducts a bidding process for each project. A number 
of business people interviewed said that kickback still existed. According to Mr 
GNT160, corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) with Kepala Dinas (Local 
Agency Head) are rife. After finishing a project someone has to give Kepala 
Dinas some kickback money. 
A similar case happened to another member of GAPENSI (Gabungan Pengusaha 
Konstruksi Nasional or National Contractors Association). My note is as follow: 
Case 7.5.: Extortive Corruption by Bureaucracy to a Govemment-
Related Contractor 
Ms YP is a civil engineer who previously worked for other 
contractors. She also runs a shop selling bags and luggage in 
Tanggulangin. After experiencing several years as an employee, she 
established her own contractor company. Dealing with government 
projects always involves kickback money. In her opinion, the amount 
of money that has to be paid for the kickback is still relatively the 
same. Kickback is also part of the business of local government 
projects. However, the way the project leaders ask for the money is 
different. Prior to decentralisation, the kickback was given directly to 
the project leader. It had to be given by the director of the contractor. 
Then, the project leader would distribute the money to his/her staff. 
160 Interview with a member of GAPENSI, March 6,2002. 
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Now, the kickback money has to be distributed by the contractor to 
the director as well as the staff involved in the project individuallyt6t. 
Although kickback money for government projects is common, most 
government-related. contractors do not regard kickback as a bad corrupt 
practice. They consider kickback as 'ucapan terima kasih' (words of thank you). 
The most common words used when I interviewed them about why they had to 
give kickback money was 'biasalah, kita ngasih sekedarnya' (It's ok, we gave 
them just enough)162. They even expressed a moral and religious judgment that 
it was just normal and legitimate. A government-related contractor running 
KADINDA (Regional Chambers of Industry and Finance) said: 
We get projects from them, we should give them part of the profit. I 
don't think this is corruption. We give them money, and they 
receive it. It is normal. Isn't it prohibited in our religious teaching if 
someone gives a gift and then we reject it?t63. 
Moreover, they said that they have a moral obligation to provide the 
Commission D responsible for physical development with lunch as well as 
'visit money' (uang kunjungan). These services are assumed to be normal for. 
business people having projects from the local government. This habit is still 
the same even though the Commission does not ask for services openly. 
Compared with FITRA's findings on corruption in five regions, my findings 
on kinds of corruption during in-depth interview are that there are at least 11 
161 Interview with Ms YP, January 25, 2002. 
162 This kind of statement that assumes kickback as nonnal thing appeared many times during interview 
with several government-related contractors, for example with JKB, AGS, UPB, DST, SWA. 
163 Interview with Mr GNT, March 20, 2002. 
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kinds of corruption existing now in the local government of Sidoarjo. Within 
each kind, there are many variants. 
1. Increasing the formal cost of services: business permits. 
2. Charging unknown cost of services: in-principle and location/site permits. 
3. Charging for free services: 21 kinds of license in the local agency for 
manpower. 
4. Charging cost of services that are not carried out by government but by the 
company itself: testing of quality of meat and fishery products (the local 
government has no laboratory, and the company does. The local 
government asks the company to do it themselves, but the local government 
still charges the cost of the services) 
5. Charging non-operating companies: damaged companies still have to pay 
disturbance permit (HO) and Land Building Tax 
6. Paying activities carried out together with government: Government invites 
private companies to a meeting, but all costs are paid by the firms) 
7. Activities of local government are paid for by local government budget 
(cleaning and dredging river) 
8. Intended miscalculation of levies and tax: use of underground and surface 
water 
9. Calculating target below potential: incentives for being over target 
10. Tax reduction: companies that have to pay high tax are offered a reduction. 
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11. Keeping information secret: in calculating the target for parking revenues 
there is no information on the number of vehicles. 
Who receives the illegal payment? I gave 13 options that could be filled as 
multiple choice by the respondents. Based on responses from the business 
people, there were 41.9 per cent saying 'do not know' and 9.0 per cent 'no 
response'. As shown in Table 7.6, three institutions indicated as receiving the 
most illegal money were the agency for industry and trade, the agency for 
labour and the district head and the deputies. 
Table 7.6. Receivers of Illegal Payment 
Category label 
Cases 
Don't know 
No response 
Agency for Industry and Trade 
Others 
District Head and Deputy 
Agency for Labour 
Local Parliament Head, Deputy and Comntission 
Planning Head and Division Head 
Police 
Local Secretary 
Political Party Leader and Party Guard (Paramilitary) 
Attorney 
Judge 
Total Responses 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
Count Percentage 
70 41.9 
15 9.0 
13 7.8 
12 7.3 
12 7.2 
12 7.2 
8 4.8 
7 4.2 
7 4.2 
6 3.6 
2 1.2 
2 1.2 
1 .6 
167 100.0 
Local parliament, planning division and police are also receivers of illegal 
money. They amount to 4.8 per cent, 4.2 per cent and 4.2 per cent, respectively. 
There was also 7.3 per cent categorised as 'others', meaning that they are 
outside the listed institutions above. 
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What does the table tell us about corruption? Those who said 'do not know' 
and 'no response' provide several possibilities. First, corruption issues are so 
sensitive that respondents may have been reluctant to name people involved in 
it. The questionnaire falls short in providing a true response. Second, the 
respondents probably do not know where the money goes. It may be hard for 
them to identify the person who really receives the money. Third, they do not 
care where the money goes. 
Those who have given various responses about recipients tell us that corruption 
has occurred in various places and among many types of people. Almost all 
institutions at the local level have been involved in corrupt practices. 
Corruption has become widespread not only within the executive bodies but 
also within the legislative body, the local parliament. 
7.3.2. Corruption in the Local Parliament 
Law No. 22 of 1999 has changed the role of local parliament. Under the Law 
No. 5 of 1974, the local parliament was subordinate to the district head. For 
more than two decades, parliament has been no more than a rubber stamp 
institution (O'Rourke 2002). The new Law No. 22/1999 has now placed the local 
parliament higher than the district head. 
With the increase in power, local parliament has a stronger bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the district head. Local parliament is always involved in the 
consultative process on local government activities. Unfortunately, this power 
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has not improved the performance of either the executive or the legislative 
body. To a large extent, this power also creates another opportunity for 
corruption. Therefore, corruption is found not only in the executive bodies, but 
also in the legislative body. Corruption in the local parliament varies from 
money politics, mark up, to extortion. 
Money politics is another corruption-related concept appearing frequently in 
discussions on the impact of decentralisation. Also, money politics is often a 
fuzzy concept when someone tries to define it. As stated by Goodpaster (2002: 
99), money politics can be described as 'the purchase of political favours or 
influence'. 
In Sidoarjo, although corruption is perceived as very common, business people 
do not see that there is money politics in the local parliament. There were four 
questions related to money politics: 
(1) Is money politics something common in the election of district/ city head? 
(2) Is money politics something common in the election of local parliament 
head? 
(3) Is money politics something common in the yearly accountability report of 
head of district/ city? 
(4) Is money politics something common in the local regulation (including local 
budget) legalisation? 
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These four issues are very important for a number of reasons. First, for the 
district head election, for example, it is something new because this is the first 
election where the district head was elected only by the local parliament 
without central government intervention. Second, the number of political 
parties in the local parliament is higher compared to the previous local 
parliament which comprised only three parties plus the military faction. Third, 
the candidates for district head from the bureaucracy do not represent the 
Golkar party any more. The bureaucracy is formally neutral, and people from 
the bureaucracy can use any political party as a vehicle for the district head 
candidacy. Fourth, the power of local parliament is now much stronger 
compared to the previous one. Fifth, the district head elected will not 
automatically run the local government for five years because continuing in the 
post depends on the yearly accountability speech in front of the local 
parliament. 
7.3.2.1. Money Politics in the Election of District Head and Local Parliament 
Head 
As far as the district head election is concerned, only 17.59 per cent of the 
respondents said that money politics is 'common' and 82.5 per cent described 
it as 'uncommon'. Similar trends appeared in questions about the role of 
money politics in the election of the local parliament chairman. If the responses 
are broken down based on the size of the company, the pattern of responses 
does not change. In the three different sizes of company, the number of answers 
for 'uncommon' is much higher than for 'common'. This shows that 
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although corruption is common, they do not see money politics as something 
common. 
Table 7.7. Perception of Business People on Money Politics in 
the District Head Election 
Uncommon 
Common 
Total 
<20 
80 
(85.1%) 
14 
(14.9%) 
94 
(100%) 
Number of Employee 
20-99 ~100 
13 11 
(86.7%) (64.7%) 
2 6 
(13.3%) (35.3%) 
15 17 
(100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
Total 
104 
(82.5%) 
22 
(17.5%) 
126 
(100%) 
Table 7.8. Perception of Business People on Money Politics in 
the District Assembly Election 
Uncommon 
Common 
Total 
<20 
80 
(85.1%) 
14 
(14.9%) 
94 
(100%) 
Number of Employee 
20-99 ~100 
13 
(86.7%) 
2 
(13.3%) 
15 
(100%) 
11 
(64.7%) 
6 
(35.3%) 
17 
(100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
Total 
104 
(82.5%) 
22 
(17.5%) 
126 
(100%) 
However, when this was discussed with bureaucrats or members of local 
parliament, the issue of the election of district head was not free from 
accusations about money politics. As several newspapers have written, money 
politics was shadowing the district head election. An activist from District 
Election Watch suspected that one of the district head candidates had received 
about five billion rupiahs from business people. If this were true, it would point 
to collusion between the district head and the business people. There might 
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have been special motivation to do this such as to gain funding for a project 
from the district head164. 
A local newspaper, Sentana, also signalled that money politics might be 
involved in the district head election in Sidoarjo165. According to one candidate, 
it is common to distribute money to local parliament members166. He said that 
the members of PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle) were given a short briefing in an hotel in 
Sidoarjo. Each member received at least one hundred million rupiahs to vote 
for a particular candidatet67. A member of the local parliament also told me that 
a number of the local parliament members received some money from the 
district head to vote for him16s. 
So far, there have only been a few reports about money politics in the local 
parliament head election in Sidoarjo. Elsewhere in districts of Java or outside 
Java, money politics also relates only to the need to win elections and retain 
power in terms of the district head. According to Afan Gaffar, the architect of 
164 See 'Lembaga Swasta Danai Cabup Rp 5 miliar (A private institution has financed the district head 
candidate Rp5 billion)', Surya, July 21, 2000. 
165 See 'DPRD Harus Hati-hati: Politik Uang Bayangi Pemilihan Bupati Sidoarjo (DPRD must be 
careful: money politics to shadow the district bead election in Sidoarjo)', Sentana, May 22, 2000. 
166 He was previously the bead of the local planning board. He told me that each member of PKB (14 
people) received Rp 100 million, whereas 13 members ofPDIP received each Rp 200 million. 
167 Interview with a candidate, February 12, 2002. 
168 Interview with Mr MR, a member of local parliament from Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan 
Bintang), January 29, 2002. 
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Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999, to win a district head election, someone has to 
provide money of more than Rp. 1 billion.169 
How did the money politics occur in the election of district head? With the 
present political system, there may be two or three dominant political factions 
in the local parliament. Candidates have to be promoted by one of the 
dominant parties. To be promoted by a political party, one may have to defeat 
the others. Transactions between the candidate and the promoting political 
party can happen. Money politics would be unavoidable. Below is described 
the case of the district election in Sidoarjo. 
Case 7.6.: Money Politics in the District Head Election 
The district head is not elected directly by the voters. It is an indirect 
election where the members of the local parliament choose from 
competing candidates. There are 45 members of local parliament in 
Sidoarjo district. · 
According to one candidate and one member of local parliament, it is 
very difficult to believe that the PDIP candidates were defeated by 
the candidates of PKB. PDIP has 17 members whereas PKB has 14 
members. There were 32 candidates for the vacancy of district head. 
These candidates were selected based on administrative 
requirements. Seven candidates were promoted through PDIP. At 
the final election, there were only three pairs of candidates (one for 
the district head, the other for vice district head). The candidates 
promoted by PDIP were Mochamad Santosa (the head of logistics in 
West Papua) and Hasan Ibrahim (the village head of Masangan 
Sukodono, Sidoatjo). The candidates from PAN were Boimin (head 
of national archive board, East Java) and Agus Salim (political 
activist of PAN). The candidates from PKB were Win Hendrarso (the 
Secretary of the Sidoatjo Government) and Syaiful Illah (local 
businessman). 
169 See 'Perkiraan Afan Gajfar Untuk Jadi Bupati Harus Sediakan Rp l milyar (Afan Gaffar estimation, 
to become a district bead someone bas to provide Rpl billion)', Kompas, March 9, 2000. 
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On September 28, 2000, the district head election was held. Finally, 
with 28 voters, Win Hendrarso was elected the district head of 
Sidoarjo and Syaiful Illah was elected the vice district head for the 
year 2000-2005. The PDIP candidates got only 10 votes although they 
have 17 seats in the local parliament. Boimin-Agus Salim got 3 votes 
(PAN has 3 seats in the local parliament). Soon after the election 
finished, the PDIP faction held a meeting. The PDIP faction formally 
sent a letter to the head of local parliament and the local election 
committee. The letter contained a rejection of the PDIP faction based 
on the result of the district head election. They suspected that eight 
members of PDIP had received money. Salamin was one among the 
alleged suspects, admitted and he had received Rp 10 million in 
advance of the total amount of Rp 200 million. He was disappointed 
since he had been promised that he would receive Rp 100 million in 
advance110. Further, the alleged suspects were threatened with 
organisational sanctions. The other 8 members who were 
disappointed with their failure to win the election said that they 
would resign from the local parliament. in 
7.3.2.2. Money Politics in the Yearly District Head Accountability Report and 
Local Regulation Legalisation 
The yearly accountability report of district heads has become a critical issue 
reported in national and local newspapers. This forum is viewed as a corrupt 
area for the local parliament to use its power to have financial benefits. Many 
district heads were feeling threatened by loss of power because of resistance 
from the local parliament. If a district head wants to stay in power, he/she has 
to have 'a good relationship' with the local government. For example, in 
Gresik District, the yearly accountability speech was used by the local 
parliament to extort money from the district head. Long before the event, 
170 See 'F-PDIP Tolak Hasil Pemilihan Bupati Sidoarjo (The PDIP faction rejecting the district head 
election result of Sidoarjo)', Kompas, October 2, 2000. 
171 See 'Wakil Ketua DPRD Sidoarjo: Hasil Pemilihan Bupati Sidoarjo bisa dibatalkan (Vice chairman 
of the Sidoarjo DPRD: the district head election ofSidoarjo can be cancelled)', Kompas. October 3, 2000. 
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a number of political factions in the local parliament raised the issue that the 
accountability report would be rejected. However, after some political deals 
with the executive, the accountability report of the district head was eventually 
accepted.172 As also stated by an academic, in many cases 'there is a prawn 
behind the rock' (ada udang di balik batu), which is a good proverb to describe 
how the vested interests behind the voice of local parliament are booming prior 
to the meeting that is to intimidate the district head to compromise with the 
local parliamentt73. 
However, the findings from the questionnaire distributed to the business 
people in Sidoarjo show that over 78.6 per cent of the respondents see money 
politics in the yearly accountability speech in Sidoarjo as 'uncommon' 
whereas 21.4 per cent said 'common'. The same perception was found among 
small, medium and big businesses in response to the yearly district head 
accountability report. In terms of the local regulation legalisation, responses of 
the business people were similar. Only 23 per cent said that money politics is 
common and 77 per cent uncommon. Yet, the three different sizes of company 
show similar trends in responding to the money politics occurring in the 
ratification of local regulations. 
172 See 'LPJ Bupati Robbah Mo/or, Jangan Dijadikan Ajang Pemerasan (The accountability report 
delayed, do not use it for extortion)', Jawa Pos ,March 14, 2002. 
173 See the comment of Priyatmoko, 'Lantang Demi Kompromi (piercing for the sake of compromise) ', 
Jawa Pos, May 16, 2002. 
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Table 7.9. Perception of Business People on Money Politics in 
the Yearly District Head Accountability Report 
Number of Employees 
<20 20-99 :2:100 
Uncommon 74 12 13 
(78.7%) (80%) (76.5%) 
Common 20 3 4 
(21.3%). (20%) (23.5%) 
Total 94 15 17 
(100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
Total 
99 
(78.6%) 
27 
(21.4%) 
126 
(100%) 
Table 7.10. Perception of Business People on Money Politics 
in the Ratification/Legalisation of Local Regulations 
Number of Employees 
<20 20-99 :2:100 
Uncommon 72 12 13 
(76.6%) (80%) (76.5%) 
Common 22 3 4 
(23.4%) (20%) (23.5%) 
Total 94 15 17 
(100%) (100%) (100%) 
Source: Data from survey questionnaires, 2002 
Total 
97 
(77%) 
29 
(23%) 
126 
(100%) 
Although the yearly accountability speech in Sidoatjo is regarded as 'fairly 
free' from money politics by most of the respondents, I suspect that the reality 
was different. When I attended the general review by each political faction on 
May 6, 2002, only the PKB faction seemed to be in favour of the district head. 
Other political factions such as the PDIP, the Gabungan (coalition) and the TNI 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Army), were clearly critical. 
The Gabungan faction was the most critical, presenting 34 points of weakness in 
the implementation of the district policy, and blaming the executive for having 
failed to run development and public services properly. According to some 
local officials, after being criticised by the local parliament, the district head 
called a meeting with all local officials. In the meeting, the district head was 
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very upset because he was very worried that the report would be rejected and 
he would not stay in power. On May 11, 2002, the executive responses were 
delivered by the district head. The responses were intended to clarify each issue 
raised by the local parliament. On May 16, 2002, the final decision was made by 
each political faction, and their statements were read in a public forum. Of the 
four political factions, the Gabungan faction was the only one that received the 
report of the district head without any critical remarks. Compared to the other 
three political factions, the Gabungan faction is the strongest one supporting the 
district head to continue to lead Sidoatjo. 
With regards to local regulation legalisation, including local budget 
legalisation, the executive and legislative relationship seems to be viewed as a 
kongkalikong (conspiracy). Each group has its own interests. Especially in the 
local budget legalisation, in order to pass the draft proposed by the executive, 
the executive often allocates certain amounts of money for the local parliament. 
Otherwise, the legislature would not receive the local budget proposed by the 
executive. 
It is not such an easy thing to prove that money politics exists in the legalisation 
of local regulations. I cannot even separate the cases of money politics relating 
to the yearly accountability speech from that relating to the legalisation of local 
regulations. Below are some examples of money politics that have been 
revealed in Sidoatjo. 
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Based on in-depth interviews with a local parliament member as well as 
detailed budget allocation, money politics most likely arise during the 
ratification of the local budget. Before being decided, the local budget has to be 
passed by the local parliament. To some extent, the allocation of money for the 
local parliament has nothing to do with its tasks, but is merely for the personal 
activities of the local parliament members such as making a religious 
pilgrimage. Here is the case of Sidoatjo: 
Case 7.7. Money Politics in the Local Budget Allocation 
Mr MTF is a member of the Sidoatjo local parliament. According to him, 
the local parliament members obtained financial assistance from the 
local budget to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. By January 2002, a group 
of the local parliament members had already been to Mecca, the others 
will go the following year. The cost of making a pilgrimage for one 
person is now Rp 25 million. For those who are non-Moslem, the 
allocation can be used by themselves to do anything174. Totally, for 45 
members of the local parliament, the local government has to provide 
more than one billion rupiahs. However, in the local budget it cannot be 
sees in what category of expenditure they put the pilgrimage cost for the 
members of DPRD. 
One type of money politics that is common in the local parliament is the budget 
mark-up for local parliament. According to BPK or Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan 
(Board of Financial Audit), the value of financial distortion had doubled in 2001 
(332 billion rupiahs) compared to that in 2000 (181.5 billion rupiahs).175 Local 
parliaments tended increase the proposed expenditure and to mark up the 
allocation of their own budget beyond the legal limit of the budget. If this 
174 Interview with MTF, February 25, 2002. 
175 See 'Hasil Audit BPK Soal Penyimpangan Anggaran Daerah, mark-up hingga konsumsi dewan' (The 
audit result of BPK on local budget misuse, mark up and the consumption of the dewan), Jawa Pos, 
March 21, 2002. 
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indicator can be termed a 'mark up', in the case of Sidoatjo, it is also very clear 
that the tendency was the same. For example, the local budget for 
governmental affairs between 1999 and 2002 was Rp47.05 billion and Rp79.65 
billion respectively, whereas that for local parliament affairs was Rp4.82 billion 
and Rp17.09 billion in 1999 and 2000, respectively. It means that the increase in 
the budget for the governmental affairs is only 169 per cent. In contrast, for 
local parliament activities, the increase is 354 per cent. It is more surprising that 
the increase in the local parliament budget has been 1,478 per cent in five years 
from 1997 to 2002, compared to that of the executive budget that was only 533 
per cent in the same period. In 1997, the budget for governmental affairs was 
Rp14.95 billion whereas the budget for the local parliament affairs was Rpl.16 
billion. However, when the budget for the former rose to Rp79.68 billion, the 
latter became Rp17.09 billion. Moreover, due to changes in the budget calendar 
from April-March to January-December, the local budget for governmental 
affairs decreased from Rp47.05 billion (April 1999-March 2000) to Rp36.13 
(April 2000-December 2000). In contrast, the local budget for the local 
parliament increased from Rp4.82 billion to Rp6.75 billion for the same period 
of change. 
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Table 7.11. Budget Standard based on Government Regulation No 
110/2000 and the 2002 Real Local Budget of Sidoarjo 
No. Description Value (in rupiah) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Representation money 
Package money 
Position allowance 
Commission allowance 
Special allowancea> 
Income improvement allowance 
Committee allowance 
8. Health allowanceb> 
9. Rice and family allowance 
10. Supporting activities expenditure 
11. Job-related travelling 
12. Uniform expenditurec> 
13. Charity expenditure 
14. Other allowances 
15. Other job-related travelling 
Total 
a) Assuming that the tax income is 15 per cent 
Government Real local 
standard budget 
787,972,198.55 551,880,000 
196,993,049.64 189,000,000 
393,986,099.28 143,700,000 
55,478,025.00 
215,164,405.87 
270,000,000.00 
160,728,000.00 
546,67 4,996.25 
630,000,000.00 
90,000,000.00 
1,697,402,996.25 
270,000,000 
160,728,000 
1,125,000,000 
438,000,000 
155,025,000 
8,610,000 
194,400,000 
1,025,000,000 
3,376,763,000 
b) Assuming that the health premium for each member is RpS00,000 per month 
c) Assuming that each member pays Rp2 million per year for uniforms. 
Source: Calculated from the 2002 Sidoarjo Local Budget 
It becomes very clear that there is mark up in the local parliament budget if the 
detailed budget is examined. Table 7.11 shows the comparison between the 
budget standard based on the Government Regulation No. 10/2000 and the real 
local budget for the local parliament. It is quite surprising that the government 
standard is in fact only Rpl,697,402,996.25 whereas the real one is 
Rp3,376,763,000.00. It means that there was a mark-up of Rpl,679,360,003.75 for 
the sake of the local parliament members' benefit. A clear example of mark-up 
is the local parliament's supporting activity expenditure. According to 
Government Regulation No 110 of 2000, Article 14 (3) on the State of the Local 
Parliament's Finances, the amount of district local parliament budget for 
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supporting activities is based on the local revenue classification. With its local 
revenue of Rp72.8 billion, the supporting activity for the Sidoarjo local 
parliament must be no more than 0.75 per cent (or Rp546.75 million) and no 
less than Rp500 million. However, looking at the 2002 local budget, I found that 
the local parliament received an amount more than double, that is 
Rpl,125,000,000.00. This proportion is even higher than what the provincial 
parliament should receive. If the proportion is based on the Government 
Regulation, the provincial parliament only receives Rp728,899,995.00. 
Another example of budget distortion is job-related travelling expenditures. 
Although in Item 11 {job-related travelling) the real amount is less than for the 
standard budget, there are 'other job-related travelling' expenditures ( item 
15) with a total value of Rpl,025,000,000.00 allocated under the local 
parliament's secretariat. Also, under the local parliament secretariat budget, 
there is Rp194,400,000.00 alloc~ted for additional allowances and 
Rp354,000,000.00 for housing assistance for the local parliament members. 
Moreover, there is a budget allocation with a total value of Rp9,144,877,426.00 
for other office costs (lain-lain ongkos kantor) under the local parliament 
secretariat budget without any detail of activities.176 This amount is not 
reasonable since the number of staff in the local parliament is only 27 people. In 
Bappekab (Local Planning Board}, with the total number of staff of 43 people, the 
budget for other office costs was only Rp7.5 million. Comparing the two budget 
176 See the 2002 Sidoarjo District Budget, budget code 1011 digit 70, page 18. 
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allocations, the budget for other office costs in the local parliament is 1,219.32 
times that of the Bappekab. 
This type of budget mark up is made possible since both the executive and the 
legislative body have mutual benefits. The local budget cannot be implemented 
without approval from the local parliament. To ensure ease approval, the 
executive would allocate some money to the budget of the legislative body 
activities. 
Another example of conspiracy between the executive and the legislative body 
is shown in the following case: 
Case 7.8.: Budget Conspiracy and Misuse of Government Property 
The issue of corruption has invited a reaction from a number of 
elements in Sidoarjo. University students and a group of NGO 
activists that are under the Parliament Watch Sidoarjo protested the 
allegation of corruption in the legislative body and encouraged the 
Sidoarjo district attorney to take the issue to court. It was found that 
there was a misuse of the human resources development budget 
reaching Rp 20 billion for the year 2003 local budget stipulated in 
year 2002. This was made possible because there was a conspiracy 
between the budget committee of the parliament and the budget 
team of the executive. 
There was also an allegation of corruption related to the transfer of 
ownership of government cars to personal cars. This ownership 
transfer has broken the Kepmendagri No. 11 of 2001 which says that 
those who are entitled to the cars are people who have held a 
position for at least five years, and that the cars must be five years 
old. 
According to an officer of the Sidoarjo district attorney, the misuse of 
the budget and of government property can be easily detected since 
they can be compared to the existing Kepmendagri. There have been at 
least 23 people charged and convicted who will be interrogated. They 
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include the chairman of the local assembly, chairmen of 
commissions, the budget committee chairman.177 
Case 7.9: Budget Mark up by Local Parliament 
The DPRD chairman of Sidoatjo was accused of marking up the 2003 
local government budget. The budget mark up was misused for 
personal benefit. The total budget for human resource development 
was Rp33 billion, however, Rp20.3 billion were not allocated for 
those purposes. The DPRD only allocated Rp900 million for training 
activities for local parliament members, Rp7.655 billion for assistance 
activities, and Rpll.732 billion for operational assistance.178 
Related to the budget mark up, the chairman of the Sidoatjo DPRD has been 
sentenced to 8 years jail since November 3, 2004. He was accused of 
misusing the human resources development budget of Rp20,137,127,600 
distributed to the 44 members of the DPRD179. Further, the court has named 
all 44 members of the DPRD as suspects since they also received money 
from the chairman.1so 
7.3.2.3. Extortive Cormption by Local Parliament 
In addition to being involved in the issue of money politics, the local parliament 
is also regarded as a new player in terms of extortion. A number of cases reveal 
that members of local parliament have tried to make private gains from the 
177 See "Kejati Temukan Penyimpangan (The court found misuse)" Jawa Pos, March 18, 2004. See also 
"Kejaksaan Kantongi 23 Nama (The court has 23 names)'', Jawa Pos March 20, 2004; "Tim Kejari Steril 
(The court team is steril)'', Jawa Pos, March 17, 2004; "Diungkit Dem-Deman Dewan (Transfer of Cars 
by Parliament questioned)'', Jawa Pos March 22, 2004; "Dewan Kelabakan (DPRD members were 
nervous)", Jawa Pos, March 13, 2004; "Soal Korupsi DPRD, Kejari Dulukan Sekwan (Corruption in the 
DPRD, the court prioritised the DPRD secretary)'', Jawa Pos, March 19, 2004. 
178 See 'Sidang Kasus Korupsi Ketua DPRD Sidoarjo Ditunda (The court session of corruption case of 
the Sidoarjo DPRD chairman delayed)' Tempo, June 30, 2004. See also 'Tim Penyidik Dikarantina (The 
investigator team quarantined)', Jawa Pos, May 21, 2004. 
179 See 'Membagi-bagi Uang, Mantan Ketua DPRD Sidoarjo Divonis Delapan Tahun Penjara 
(Distributing money, the former chairman ofSidoarjo DPRD put in jail for 8 years), Kompas, November 
03, 2004. 
180 See 'Anggaran Terkait Korupsi Dewan Sidoarjo (Budget related to corruption in the Dewan of 
Sidoarjo)', Jawa Pos, January 5, 2005. 
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local government activities. A respondent from a local government-owned 
company said that a top level member of local parliament involved his son in 
supplying materials for cleaning water for PDAM. A similar thing also 
happened in the Agency for Cattle (Dinas Peternakan) where a member of local 
parliame~t asked for a project related to cattle (sapi kereman). He wanted to be 
the supplier to the project. 
According to several business people, the current local parliament members are 
very active in visiting companies. They argue that many companies have no 
license or have not paid taxes and levies. To increase the local revenue, they 
force every company to register with the local government. However, many 
business people said that the visits of the local parliament members were just to 
extort pocket money from the business people. 
How much is the pocket money for the member of local parliament? This is in 
fact not easy to find out from the business people: They were usually reluctant 
to tell me the amount. They always say 'sekedarnya' Oust enough). However, a 
TSC manager told me that when he gave the local government team visiting his 
company one million rupiahs, they said that it was not enough. Roughly, each 
person received about two hundred thousand rupiahs. Beside the pocket 
money, the local parliament members usually asked him to prepare lunch in 
his office for them. 
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This amount of the money is very surprising when compared with what other 
companies have experienced with the local parliament. 
Case 7.10.: Extortive Corruption by Local Parliament 
SK Co Ltd. is a company producing vehicle tyres for the domestic 
market. The company is very close to the local parliament building. 
According to the secretary and the manager, almost every 2-3 months 
a group of 15 people comprising local parliament officers and 
bureaucrats come to check the licenses. For the last two years, there 
have been a total of 12 visits from the local parliament. The visitors 
came from different commissions of the local parliament. However, 
the questions raised are always the same. The company always 
provides them 'pocket or visit money' for ea ch visit.181 
Having examining many cases, it must concluded that corruption has 
mushroomed in the local parliament. The corruption includes money politics, 
mark-ups and extortion. However, there is a serious question: why do business 
people not see money politics in local governance? Looking at the responses to 
questions regarding money politics from the business people, it seems there are 
contradictions in the perceptions of the business people about the real politics 
in the local governance. Certainly, money politics really exists. 
There are several reasons for that. First, perhaps they do not know what 
happens in the high politics process. In fact, the process of high politics such as 
the election of district head is the business of the local parliament. The district 
head election and process of local regulations are not day-to-day politics that 
involves people beyond the local parliament. Second, while money politics does 
not affect them directly, they do not regard it as corruption. Bribes given by a 
181Interview with SBD, a manager of SK Co. Ltd., March 4, 2002. 
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candidate to the parliament members are none of the business people's affairs. 
To business people, corruption is assumed to be the cause if they lose money. In 
this respect, they are not the victims of the high politics games. Third, they do 
not care what the elite is doing. 
7.3.3. Corruption Beyond the Local Polity 
The preceding sections have discussed corruption in the local government and 
local parliament. This chapter now turns to discuss corruption that occurs 
beyond these two local institutions. 
In the name of reform and local autonomy, members of society often claim that 
they have to obtain benefits from companies around them by forcing business 
people to share their profits. As will be seen in the discussion later, many cases 
of extortion show that a degree of corruption is pervasive beyond the local 
state. According to several business people, pressure from members of society 
is a new phenomenon. 
It is ironic that decentralisation in Indonesia seems not to create the kind of civil 
society that empowers local government. Uncontrolled civil society has led to 
uncontrolled corruption. A number of respondents interviewed said that 
extortion by groups such as members of society 'NGOs', and 'journalists' has 
turned into heavy financial pressure for many companies. However, only 
medium and big businesses were the targets of such extortion. 
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Case 7.11.: Extortive Corruption by Local Community 
Mr NZ is one among the victims of extortion. He is the secretary of a 
business association in Sidoarjo. He is also a manager in COM Co. 
Ltd, a company exporting packed frozen chicken to Japan. He said 
that pressures came not only from the government relating to taxes, 
levies or other illegal payment, but also from people taking 
opportunities for their own interests. For example, a candidate in an 
election for village head used the slogan 'if I am elected village head, 
jobless people will be employed in COM'. When he was elected, the 
new village head asked the COM company to employ those people 
who had elected him village head1s2. 
A similar thing happened to RMY Sidoarjo Mall Ltd. 
Case 7.12.: Extortive Corruption by Local Community and Security 
Personnel 
RMY is now the biggest retail mall in Sidoarjo, and employs more 
than 350 people, excluding those who are at the management level. It 
opened on October 2001 and is situated in the centre of the city. 
When it had just started, the company was asked by the village head 
to select the applicants for jobs in his office to ensure that only people 
coming from his village were selected. Other pressures relate to 
people's demands to build facilities such as village roads, drainage 
systems or a sport arena. As a new shopping centre and the biggest 
one, RMY Mall has also been the target of extortion from the security 
personnel. In every event held by the military such as anniversaries 
and inaugurations, members of the military often ask for money. The 
amounts are not small: they could be more than RplO million. ts3. 
Elsewhere, TSC Co Ltd has faced pressures from people demanding monetary 
compensation for the company's activities. The company was accused of 
destroying village roads and creating pollution. In fact, the company had 
already received a license agreeing that the level of pollution was acceptable. 
The ·members of the society asked for RplOO million. The company agreed to 
182Interview with NZ (Secretary of APINDO), April 2, 2002 
183 Interview with BNI, the assistant manager ofRMY Sidoarjo ~all, May 6,2002. 
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improve the road to a total value of Rp40 million, however, the citizens society 
asked for more than that plus cash. 
What TK Co Ltd. faced was .extortion by 'journalists' and 'NGOs', which 
usually exploit issues to do with the environment or labour wages. Both 
'journalists' and 'N GOs' watch companies that are experiencing critical 
issues and they try to publish the bad things. However, they agree not to 
publish them if the company will give them a certain amount of money. For 
example, according to the manager of environmental affairs, many 'activists' 
provoked the society to complain about the company in order to claim 
compensation. They mobilise the people to boycott the company184• 
Case 7.13: Exploitation by 'NGO s' and 'Journalists' 
TI< Co Ltd has experienced extortion several times by some people 
who called themselves NGOs and journalists. They questioned the 
purity of the water the company has released into a river. They 
accused the company of polluting the river and threatened the 
company, demanding it pay compensation to the community 
members surrounding the river. However, they also offered the 
solution, to pay money to them in order to avoid paying too much to 
the community. In fact, the company had cleaned the water before 
allowing it to flow into the river. According to a manager of the 
company, many small businesses have created even worse pollution, 
but they are not questionedtss. 
184 Interview with Ir PST, a manager ofTK Co Ltd., March 20, 2002. 
185 Interview with Ir PST, a manager ofTK Co Ltd., March 20, 2002. 
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Other ways of extorting money from business people are by forcing business 
people to finance 'public activities or properties'. A number of 'voluntary 
organisations' offered tickets for seminars, training or shows. For a seminar, 
the cost could be 250 thousand rupiahs. For a show, one company sometimes 
had to buy five tickets with a total value of 500 thousand rupiahs. Several 
companies were visited by 'the military pensioner organisation' to buy 
calendars or other products which were very costly. And in many cases, the 
business people who had been victims of extortion were not sure that all were 
for the public. 186 
Other targets of extortion from the 'journalists' and 'NGOs' are bureaucrats 
and local government-owned companies. For example, according to a PDAM 
manager, several journalists took the opportunity when there were some 
problems relating to public water services. They demanded the company 
provide them with money so that the problems would not be published. The 
company would usually give them a total of Rp300,000 for a group of 6 
'journalists'. 1s1 
186 Interview with several business people from SK Co.Ltd and Atak Co Ltd (March 22, 2002). 
187 Interview with Suharyanto, the manager of general affairs of PDAM, May 20, 2002. 
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7.4. Conclusions 
The evidence above reveals to what extent political and administrative reform 
through decentralisation of power to the local level has actually worked. The 
most serious concern arising out decentralisation is to reduce the centralisation 
of power in order for citizens to control the management of governmental 
affairs more easily. It is also expected that the local government officials will be 
more accountable to their constituents. 
However, in the case of Sidoatjo, decentralisation has not automatically 
decreased corruption at the local level. It is hard to say, too, that 
decentralisation has decreased the level of corruption at the central government 
level. As shown in many cases, on the contrary, corruption has become more 
common. In this regard, various modes ·of corruption still exist and are 
occurring openly. Also, the perpetrators of corruption come from various 
elements within the executive and the legislative bodies. Contrary to the picture 
given by the existing literature, corruption involves not only bureaucrats and 
local parliamentarians, but also other actors beyond these institutions. Such 
actors include 'NGO activists', 'journali sts' and members of the public. 
The degree of corruption varies from petty bribes involving small sums paid to 
low level officials to grand bribes paid to government leaders or politicians. In 
Sidoatjo, the forms of corruption have been widespread such as kickback, 
extortion, mark-up, and money politics. In terms of seal~, corruption has 
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involved large amounts of money, especially when it is related to money 
politics. This is something new; previous cases of corruption did not involve 
such large amounts of money and were mostly undercover rather than being 
out in the open, as they are now. 
However, the case of Sidoarjo also shows that corruption has been perceived 
differently to different business people. To most business people, an act is 
regarded as a corrupt practice as long as it affects them directly and badly. 
Kickback money that had to be paid by government-related contractors is 
generally not regarded as corruption. Here, the amount of money paid is so 
'just enough' so that it does not burden their businesses. This has been viewed 
as an obligatory act by whoever receives 'luck' from the local government, in 
the form of contracts and benefits. 
On the other hand, extortive corruption of businesses involving huge amounts 
of money has mattered. Business people normally see it as corruption because it 
has become a burden on business activities. Different from kick-back money, 
with extortive corruption, business people do not derive any mutual benefit. 
Money politics that only involves high politics between the legislative body and 
the executive is beyond business people' s concern. Business people are blind 
to money politics because this is an activity beyond their daily lives. Although 
money politics can be categorised as corruption, it does not affect the business 
people directly. 
289 
As described through many examples, only medium and big businesses have 
been the target of extortion. Fewer small businesses than medium and large 
businesses were complaining about extortion. This can be explained as small 
businesses are not required to have large numbers of licences that are the 
targets of extortive activities for corrupt people. Therefore, pressure from 
corruption in business activities does affect medium and big businesses. It 
always creates a high cost economy. They then have to pass on the cost of 
corruption as a part of production costs. 
The next chapter will focus on the strategies adopted by business people in 
response to the changing situation. The possibilities for business people to 
relocate and expand their businesses will be discussed. Further, the next 
chapter will also examine the pattern of local government-business relations 
after decentralisation. 
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Chapter Eight 
DEVOLVING POWER FROM THE 
CENTRALTOLOCALGOVERNMENTAND 
THE BUSINESS SECTOR: 
An Emerging New Local Government-
Business Relationship?tss 
8.1. Introduction 
Dulu, para pengusaha bangga bisa dekat dengan 
penguasa. Sekarang bisnis dan politik sudah terpisah 
(Formerly, businessmen were proud of being 
close to government officials. Now business 
and politics has been separated)189 
The research question discussed in chapter three with regard to decentralisation 
is whether or not a new pattern of local government-business relationship is 
emerging. In Indonesia, the relationship between government and business has 
been associated with various models, various definitions, terms and emphases 
such as ersatz capitalism, corporatism, patron-client, patrimonialism and 
pluralism. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to provide evidence of a 
different perspective of local government-business relations. 
188 Part of this chapter has been presented at the Indonesian Regional Science International Conference, 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, August 13-14, 2004. 
189 Dahlan Iskan, the Chief Executive Officer of Jawa Pos, March 16, 2002 
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With decentralisation, the difficulty of the local government to derive enough 
revenue from various sources leads to a further question: how does the local 
government build a connection with the business sector? On the other hand, 
when the local government relies on the business sector to some extent to 
support the local economy, how do the business people build a connection with 
the local government to survive in their businesses? Unlike what has been 
observed by most political scientists focusing more on the national level, at the 
local level, the relationship between the local government and the business 
sector is in need of qualification. At the local level various types of business 
have different interests in dealing with the local government. Therefore, 
different types of local government-business relations may exist. 
The evidence from the fieldwork shows that the local government has behaved 
differently to different types of business on the one hand, and the business 
people have also responded differently in making a relationship with the local 
government, on the other. As will be discussed later, there are also differences 
of relationship among groups of business people. Although it is very difficult to 
categorise, I will try to provide different cases to describe these relationships. 
Three different types of businesses will be explored. They are: government-
related contractors, medium-big businesses and small businesses. In terms of 
type of business, they are also different. Government-related contractors are 
service-oriented, whereas medium-big businesses are manufacture-oriented 
and small businesses are trade-oriented. 
292 
8.2. Current Pictures of Local Government-Business 
Relations in Sidoarjo 
The previous studies on this topic are limited and have come to different 
conclusions. In this chapter, I present current pictures of the local government-
business relations in Sidoarjo. 
8.2.1. Local Government-Related Contractors: The Case of 
GAPEN SI 
8.2.1.1. Characteristics of the Business. 
In Sidoarjo, there are more than 250 building contractors undertaking local 
government projects such as building, road and bridge-making, and sanitation 
and irrigation system installation. They are organised under Gabungan Pelaksana 
Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia or GAPENSI (Construction Businessmen' s 
Association); and GAPENSI as an organisation is under Kamar Dagang dan 
Industri Daerah or KADINDA (Local Chamber of Finance and Industry). 
GAPENSI is the only organisation acknowledged by the government as a 
business partner engaged in local government building construction projects. 
Those who are not enrolled under GAPENSI are not allowed to propose a 
tender for government-funded projects. Although the list numbers more than 
250, there are in fact only about 100 real companies since a person can have 
more than one company under different names. Someone usually has two or 
three companies and they use them for project bidding. 
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All members of GAPENSI are indigenous people. There are no Chinese people 
working in this kind of activity. Chinese people prefer to deal with building 
projects that have few connections with local government. They work for 
· building projects funded by the private sector such as supermarkets, factories, 
and housing. They are organised under the real estate agency organisation, Real 
Estate Indonesia or REI. However, some members of GAPENSI are also 
members of REI. 
In terms of the size of company, government-related contractors are divided 
into six categories based on the scale of the project they can undertake. 
The categories are as follows: 
• B (Besar or big) : >10 billion rupiahs 
• Ml (Menengah 1 or medium 1): 3-10 billion 
• M2 (Menengah 2 or medium 2) : 1-<3 billion 
• Kl (Kecil 1 or small l) 
• K2 (Kecil 2 or small 2) 
• K3 (Kecil 3 or small 3) 
: 400 million - <l billion 
: 100 m to <400 m 
: < lOOm 
Category B comprises the biggest contractors with the ability to undertake a 
project on the scale of more than 10 billion rupiahs, whereas category K3 
includes the smallest contractors with an ability of only less than 100 million 
rupiahs. In the GAPENSI record in Sidoarjo, there are only two companies 
categorised as B; three for Ml; ten for M2; thirty-one for Kl; more than 150 for 
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K2; and no company categorised as K3. This shows that the biggest proportion 
of the members is mostly K (small). However, whatever the category, doing 
business as government contractors is always regarded as a bisnis basah 
(profitable business). Even for the K-3 category, this business is more profitable 
than any other small business activities. 
According to some local contractors, working with local government's projects 
is safer than with the private sector's. Although the profit obtained from 
government's projects is less than that from the private sector's, the payment 
is mostly on time since the authority for expenditure by the local government is 
not controlled any more by the central government. Before decentralisation, the 
payment of Kandep to the local contractors depended upon payment by the 
department in Jakarta. 
In contrast with the private sector's projects, such as housing, payment is 
sometimes dependent upon the sale of the houses. It can take several months or 
a year to receive the payment. Moreover, it is very sure that every year the 
government allocates some money for infrastructure projects. 
8.2.1.2. Relationship with the Local Government: Collective Actions and 
Mutual Symbiosis. 
The local contractors interviewed generally saw local autonomy as a blessing to 
them. Under local autonomy, the GAPENSI of Sidoarjo will get more benefits 
than other types of businesses. The increase in the local government budget will 
· probably increase the number of projects offered to them. Although the 
percentage of development· expenses over the total local budget is getting 
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lower, the nominal expenditure of the local government is getting higher, 
especially in 2002. As can be seen from the Sidoarjo local budget, in 2000, 
development expenses were only Rp38.72 billion whereas in 2001, it reached to 
Rp46.41 billion. In 2002, it was more than double compared to the previous 
budget, that is Rp104.08 billion19o. 
8.2.1.2.1. Influence of GAPENSI on the Local Government: Collective Action 
There has been a significant change in the perception of the existence of 
GAPENSI among business people working on government-related projects. 
Before 1999, GAPENSI was perceived negatively. Its leadership was regarded 
as self-serving and its existence represented the interests of the local 
government rather than that of construction business people. The people in 
GAPENSI were often associated with Golkar party members. Two former 
officers191 were elected as local assembly members representing Golkar in the 
2004 election in Sidoarjo. It was very common for the power holders at the local 
level to use GAPENSI for their own political interests. GAPENSI was a business 
representation that could be characterised as a corporatist organisation at the 
local level at that time. 
190 Counted from Sidoarjo local budget, various sources. 
191 They are Gatot Supriadi (former chairman ofGAPENSI) and Choirul Chodirun (former organisational 
development head of GAPEN SI). 
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While public criticism of GAPENSI is still common, GAPENSI now exerts a 
very powerful influence on the local government. However, although it has 
been very strong, its influence is only on a specific issue. This is because the 
business of GAPENSI is not affected much by local regulations such as local 
taxes and levies or licenses. Although members of GAPENSI work on local 
government projects, they have nothing to do with administrative requirements 
from the local government. For example, in running their project activities they 
do not need a Business Agreement Letter, Upset/Disturbance Law Permit, 
Location Per~t and Land Release Permit, all of which are very costly to 
business people. This is, however, very different if they build houses for the 
private sector that need some of the above requirements. For the latter, some 
complicated procedures and costs related to bureaucracy will apply. 
The role of GAPENSI is growing. The label of GAPENSI as a corporatist 
organisation may be inappropriate now. The current decentralisation policy has 
actually strengthened GAPENSI' capability for collective business action to 
push the local government for reform. 
There were two critical issues raised by GAPENSI when local autonomy was 
undertaken in Sidoatjo: transparency of local government project distribution 
and protection of local contractors. In this respect, the contractors have also 
seen local autonomy as a vehicle for transparency through which the district 
head can be controlled by the local parliament as well as by the business 
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people192. The current chairman of the Sidoarjo GAPENSI has acknowledged 
it193, 
As far as transparency is concerned, there is growing organised group action 
among the GAPENSI members in questioning the fairness of local government 
projects that had mostly been run by the district head's families. 
Case 8.1.: District Head and Family Business 
Prior to the reform; it was very common that the family members of 
the previous district heads dominated the business of local 
government projects conducted ·by GAPENSI. The projects from the 
local government could flow easily in to their pockets. They had a 
number of companies under different names. It could be the name of 
the wife, sons or other extended family members of the district head. 
In conducting the projects, they just subcontracted them to other local 
contractors. They gained profits without working too hardt94. 
Since the demand was very strong, the then district head had cancelled some 
projects held by his family members. 
Case 8.2.: Breaking up Family Business Ties 
The district head of Sidoarjo gave up all projects conducted by his 
family members. The decision was delivered through the division 
head of program arrangement (Kepala Bagian Penyusunan Program) of 
Sidoarjo district government, Mr. HM Sutjipto. This was to respond to 
protests from the GAPENSI officers in relation to KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi 
dan Nepotisme or corruption, collusion and nepotism) allegations. 
There were at least three projects run by his son, Genod. He borrowed 
CV Agung as a company flag to obtain the projects from the local 
government. The three projects were labour intensive projects coming 
from the Dinas Pekerjaan Umum Cipta Karya for drainage, paving and 
sanitation works. In a meeting, the official also surrendered seven 
192 This issue was taken up in the campaign for the election of the GAPENSI Chairman. Mr Unggul 
Prabowo, one of the candidates raised the issue of transparency and openness during the campaign for the 
election. He also made a statement in a local newspaper, in which he demanded the cutting of projects 
that are now in the hands of the district head's family members. 
193 Interview with Mr Sri Wahyu Hermanto. He told me that he is a family member of the previous Bupati 
of Sidoarjo and he also recognised that district head families' business were common. 
194 Interview with a member of GAPENSI 
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projects that were previously run by officials of Sidoatjo district. The 
Secretary of GAPENSI expected that the initiative taken by the district 
head would be followed by other local govemmentofficials195. 
In terms of transparency, the tender process has been open. Before 
decentralisation, some projects were kept secret and only certain people were 
informed about them. The announcement of a project was only on the 
whiteboard located in every agency. All local agencies are now obliged to 
disclose the announcement of tenders to all GAPENSI members. Moreover, 
they have to announce the tender through radio and newspaper. Also, every 
member of GAPENSI has the right to be informed why he/she lost and why 
other people won the tender196. 
In terms of protection, business people under GAPENSI pushed the local 
government to protect them. GAPENSI asked for Sidoatjo local government to 
empower (memberdayakan) and guide (membina) them. This means that the 
Sidoatjo local government has to protect them from other competitors coming 
from other districts, especially contractors from Kota Surabaya. If there is no 
protection from the local government, contractors from Kota Surabaya 
numbering more than 1,000 will take up all the available projects. In terms of 
qualification, contractors from Kota Surabaya are much better than those of 
Sidoatjo. The experience, capital and expertise of contractors of Kota Surabaya 
are beyond the capacity of those of Sidoatjo. 
195 See 'Bisnis Anak Bupati Sidoarjo Dicabut (The Businesses of the Sidoarjo District Son were 
cancelled), Surabaya Post, May 29, 2000. 
196 Interview with Budiono, the secretary of GAPENSI. 
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For the local government of Sidoarjo, this demand has actually created a 
tension between protecting indigenous businesses and complying with the 
higher-level regulation since the Keputusan Presiden or Keppres (Presidential 
Decree) No. 18 of 2000 clearly states that tenders must be open to any 
contractors. No limitation is imposed on putting in a tender and competitors 
can come from other regions as well. However, the local government believes it 
has to look after local contractors, too. The local government has its own 
interests to protect with the local contractors to ensure their financial support 
for various social activities. 
In this respect, the local government of Sidoarjo has responded in a way that is 
perceived very positively by the local contractors of Sidoarjo. Some strategies 
have been adopted by the local government to ensure a balance between 
Keppres and the local demand. 
First, tenders are open for projects with an expenditure of more than 700 
million rupiahs, whereas they are only open to local contractors for projects that 
spend less than 700 million rupiahs. This limit has given advantages to local 
contractors because there is a very limited number of projects that amount to 
700 hundred million rupiahs delivered by the local government. Moreover, they 
have limited capacities to carry out such big projects. For GAPENSI, this option 
has been agreed since this limitation hardly affects them. Of 171 projects in 
2002, only fewer than 8 per cent with a total budget of more than 700 hundred 
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million rupiahs were offered by the local government. This means that more 
than 90 per cent of the projects will be shared out to local contractors. 
Second, the local government will not make a formal statement about this 
agreement to avoid being seen to be against the Keppres. It is up to GAPENSI to 
manage this. For GAPENSI, the signal from the local government has 
legitimised them to arrange with other GAPENSI from other districts not to 
interfere with each other. The provincial level GAPENSI has also been forced to 
comply with the agreement among district level GAPENSI. The local 
government will close its eyes to this. 
Third, to distribute the projects evenly, the local government lets GAPENSI 
'share' the projects by breaking up one project into different sub-activities. 
Due to the limited number of projects, it is not easy to guarantee that every 
contractor can have a project. The number of projects from the local 
government is usually around 70 to 80 packages, however, the number of 
contractors is around 100. Therefore, to rehabilitate a primary school building, 
for instance, GAPENSI is allowed to sub-divide the activities into different 
small projects and sub-contract them to other members of GAPENSI197• Big 
contractors obtaining large projects from the local government have an 
obligation to sub-contract 20 per cent of the total value to small contractors. 
197 A member of GAPENSI told me that he had a project refurbishing a primary school fence from other 
contractors winning the tender (Unggul Prabowo) 
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8.2.1.2.2. Local Government and GAPENSI: Mutual Symbiosis 
The relationship between GAPENSI and the local government seems to be a 
symbiotic one. The closeness of the district head to GAPENSI is shown by his 
presence at every single Musyawarah Cabang or Muscab (branch meeting at the 
district level) of GAPENSI. Most local pejabats such as vice-district head (Wakil 
Bupati), local agency heads (Kepala Dinas) as well as military officers will 
accompany the district head when attending meetings. The district head is 
usually asked to deliver a speech containing policies of the local government 
and the expectations of the local government of GAPENSI. 
The presence of the district head is not merely to show his concern with local 
contractors but also to provide real benefits. 
Case 8.3.: Benefits Given by the Local Government 
In the Muscab on the 6th of March 2002, the district head promised to 
provide GAPENSI with a project worth about ten billion rupiahs. This 
project aims to develop 335 villages based on a local participation 
program that can be conducted together with GAPENSI. This project 
is expected to raise participation in the community to contribute 
money. The money can be for building village roads, rehabilitating 
houses or sanitation19s. In the implementation, GAPENSI is 
responsible for planning and doing the technical work. 
On the other hand, the district head demanded that the members of GAPENSI 
be professional and skilful in undertaking local government projects. In terms 
of professionalism, the Bupati of Sidoatjo demanded the GAPENSI leader 
198 This kind of project provides the initial money, and the community also contributes money, labor or in 
kind {food or drink and materials). 
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discipline his members. One name only can be used for one company, only one 
name can be proposed in one tender. 
Case 8.4.: Demands for Professionalism from the Local Government 
The Bupati asked the GAPENSI leader to discipline its members in 
order to eliminate falsehoods in submitting data. The GAPENSI 
members often claimed falsely that they were capable of doing big 
projects. In fact, they often had insufficient equipment to do the job. 
Moreover, the district head threatened the GAPENSI members who 
have been committing fraud (kecurangan) and they will be black-listed. 
Some contractors have also manipulated the funds with the result that 
the quality of the building has been poor 199. 
At the branch meeting, the Bupati also took the opportunity to request the 
GAPENSI members to contribute voluntary donations to Sidoatjo activities. 
This was a definite request, made when he gave a speech during the opening 
ceremony of the GAPENSI meeting. 
Case 8.5.: Contributions of Contractors to the Local Government (I) 
The highest concern of the Bupati is how to develop the football club 
Deltras (abbr: Deltra Putra Sidoatjo). This club previously belonged to 
H. Mislan under the name of Gelora Putra Delta (GPD). In October 
2002, the club was bought by the local government of Sidoatjo. 
Further, the local government is concerned with how to finance the 
team. The salary of the players varies from three million to twelve 
million rupiahs a month. Some players are hired from overseas clubs. 
The football club is very important for Sidoatjo as it will increase its 
fame. The. district head is willing to be the chairman of the Club. He 
has also assigned his deputy to be responsible for the manager and for 
199 For instance, the renovation of the bridge connecting Sidokare and Taman Pinang was funded by a 
local budget ofRp 575 million, however, it was stated only as Rp 336 million on the project white board. 
There was Rp 139 million difference between what was stated in the local budget and in the location of 
project. See 'Anggaran Jembatan Susut 'Jawa Pos, October 3, 2002. 
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collecting the money from business people.200. In every single game, 
whether in Sidoatjo or in any other city, most local government 
officers and local parliament members attend the football competition. 
A large amount of money is spent. It is also beyond the local 
government budget to pay all expenses. The only way to finance this 
activity is through donations from the business people. 
When asked, the former chairman of GAPENSI20t said that he had donated 
about Rp 25 million to the football club. He knew that some other members 
had also given contributions for the club. According to a member of the 
legislature202, Sidoatjo had already hired some football players from overseas, 
valuing them at more than 100 million rupiahs per person a year. 
The existence of GAPENSI is in this context also, very important for the local 
government. Another way for local government to collect money is by putting 
on a yearly festival and the Bandeng (milk fish) auction. 
Case 8.6.: Contributions of Contractors to the Local Government (II) 
Bandeng is the name of a fish produced in fish-ponds, one of the most 
popular products of Sidoatjo. A festival is usually held together with 
the birthday of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. The festival has been 
a tradition in Sidoatjo for a long time. Unfortunately, it was not 
performed for several years until 2001 when the new district head 
took the initiative to hold it again. All pejabats get involved in the 
bidding. The district head always starts bidding followed by his wife 
and then by the vice district head and other local pejabats. 
In the 2001 auction, the district head made the first offer of Rp250,000 
for the first bandeng. Generally, the following person will make a 
higher offer than the previous one. However, in the Sidoatjo auction 
the local pejabat offering after the district head was less than RpS0,000. 
200 See 'Gelora Putra Delta Siap Masuk Ligina VIII, Wien Hendrarso Ketua Umum, Syaiful lllah 
Manager (Gelora Putra Delta ready to enter Ligina VIII, Wien Hendrarso the Chairman, Syaiful Illah the 
Manager), Potensi Sidoarjo, Edisi 04 Oktober 2001. . 
201 Interview with Gatot Supriadi, former chairman of GAPENSI, and now chairman of KAO INDA. 
202 Interview with Mustafad Ridwan, legislative member ofDPRD Sidoarjo 
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When it was the turn of the business people to offer, they made an 
offer barely higher than the district head's. For example, the 
representative of PT Tjiwi Kimia increased it to Rp300,000. It was then 
followed by other business people and jumped to 500 thousand 
rupiahs. The final highest bidder of the first bandeng was Haji Taat 
who was the chairman of GAPENSI, offering Rp41 million. 
In 2003, the first offer made by the district head was RpS00,000 
followed by his wife with only Rp400,000. Finally, the winners of the 
bidding were from GAPENSI (Rp130,872,233); PT Hastina Pura 
(Rp89,300,000) and CV Tunggal Jaya (Rp45,000,000). The last two 
contractors are also members of GAPENSI. 
The money collected by the local government through the milk-fish auction 
does not appear in the local budget portfolio. It is used for social activities such 
as charities and cultural festivals. 
Looking at the stories related to how the local government collects money 
through the football club and the Bandeng Festival, it is obvious that the 
symbiotic relationship has come into play between the contractors and the local 
government officials. 
8.2.1.3. Dealing with Other Stakeholders · 
There are several stakeholders who influences business activities at the local 
level. They are the central government, local government, local assembly, 
political parties and business associatio~. The question is what is the nature of 
the relationship between local government-related contractors and those 
stakeholders? As mentioned in Chapter one, local government-business 
relations refer to the degree of interdependency between two actors and to the 
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way they interact with each other: Table 8.1 illustrates how business people 
interact. 
On whom do they rely when they face problems related to their business and 
government regulations? In this regard, the existence of GAPENSI is important 
to the members. Although they sometimes rely on the local government, most 
contractors contact GAPENSl first when they face business problems (from my 
survey 43.3 per cent). The trust given by the members to GAPENSI is high. 
GAPENSI will represent the members in dealing with local government. The 
table also shows that the relationship between the GAPENSI members and 
other stakeholders is not close. The percentage of the GAPENSI members 
dealing directly with the central government or local government is low. 
Interestingly, although the current situation has given more power to the local 
assembly, they have not used it as a bargaining tool with the local government. 
Similarly, political parties are not regarded as important dealing with the local 
government. The GAPENSI members very rarely contact them for coping with 
problems related to local regulations. 
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Table 8.1. The Relationship of Contractors with Stakeholders 
Responses Central Local Local Political Business 
Gov't Gov't Assembly Party Association 
Never 69.0% 67.4% 81.1% 83.3% 20.0% 
Rare 3.4% 12.6% 9.5% 6.7% 10.0% 
Sometimes 20.7% 11.6% 6.3% 6.7% 23.3% 
Often 6.9% 7.4% 3.2% 3.3% 43.3% 
Very often 0% 1.1% 0% 0% 3.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Question: In the last 12 months, to whom did you contact when you encountered 
difficulties in relation to local regulations and policies that hampered business 
activities? 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
There are several reasons explaining why the local assembly with its strong 
power is not important to the local contractors. Related to the patron-client 
relationship, why do business people not rely on local assembly members as 
their patrons? First, the local assembly is relatively new. Local contractors have 
no good connections yet with the local assembly members. It takes time to build 
up the trust to establish a patron-client relation. Second, the local assembly 
members come from various political parties. With these varied political 
backgrounds, it is more difficult and more expensive to deal with them. 
Building a personal connection with someone in the local assembly from a 
political party would probably bring about a conflict with other members from 
other political parties. Third, relying on the local assembly members is too risky 
since they have limited time in their position. Their business would depend on 
the length of that position in the local assembly. 
307 
8.2.2. Medium-Big Businesses: The Case of APINDO 
8.2.2.1. Characteristics of the Business. 
There are more than 340 companies categorised as medium-big businesses in 
Sidoarjo. According to the Sidoarjo statistics, they employ more than 45,000 
workers. The companies exist across several areas of Sidoarjo - Taman, Krian, 
Waru, and Candi. They vary in terms of ownership, however, most of them are 
Chinese Indonesian. Some medium and big companies are owned by foreigners 
whereas among the indigenous people ownership is very rare. They also 
usually employ foreign expatriates either from Asian countries such as Taiwan, 
Japan and Hongkong or European countries such Germany and Holland. In 
Sidoarjo, at the moment there are more than 450 expatriates. Medium and big 
business activities are mostly manufacturing industries producing materials for 
national and export markets. Many of the companies have their headquarters in 
Jakarta and Surabaya whereas Sidoarjo is only used as the place for the factory. 
Medium-big businesses have organised themselves under Asosiasi Pengusaha 
Indonesia or APINDO (the Indonesian Employers Association). Although 
medium and big businesses are supposed to be under Kamar Dagang dan 
Industri Daerah or KADINDA (Local Chamber of Finance and Industry}, they do 
not assume that KADINDA is important. Moreover, KADINDA is also often 
associated with the government interests. The current chairman of APINDO is 
Mr Sutadji. He was formerly a bureaucrat (in the past, he would have been 
automatically a member of Golkar) and has resigned to become a businessman, 
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running an export furniture business. While he runs his business, he is now also 
a political activist for PDIP. 
8.2.2.2. Relationship with the Local Government: Individual and Covert 
Relations. 
How is the relationship between the local government and medium-big 
businesses? Based on interviews with several business people, it became clear 
the relationship of medium-big businesses with local government is different 
from that of small businesses with the local government or that of local 
government-related contractors. 
In fact, the local government of Sidoaro is not as strong as the central 
government vis-a-vis medium-big businesses. They seem to be beyond the 
control of the local government. They usually look down on local government 
officials203. The evidence that they do not respect local officials can be observed 
from several cases. 
The first case relates to the visit of a local pejabat. The picture of clientelism that 
is common in Indonesia may be true only between big business groups and the 
central government. However, in the case of Sidoatjo, the hierarchical 
relationship between the two is not clear-cut. For instance: 
203 Interview with some bureaucrats of Sidoarjo. 
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Case 8.7.: Local Government Officials Versus Big Companies 
One day, a cohort of local officials consisting of executives and 
legislatives visited one of the biggest companies in Sidoatjo to do an 
inspection. However, the managers of.the company rejected the visit. 
They did not want to meet the local pejabats. According to a local 
pejabat, this is not the only case. In certain companies, some pejabats 
have been received only by the company's administrative staff, not 
by the manager or the owner. Very often, the security guards were 
very strict in refusing them entry. The way the companies treat the 
pejabats shows how the local government has been perceived as not 
important to business people. The visits of pejabat are always regarded 
as being for picking up money from the business people204. 
Another case relates to the changes of regulation either from the central or local 
government. Some regulations concerning medium-big businesses are still 
issued by the central government. Some other regulations are under the 
authority of the provincial or the local government. Therefore, local 
government officials are often regarded as ineffective2os. In contrast to the 
experience of businessmen, the local government officials are not confident in 
dealing with them. In practice, local government officials do not have enough 
experience to talk about business activities. Moreover, in terms of the 
appearance of social status, business people looks more confident before local 
government officials. 
A third case relates to conflict resolution between workers and the 
management. In intermediating a conflict between the businessmen and the 
workers, the local government is usually weak vis-ll-vis the businessmen206. 
204 Some businessmen I interviewed have the same opinion about the motives of pejabats to visit their 
companies. The bureaucrats I interviewed also said that they were not confident with the businessmen. 
205 Interview with Mr from Bidar Satria and Sehat Komodo 
206 Interview with several workers doing demonstration in the local assembly. 
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Most workers protest that companies' policies do not show trust towards the 
Disnaker (Local Agency for Manpower). The agency cannot handle their 
problems and it seems to be under the control of medium-big businesses. On 
the other hand, workers tend to bring their problems to the local assembly. 
Commission E in the local assembly, responsible for social welfare affairs, is 
regarded as being strong enough to cope with these problems. Moreover, 
officials from the Disnaker were often upset with the way the local parliament 
dealt with issues of worker-management relations. They assumed that the local 
parliament has gone beyond its authority, and that authority was supposed to 
be in the hands of Disnaker. 
To what extent do medium-big businesses influence the local government? In 
this respect, only two issues were raised by medium-big businesses, but they 
are crucial. The first and most common issue is workers' wages. This issue is 
only. relevant to medium-big businesses, but not to small businesses or 
government-related contractors. 
Under the organisation of APINDO, medium-big businesses are regarded as 
important by the government. In particular, APINDO has been involved in 
determining the minimum wage standard at the district level. Every year, the 
minimum wage is adjusted to the prevailing conditions such as inflation or 
macroeconomic conditions. Before decentralisation, APINDO was also 
involved; however, the minimum wage was determined by the provincial 
government. When district governments have become autonomous, they can 
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make their own minimum standard of wage. However, the exact amount of the 
adjustment depends on the negotiation between the three parties: the business 
people, the workers' union and the district government. The decision made at 
the local level will be proposed to the provincial government, where the 
governor will ratify the proposal. 
Compared to the cases of Singapore and Korea, the government supports the 
business sector through keeping wages low, the Sidoarjo government seems to 
be ambiguous. At the formal level, the local government uses the three-party 
mechanism to determine the level of labour wages. The regional minimum 
wage (Upah Minimum Regional or UMR) per month in Sidoarjo was Rp 330,700 
in 2001. For the year 2002, the UMR was increased by 37%. During the 
negotiations, APINDO had in fact an objection to increasing this already-large 
percentage. APINDO proposed only a 20-25 per cent increase with a total UMR 
of Rp415,000-Rp 420,000, not as large as the Rp435,000 proposed by the 
government and labour association. Although it was very hard to compromise, 
the final decision of the UMR was Rp435,0oo207. 
However, in the implementation, the local government always lets the business 
people pay according to their own capability. In this case, many medium-big 
businesses pay their employees below the standard of the minimum wage 
agreed by the three parties. The record of the Disnaker shows that the number of 
207 Interview with a local pejabat. See also, "UMR, bukan sekedar angka {UMR, not only figure)", 
Kompas, January 14, 2002. 
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strikes did not decrease. Over five years, the numbers of strike day were as 
follows: 48 (1997), 134 (1998), 28 (1999), 100 (2000) and 85 (2001)208. The most 
significant issue is about under payment of wages. The business people argued 
that they faced difficulties during the crisis due to increases in the costs of raw 
materials, electricity and telephone on the one hand. On the other hand, the 
market demand is currently very low, driving profits down. 
The formal mechanism for finding a solution· through tripartiet (employers, 
workers' union and local government) does not work well enough to cope 
with the payment of wages. The case of medium-big businesses provides a 
picture of a relationship characterised as individual and covert when they have 
to deal with the government. In many cases of disputes between the 
management and the labour in relation to the minimum wage standard, the 
management dealt directly with the local parliament or with the local 
bureaucracy. They did not involve the business association in handling such 
problems, although the association had determined the minimum wages.209 
Case 8.8.: Coping with Conflicts between Companies and Workers 
Sidoarjo is always coloured with daily demonstrations by workers. 
Normally, they demand an increase in wages. When they cannot cope 
with the problems by themselves, they will go to the Disnaker or the 
Local Assembly office. More than twenty workers can always be seen 
in the Local assembly office almost every day. They are waiting for a 
meeting that will be facilitated by the Commission in the DPRD. 
However, it is very rare that the representatives of the company come 
to the meeting. They often avoid meetings in the DPRD office. They 
208 Records presented by a local government official, interview, March 28, 2002. This record of strike is 
only based on the number of days. In fact, in one day a number of strikes can happen simultaneously in 
various companies. Therefore, the total number of strike can be double or triple compared to the existing 
record. 
209 Interview with and observation of some business people in the local parliament and local bureaucracy. 
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prefer to discuss their problems in a personal way with the DPRD 
members without the attendance of workers. 
Beside the minimum wages standard, another issue related to medium-big 
businesses is increases in local taxes and levies. Under local autonomy, medium 
and big businesses are the most affected compared to small businesses. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, they are the main target of local taxes and 
levies. All local and central regulations relate to their activities. From 
production to selling, they cannot avoid being taxed and levied from the local 
and central governments. Taxes and levies include, for instance: underground 
and surface water tax, HO permits, land and building tax, value added tax, 
income tax, fee for use of expatriates, and so on. 
In issuing new regulations on local taxes and levies, the local government never 
involves the business people, that is, those who will face the impacts. 
Interviews with several business people show that the local government has 
been isolating itself in producing such new regulations. Local government 
officials often visited medium-big companies to discuss their plan to issue new 
regulations. However, the visits were only to inform them about the plan, but 
not to accept any input from the business people. When I asked local 
government officials why they never discussed these matters with business 
people, I was told that it was useless to discuss it with business people. On the 
one hand, the local government was forced to produce new regulations to 
increase its revenue. On the other hand, business people tended to reject the 
proposals of local government. 
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Although local taxes and levies have serious impacts on business activities, 
business people did not raise the issue as a concern of APINDO. Also, APINDO 
as the representative of medium-big businesses did not claim the increase in 
local taxes and levies as their concern. They do not use the business 
representation to force the local government to change the existing policies. 
Business people prefer to cope with the issues of wages and taxation through 
personal contacts with local government officials. 
Beyond the formal target of taxes, medium-big businesses are also the target of 
demands for ' voluntary' contributions. In the case of Sidoarjo, for instance, 
the district head invited business people from medium and big companies 
shortly after Lebaran210 in January 2002. It was aimed at creating a good 
relationship between local government and the business sector. According to a 
committee member present at the meeting, the district head delivered the 
message that business people need to be concerned with local development. 
Without the support of business people, the local government cannot afford to 
develop the Sidoarjo regions. As a result, according to one of the committee 
members, business people collected money together to be contributed to Pemda 
for local development. This included sponsorship of sport activities, of social 
and cultural activities, and of education for the poor. 
Such collections of money are not just conducted once a year. 
210 lebaran is a Muslim celebration after finishing the fasting month. This celebration has also become a 
tradition involving non-Muslim and is a time to gather together. 
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Case 8.9.: Collecting Money from Medium-Big Businesses 
On October 29, 2002, the district head gathered 300 businessmen of 
Sidoarjo in four different places simultaneously. This invitation was 
under the title of pertemuan silaturahmi (friendship meeting) to tighten 
the relationship between the business people and the local 
government. In Hotel Utami, the gathering was led by the district 
head whereas in Porong the meeting was chaired by the district 
secretary211. In the end, the business people were provided by the 
district head with an account number 1410001169077, through which 
they could transfer money for local development. However, the 
account being in district head's name brought about the suspicion of 
the business people about the use of the money for private interests 
rather than for public ones. In fact, according to a high level local 
pejabat, it is very common that big businesses menyetor (transfer) 
money to the district head. The amount of money was not mentioned 
but it is of course would not be a small amount212. 
What have the business people obtained from Pemda? It was of course not for 
nothing that they contributed money to the local government. The district head 
established a hotline to receive any complaints coming from business people. If 
they had objections related to the amount of tax or levies they could express 
their concern straight away and directly to the district head. This access is not 
granted to small businesses. The hotline can also be used for personal relations 
between the business people and the local pejabat. 
The hotline access directly to the district head also shows that although there is 
an association representing the medium and big businesses to articulate their 
interests in the local government policy such as in determining minimum wage 
standard in Sidoarjo, most businessmen still indulge in covert activities 
211 See 'Pengusaha Ditodong Sumbangan Bola (Businessmen forced to donate to football club)', Jawa 
Pos, October 30, 2002. Unfortunately, there was no information on who chaired the gathering in Krian 
and in the local government office. 
212 Interview with Asekda Bidang Tata Pemerintahan 
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individually. A number of bureaucrats said that many big companies are 
beyond their capacity to control since they can bypass the local regulations 
through individual connections with the district head. 
This became very obvious when I observed the case of the implementation of 
the minimum wages standard. Many companies still complain about the level 
of the minimum wage although it has been ratified by companies that are 
represented by APINDO. For example, the boss of Maspion complained that 
the minimum wage is too high in Indonesia, that it was much more than that of 
China2t3. However, in this instance, he did not use APINOO to channel his 
complaint since it cannot negotiate any more about wages that have been 
determined. 
As far as the relationship between big businesses and government is concerned, 
the current situation has changed the perception of business people. As clearly 
stated by a top businessman in Sidoarjo, competing to embrace the rulers is not 
the best strategy to run a business. This owner of Maspion, Mr Alim Markus, 
said that what businessmen need is in fact security assurance214. Another 
successful business has also supported the separation between business and 
politics21s. 
213 See 'Alim Markus Keluhkan UMR (Alim Markus to Compalin UMR)', Jawa Pos, April 11, 2002. 
214 SeeJawa Pos, 16 March 2002. 
215 See Dahlan Iskan in Jawa Pos, 16 March 2002. 
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In contrast, informally medium-big businesses develop another type of 
relationship individually, not collectively. Although medium-big businesses are 
under APINDO, this organisation seems to be rarely used for negotiations with 
the local government. In the representations in determining the minimum 
wages standard, big businesses seem not to be very worried about the high 
standard of wages. However, when the policy is implemented, they usually 
make a variety of efforts to gain benefits. For example, although the minimum 
wages standard had been agreed by labor organisations, APINDO and the local 
government, there was a rumour that the Governor had changed the agreed 
wages standard from Rp453,000 to Rp433,000. The suspicion then formed that 
some business people had been making undercover negotiations with the 
Govemor.216 
Business people, in dealing with local government officials to reduce taxes and 
levies, also often use similar approaches. Several companies, to avoid being 
taxed highly by asking for tax reduction, have also undertaken individual and 
covert forms of action. Ispat Indo Ltd, for instance, gained a tax reduction up to 
61 per cent. This company was charged tax on its electricity use of about Rp 380 
million a month, however, it was finally reduced to Rp 150 million a month. 
Other companies used similar strategies. Some people won a tax reduction after 
216 See 'lsu UMR Rp 433 Ribu Panaskan Buruh Sidoarjo (The issue ofUMR ofRp 433 thousand to heat 
workers in Sidoarjo)', Surabaya Post, 14 December 2001. 
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lobbying pejabat. For big businesses, dealing with government officials is 
cheaper than complying with the existing regulations211. 
8.2.2.3. Dealing with Other Stakeholders 
A summary of the relationship between medium-big businesses with the 
stakeholders can be seen in Table 8.2. It is shown that the percentage of 
connection with the business association is 15.6 per cent often whereas that 
with the local government is 28.1 per cent often. It means that medium-big 
businesses usually rely on the local government when they are facing problems 
related to their business and government regulations. APINDO as a channel for 
negotiation is still important, but it is less significant compared to the local 
government. This asserts the phenomenon of how medium-big businesses hold 
up business associations when they have to deal with the local government 
formally and put it aside when they can deal individually with the local 
government in secret. 
217 Interview with a local government official (anonymous). 
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Table 8.2. The Relationship of Medium-Big Businesses with stakeholders 
Central Local Local Political Business 
Gov't Gov't Assembly Party Association 
Never 65.6% 28.1% 56.3% 87.5% 50.0% 
Rare 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 3.1% 3.1% 
Sometimes 12.5% 31.3% 25.5% 9.4% 31.3% 
Often 9.4% 28.1% 6.3% 0% 15.6% 
Very often 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Question.: In the last 12 months, to whom did you contact when you encountered 
difficulties in relation to local regulations and policies that hampered business 
activities? 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
The responses of big-medium businesses in relation to local assembly and 
political parties are similar to those of local government contractors. They are 
less important compared to business associations and the local government. 
This shows that the transfer of power from the central government to local 
government has also shifted the orientation of medium-big businesses from the 
central government to local government. There also seems to be an emerging 
patron-client relationship between the local government and medium-big 
businesses. This is not done in an open way, but in a covert way. 
In short, the relationship between local government and medium-big 
businesses is the same as that between local government and building 
contractors. For medium-big businesses, local government officials are seen to 
have become lower and weaker. However, they are still regarded as important. 
Medium-big businesses can still control local government officials by not 
obeying the rules agreed together such as the minimum wages standard. 
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8.2.3. Small Businesses: The Case of INT AKO Cooperative 
Tanggulangin 
8.2.3.1. Characteristics of the Business 
The largest number of businesses in Sidoarjo are small businesses. Their 
activities range from trade to industry and from making leather bags in 
Kecamatan (sub-district) Tanggulangin district to making traditional metal 
stoves in Kecamatan Waru. They are spread out across Sidoarjo, which 
comprises 18 kecamatan. According to local government statistics, there were 
1,737 small industries employing 42,161 workers and 11,525 cottage industries 
with 46,342 workers in 2000 (Kantor Statistik Sidoarjo 2000: 188). Some small 
businesses organise themselves in cooperative organisations, whereas others do 
not. They are mostly owned by indigenous Indonesians. They run their 
businesses with their own families. Most of them have no business license since 
none is required for small businesses. 
I focus in this section on the small businesses of Tanggulangin. This group of 
small business are found in southern Sidoarjo. They have existed there since 
1913. They. are organised under a cooperative of INTAKO (lndustri Tas dan 
Koper or Luggage and Bag Industry) located in Kedensari, Tanggulangin. The 
cooperative was established on April 7, 1976218. The pioneers of the cooperative. 
218 There were two cooperatives established before INT AKO, however, both were dissolved due to poor 
management. They were Koperasi Budi Daya (established in 1960) and CV Tanggul Jaya (established in 
1971). 
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were only eight people, and there were only 27 members at this time2t9. In 1981, 
the cooperative purchased land to build an office. This development is proof 
that the cooperative was successful. At that time most of the business people in 
Tanggulangin were interested in joining the cooperative. In 2004, there were 
346 people registered as members of INTAKO. Thus, INTAKO may be the 
biggest cooperative of small business in Sidoarjo. 
The chairman of the cooperative is now H. Sodiqun Said. He was previously 
the secretary of INT AKO and replaced the previous chairman (H. Ismail Syarif) 
who is now a member of parliament at the provincial level, representing Partai 
Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party). Mr H Sodiqun Said was previously 
a political activist for PKB but he resigned to concentrate on his business. He 
was elected the chairman of the cooperative on February 21, 2001 by obtaining 
139 supporters out of 145 members attending the election and defeating four 
other candidates. He was elected for the period 2001-2003. 
During many of my discussions with local pejabat, small businesses in 
Tanggulangin were always mentioned to show how outstanding they were, 
compared to other small businesses. Tanggulangin has been claimed as a trade-
mark of Sidoarjo in nurturing small businesses. They produce leather made 
bags that are marketed outside Java and are even exported overseas. 
Tanggulangin is the pride of the Sidoarjo people as well as of the local 
219 They were HM Sholehudin, Said (late), H. Ghozali MZ (late), Kusman, Sena'I (late), H Ruslan MZ, H 
Sholikin and Ridwan. 
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government. Every Central or Provincial Government Officer coming to 
Sidoarjo is brought to visit the small businesses in Tanggulangin. Visiting 
Sidoarjo is not worth it without visiting Tanggulangin. 
8.2.3.2. Relationship with the Local Government: Independent and Beyond the 
Government's Target 
The decentralisation policy introduced by the government has hardly affected 
this kind of business They are not dependent upon the government policies. 
They can exist although they have no legal permits such as SIUP or TOP. It is 
also clearly stated in the decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 
289/MPP/Kep/10/2001 that small businesses that have no legal status are free 
from the need to have SIUP. The local government itself does not care whether 
people running small businesses have licenses or not. When the local 
government of Sidoarjo held an open day for small businesses to have permits 
for free, only a few people came. There were only eight people out of thousands 
of business people taking the opportunity to obtain a free business permit. For 
small businesses, business permits are not important as these are only required 
when they want to obtain some small credit from Disperindag or a bank. This 
also shows that small businesses actually do not need financial support from 
the local government or other financial institutions such as banks. 
The number of small businesses under INTAKO (346) is not such a small 
number. However, by comparison ·with GAPENSI and APINDO, the small 
businesses under INTAKO do not have enough power to influence the local 
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government in shaping policy. They are not involved in policy making 
regarding small business regulations in Sidoarjo. For example, in terms of the 
minimum wage standard, they are not represented in the process (together with 
the local government, workers' unions and other business associations). On 
the other hand, they are not affected by the minimum wage standards set by 
the government since their businesses are run by their own family members. 
They do not employ permanent workers who need the minimum salary. If they 
have many orders, they can easily employ contract workers for a fixed period of 
time. In terms of payment, the amount of money received by the contract 
workers can be much more than the minimum wages determined by the 
government. While the minimum wage is only Rp453,000, the contract workers 
can earn more than Rp750,000 a month working for one of these businesses. 
That decentralisation policy also means so little to small businesses is because it 
has no effect on taxes. Local taxation and levy regulations issued by Pemda 
Sidoarjo are not directed toward small businesses. From the local 
government's perspective, if local taxes and levies were applied to small 
businesses, they would become a burden on those small businesses. On the 
other hand, the local government has few resources to help them. Compared to 
medium and big businesses, small businesses are far from being the target of 
exploitation, formally or informally. Executives and members of the legislature 
rarely visit them, except when accompanying pejabat from Jakarta. 
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Compared to GAPENSI, small businesses are regarded as being of little 
importance. For example, when the Cooperative of small businesses in 
Tanggulangin held its yearly meeting on February 14, 2002, there were only a 
few local government officials attending, and they were only lower level pejabat. 
They were not the heads of local agencies or the vice-district head, much less 
the district head. This had also happened in previous meetings held by 
INTAKO. In the Javanese culture, the level of pejabat attending an event is an 
indicator of the importance of the event. In the case of Tanggulangin, it is clear 
that although their existence is important for Sidoarjo, the concern of the local 
government is half-hearted. 
In several interviews with people from Tanggulangin, they showed that· they 
can survive without government assistance or interference, and the local 
government does only little things for business people. Case 8.10. is an example 
of a successful businessman who is not dependent on local government 
policies. 
Case 8.10.: An Independent Businessman 
His name is Sungkono. He graduated from high school and is one of 
the most successful businessmen in Tanggulangin. He is a high profile 
person in terms of the way he speaks and of the property he displays. 
According to local government officials, he is a hard worker and has 
developed his business without any government assistance. He 
started his business by himself and now he manages a big company 
with a lot of workers. With his success, Sungkono was intending to be 
a politician. In the last election in 2004, he was elected a local assembly 
member representing PAN. 
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What has the local government actually done in relation to small businesses? 
Several programs are conducted by the local government for business people in 
Tanggulangin. However, the business people see them as an obligation for the 
sake of the continuation of a local agency. Unless there are programs related to 
small businesses, the existence of the local agency will not be recognised by the 
local government nor by the local assembly. The local agency should have been 
liquidated. A number of training programs have been introduced by the local 
agency such as on technical expertise, management and cooperatives. However, 
the main concern of the business people in Tanggulangin who need support 
from the local agency is in fact related to transportation. They demand 
improvements to the bridge and roads connecting to Kedensari Tanggulangin. 
The INTAKO chairman said that developing transportation would break the 
isolation of Tanggulangin. Unfortunately, this is beyond the financial capacity 
of the local government. At the moment, the local government is planning to 
build double-lane road that will be financed by the district and provincial 
government. However, this is only on paper, the small businesses in 
Tanggulangin cannot force the local government to speed up the 
implementation. 
In fact, the capacity of the local government to assist small businesses can be 
gauged from the size of the local budget under the Agency for Cooperatives 
and Small and Medium Businesses. It is very clear that there has been no 
significant change in terms of budget since the adoption of the new 
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decentralisation policy. The budget allocated for small credit in the Local 
Agency of Industry and Trade is not increasing. Also, the local budget allocated 
for small businesses has decreased. 
According to the Agency's head of cooperative and small-medium businesses, 
the local budget allocated in his agency is becoming lower and lower. The 
budget proposed for small business activities has been cancelled by the local 
planning agency. In 2000, the Agency of Cooperatives received central 
government subsidies to nurture cooperatives, and Rp 950 million was 
distributed to eight cooperatives and three micro financial institutions. In 2001, 
no central government funding was received, but revolving funds of Rp 500 
million from the provincial government were obtained. However, in 2002, the 
amount of money received was only Rp160 million from the central 
government, although the proposal from the agency was for Rpl,000 million.220 
So, how have the recent political changes affected small businesses? As far as 
the connection with political parties is concerned, small businesses are now 
relatively independent. When the bureaucratic apparatus still played an 
important role in politics, these bureaucratic apparatuses used their power to 
control small businesses through giving financial aid. When Golkar dominated 
the political arena, bureaucracy was the arm of Golkar by which political 
220 Interview with the local agency head of Cooperative in Sidoarjo, February 12, 2002. 
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mobilisation was executed. Bureaucracy would give money to small business 
cooperatives if they voted for Golongan Karya or Golkar (Functionaries Groups). 
With the new political reforms positioning the bureaucracy as a neutral body, 
there has been no pressure from the bureaucracy to vote for a certain political 
party. In the case of small businesses in Tanggulangin, in 1992221, Golkar won 
the highest number of votes. The results were as follows: PPP or United 
Development Party (10,371 or 32.18 per cent ), Golkar (16,334 or 50.69 per cent) 
and PDI (5,519 or 17.13 per cent). This was a dramatic contrast with the results 
of the election of 1999. In the last election, PKB (The National Awakening Party) 
dominated by obtaining 18,121 votes (45 per cent). PKB is a new party 
supported by the Nahdatul Ulama (traditional Muslim) followers, who 
previously supported the PPP. On the other hand, Golkar only got 3,115 votes 
(8 per cent). PDIP was in the second rank with 10,472 votes (26 per cent) and 
PAN was 3,115 (14 per cent). Therefore, the shift from Golkar to PKB is 
understandable. Apart from the fact that the bureaucracy is now technically 
neutral, with its limited amount of money, the local government budget 
managed by Diskop & UKM and Disperindag directed to the cooperative of 
Tanggulangin is almost nothing. 
221 Until the 1997 election, there were only three political parties: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or 
United Development Party representing Muslim groups, Golongan Karya or Functional Groups and Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia representing nationalist groups. In the 1999 election, there were 48 parties 
contesting the election. Most members of PPP resigned and have become members of Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (The National Awakening Party). 
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Also, the current situation has made the business people in Tanggulangin free 
from the political influence of the chairman of the cooperative. Previously, 
allocation of local government resources channelled through the cooperative 
was used by the cooperative to control who would get what and who would 
not get what. The limited amount of money provided to the cooperative 
reduced the influence of the cooperative members. Although the former 
cooperative chairman is a political activist of PAN (National Mandatory Party), 
the majority of cooperative members are true followers of PKB. While at the 
district level PDIP won, in Tanggulangin PKB was very successful. The 
chairman was then elected a member of the assembly in the province. His 
successor was a functionary of PKB in Sidoatjo. However, he then resigned. 
During the election campaign, signs of various political parties were evident in 
Tanggulangin, but none of those political parties have a political affiliation with 
the cooperative in Tanggulangin. 
8.2.3.3. Dealing with Other Stakeholders 
What can be observed from the overall responses of small businesses in 
Tanggulangin? Do they have similar relations as those of local government-
related contractors or medium-big businesses? If not, what sort of relations do 
small businesses have the government? 
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Table 8.3. The Relationship of Small Businesses with Stakeholders 
Central Local Local Political Business 
Gov't Gov't Assembly Party Association 
Never 81.9% 67.4% 81.1% 86.3% 57.9% 
Rare 4.3% 12.6% 9.5% 7.4% 8.4% 
Sometimes 11.7% 11.6% 6.3% 4.2% 14.7% 
Often 2.1% 7.4% 3.2% 2.1% 14.7% 
Very often 0% 0% 0% 0% 4.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Question: In the last 12 months, to whom did you contact when you encountered 
difficulties in relation to local regulations and policies that hampered business 
activities? 
Source: Data from survey questionnaire, 2002 
Table 8.3 sets out the relationship between the smaU businesses in Sidoarjo and 
the stakeholders. It is very clear that they do not rely on either the central 
government institutions, political parties or the local assembly. They usually 
'never' contact those institutions when they encounter problems. Although 
relatively insignificant, they rely more on the local government and the 
business association. In this regard, small business associations are perceived as 
more important compared to the local government. Compared to the other two 
groups of business, small businesses have few relations with any other actors. 
This is one sign of the degree of independence of small businesses. 
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8.3. Conclusions 
Looking at the case of Sidoarjo, these findings suggest that the business sector 
in Sidoarjo cannot be perceived as a single entity. Based on the three different 
stories, we can see that various types of business have their own characteristics 
in relation to local government. The recent changes in the political environment 
and business climate, moving from centralisation to decentralisation, have 
affected them differently, depending on the type of the business. 
For local government-contractors, decentralisation has been regarded as a 
positive move. The increase in income through local taxes and levies is positive 
for both the local government and the contractors. The position of the local 
government seems to be that of a patron on which the contractors rely for their 
business activities. However, this is not necessarily the case. This cannot be 
regarded as a hierarchical patron-client relationship. In the literature, 
government officials are regarded as the patrons whereas business people are 
regarded as the clients. In the case of Sidoarjo, they have symbiotic relationship 
because both local government and the government-related contractors have 
obtained advantages. Who is the patron and who is the client is not obvious. On 
the one hand, the local government supports the local contractors by providing 
contracts and protection from competitors coming from other regions. The local 
government also obtains money from the local contractors in the form of 
donations, on the other hand. They contribute money to the local government 
openly. 
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As far as the influence of local contractors is concerned, it can be described as a 
group-based influence. They also tend to rely on the business associations when 
dealing with their problems. This is different from a patron-client relationship 
that is characterised by individual connections between business people and 
government officials. Under decentralisation, the relationship between the two 
parties is getting closer. 
Medium-big businesses present a different picture compared to government-
related contractors and small businesses. The local government focuses on this 
kind of business as an important source of local government income. Income 
for the local government is collected through formal channels: taxes and levies. 
However, other informal mechanisms have also been used by the local 
government to extract money, styled as 'voluntary donations'. 
Although they are organised under one umbrella, it does not work well for 
medium-big businesses to protect their interests vis-a-vis the local 
government's. At a formal level, the association of medium-big businesses 
functions to articulate their interests. Looking at the corporatist model, it may 
be true that the local government tries to use APINOO to push medium-big 
businesses to increase the minimum wages. This has happened at the formal 
level where medium-big businesses often easily agree to the demands for 
higher wages. However, informally, access to policy issued by the local 
government is normally achieved through individual contact with the local 
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government officials. This individual relationship is also conducted in covert 
form. 
Overall, the relationship of medium-big businesses with the local government 
tends to be closer than to other stakeholders. However, it may still be in an 
individual and covert form. 
For small businesses, the new political environment has had few impacts 
compared with those experienced by other types or sizes of business. Small 
businesses have limited connections with local government. First, their 
activities are free from local government regulations such as licences and any 
other obligations. Second, although the local government is willing to generate 
local revenue, it is very obvious that they are beyond the local government's 
target for local taxes and levies. 
Small businesses are free from political influence exerted by the bureaucracy. 
However, access to local government resources is also shrinking since the local 
government only has allocated a small budget for them since decentralisation 
has been applied. Small businesses tend to rely on their business association, 
and not on other institutions (local and central government, local assembly, and 
political parties) for support and help. 
The case of the small businesses under INTAKO Cooperative shows that a 
model of patron-client, corporatism or pluralism does not fit here. Both 
individual and collective connections with local government are limited. 
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Chapter Nine 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
9.1. Introduction 
The objective of this study was to analyse the impacts of the current 
decentralisation policy on the business sector in Indonesia. In conducting the 
research I focused on what has happened with the business sector in Sidoarjo 
district, East Java, Indonesia before and after the decentralisation of power was 
implemented. 
This study began with critically reviewing the existing literature on local 
government and decentralisation, and found that it focuses more on the 
relationships among different layers of government. In this study, I started with 
an assumption that the implementation of the current laws on decentralisation 
issued in 1999 left some questions not only about the vertical relationship 
between the central government and local government but also about the 
horizontal relationship between local government and the business people. 
This study selected four themes through which to explain the changes at the 
local level during the early stage of implementation of the current 
decentralisation. 
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9.2. Summary and Conclusions 
This section summarises and discusses the research findings based on the 
research questions. Conclusions will be presented in the context of the broader 
theory that was discussed in Chapter two. 
9.2.1. Decentralisation and Central-Local Government Relations 
The first research question related to the impacts of decentralisation on the 
functions and financial structure in Sidoarjo as well as the relationship with the 
central government. Answering this question is important to understand how 
the process of devolving functions and resources works. 
In answering the first question, I have shown in Chapter five that significant 
changes have occurred in Sidoarjo local government. Decentralisation has 
created a more dynamic rather than static condition in the existing local 
government. Decentralisation as a process of transferring powers and functions 
from the central government to local government has changed the relationship 
between different layers of government vertically. The functions transferred to 
local government have been enormous and have had strong impacts on the 
organisational and financial structure of the local government. 
The transfer of power and functions from the central government based on Law 
No. 22/1999 was very different compared to that arising from Law No. 5/1974. 
The new law introduced in 1999 bypassed provincial governments that 
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previously filtered the transfer of functions from the central government to 
local government. As a result, the provincial government has been put in a 
very weak position whereas the district government has become very powerful. 
Being an autonomous government, Sidoarjo is a step·ahead compared to other 
districts in East Java. A number of functions have been devolved either from 
the central government or provincial government. This has been followed by 
reorganisation of local agencies by merging all agencies that were previously 
controlled by the central or provincial government. A very large number of 
public servants were transferred to the local government in 1995. Those who 
had Grade III-a classification and above were still under the control of the 
central government and they could make their careers in other districts or in 
the central or provincial government. When Law No. 22/1999 was issued, the 
local government personnel increased to 13,257 people. Those who were still 
controlled by the higher governments were eventually transferred to become 
local government personnel. 
The implication is that the local government has taken on a huge burden and its 
structure has become very fat. The need to find money for salaries has 
increased. However, the local government relies only on the central 
government transfer: the general allocation fund (DAU). Consequently, the 
dependency of Sidoarjo local government on the central government's money 
has become stronger. In contrast, the proportion of local revenue to the total 
local budget has become smaller since decentralisation. Only small taxes and 
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levies were surrendered to the local government whereas the big ones were still 
retained by the central government. The provincial government still controls 
such major taxes as the tax on motor vehicles and the tax on vehicle 
ownership transfer. 
After decentralisation, extraction of local resources by the central government 
and provincial government is still continuing. The amount of money taken from 
Sidoarjo by the two higher-level governments is larger than that taken by local 
government. Exploitation of resources by the central and provincial 
government has caused problems for the local government in increasing local 
revenue. Eventually, most of the local budget still comes from the central 
government. 
In short, the position of the local government is quite different from that of the 
existing models. In the case of Sidoarjo, it is not simply an autonomous or 
integrated local government. In terms of structure, Sidoarjo has become 
autonomous. However, in terms of resources, it has become very dependent on 
the central government. Therefore, it can be said that the Sidoarjo government 
is characterised as a transfer-based local government with autonomous 
authority to manage the expenditure. 
9.2.2. Decentralisation and Business-Related Services and 
Regulations Under Decentralised Local Government Regime 
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The second research question was concerned with the nature of decentralised 
local government in Sidoarjo in terms of policies related to the business sector 
and how various business people have responded to the changes. 
The answers to the questions were presented in Chapter six. In terms of 
policies related to the business sector, there are still no clear divisions between 
the central, provincial and local governments. Some functions are still in the 
hands of the provincial government but are conducted by t,he agency in the 
district government. Within the local government, various local agencies still 
exist. Related to business-related services, they are fragmented in various local 
agencies. Conflicts of interest among local agencies are still strong. 
In relation to local regulations, from a formal perspective the Sidoarjo local 
government has created new policies to invite and facilitate business people, on 
the one hand, and to create other regulations to procure instant revenue, on the 
other. This has led to a policy dilemma for the local government. One can be a 
trade-off for the other. 
To invite and facilitate the business sector, improving public services was 
conducted. First, the local government established a one-stop service to put all 
14 necessary permits under one umbrella. The status of the existing office that 
provided permit services was raised from kantor (office) to dinas (local agency). 
The improvement was intended to give more power to the local agency so that 
it could make decisions without being interfered with by other local agencies. 
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The business permit was previously delivered by the local agency for trade, 
whereas permits for building establishment (IMB) were delivered by the local 
agency for public works. 
Second, inviting new business people and encouraging the existing business 
people have also been achieved by promoting a growth pole triangle. The new 
local government reintroduced the initiative established 10 years ago to attract 
business people by introducing tax holidays and free of tax. The local 
government has also created a website that can be accessed from anywhere. 
Other policies are directed towards increasing local revenue. In doing so, 
shortly after the promulgation of local autonomy on January 1, 2001, the local 
government of Sidoarjo passed several local regulations related to local taxes 
and levies. A number of perdas have been amended to adjust the existing local 
taxes and levies. Amendment was intended to increase the charges to achieve 
targets of local revenue. A tax on special area parking and some new levies 
such as on fire extinguishers, on business permits and on labor services were 
introduced. Levies that had been banned before decentralisation have now been 
reintroduced under different titles. 
In Chapter six the responses of business people to the formal regulations were 
also discussed. In general, responses of business people in Sidoatjo to local 
regulations related to business activities were not positive. Some regulations 
were responded to positively, whereas others were not. For example, in terms 
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of business permit facilitation, most of the responses were good. There was no 
significantly different response to permit facilitation among small, medium or 
big businesses. For tender process facilitation, although government-related 
contractors responded positively, most other groups of business gave negative 
responses. For other issues, most responses given by business people show that 
they are not satisfied with the regulations introduced by the local government 
of Sidoarjo. Responses of the business people related to local taxes and levies 
were very different from that to other local regulations. They believe that local 
taxes and levies were worse after decentralisation than before. This can be seen 
from the many cases where local taxes and levies increased dramatically after 
decentralisation was brought in. For example, the levy on business permits has 
now been changed. Generator set and fire extinguisher levies have been 
introduced to increase local government revenue. The increase in the 
disturbance permit cost has also been enormous. 
In conclusion, what has been done by the local government produced two 
contradictory impacts. However, the creation of the one-stop shopping policy 
and the promotion of the growth-pole triangle development to invite new 
investors and to encourage the existing business people to expand their 
businesses have become meaningless. In this regard, new local taxes and levies 
introduced by the local government that have been perceived negatively may 
have worse impacts in the absence of benefits obtained from the former 
policies. 
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9.2.3. Decentralisation and Corruption at the Local Level 
The third research question was associated with the impact of decentralisation 
on the degree of corruption at the local level. 
In Chapter seven I discussed how corruption exists and spreads. The 
strengthened role of local government has given more opportunities for local 
officials to be more corrupt. As an employer allocating money for physical 
projects, they are now managing more money. In terms of local taxes and 
levies, although the proportion of the_ total local budget is getting less, the 
amount has increased significantly. Local government is now also controlling 
business licences independently. 
In daily lives, people talk a lot about corruption. Newspaper reports have been 
full of cases related to corruption. The survey I conducted covering 126 
business people showed that corruption has not decreased during the early 
time of decentralisation. Business people see that corruption is still common 
and has mushroomed in various agencies. A number of corrupt practices are 
still prevalent, and various types of corruption still exist. They include 
kickback, extortion, bribery, manipulation, mark up and money politics. Actors 
involved in corruption are not only those who are in the local government 
institutions. Local parliament members have also been a new actor playing in 
corruption games. Beside that, actors beyond the two institutions have arrived 
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to, complement the old corruption players. NGOs and newspaper staff have 
also been among the actors in corruption at the local level. 
Although corruption has been perceived as very common, business people 
express differently what they mean by corruption. The greatest concern of 
business people is whether what the local government officers do affects their 
businesses negatively or not. Some business people see returning money as a 
kickback is something normal in business activities. For government-related 
contractors, their activities depend on government projects managed by local 
government officers. Local contractors have a sort of obligation to share the 
profits with local government officers. 
For big businesses, extortion is a big problem for their business. They have to 
spend some money to ensure their business works well. Extortion comes from 
local government officers, local parliament members as well as NGO and 
newspaper people. Victims of extortive corruption are not only private 
companies but also state or locally-owned companies operating in Sidoarjo. 
Local government officers and local parliament members use their power to 
inspect companies' licences and then force business people to provide money 
unless they want to have problems. Some companies have been asked to 
provide money to finance activities that are supposed to be the responsibility 
of the local government allocated in the annual budget. The modes employed 
by NGO and newspaper people were by exploiting issues such as the 
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environment, wages and work conditions. Unless businesses want their case to 
be 'blown up' , en velopes have to be given to the extortionists. 
In terms of money politics, there is a difference between what the business 
people perceive and what really exists in practice. When asked about money 
politics, most business people said that money politics was not common. 
However, many cases show that money politics has arisen in many ways, for 
example the district head elections and in the yearly accountability speech. The 
mark-up of the budget is very clear since it is very different from the 
government standard written in government regulation No. 110/2001. 
In conclusion, decentralisation has not reduced the level of corruption at the 
local level. Corruption has spread even more widely not only in the 
bureaucracy but also in the legislature, NGOs and the society. Although 
corruption is commonly regarded as a bad thing, the perception of business 
people of corruption has been varied according to the different types of 
business. 
9.2.4. Decentralisation and Emerging Patterns of Local 
Government-Business Relations 
The fourth research question dealt with the implication of decentralisation on 
local government-business relations. 
The relationship between local government and the business sector is not a 
single picture. Various groups of business have different types of relationship 
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with the local government. Government-related contractors tend to be closer to 
the local government. However, their relationship with the local government 
is not dientelistic or corporatist, as described by many researchers. As 
clientelistic or corporatist businesses, they were always described as the arm of 
the local government's interests and they were under control of the local 
government. 
The independence of the local contractors is now stronger than before. They can 
force the local government to conduct internal reforms in relation to the 
management of contracts. How they interact with the local government is 
different from the ways in which other groups of businesses do. Most of them 
play in a group by using their own organisation, GAPENSI, which can 
represent some of them to lobby the local government to change what they 
want. Some changes have occurred such as protection by the local government 
from free competition involving other contractor~ from different districts. 
;•r'·*' 
Internal changes within the local government have included expulsion of 
contractors associated with local government officials. The previous district 
head has returned the budget of the projects that were not tendered openly 
with other members of GAPENSI. 
Symbiotic relationships have now arisen between .local government-related 
contractors and the local government. The businesses of local contractors rely 
for their existence on the local government projects. The local government has 
344 
The relationship between medium-big businesses and the local government of 
Sidoarjo presents a different picture. This group of businesses were previously 
close to the central government. When the power was decentralised, the local 
government tried to build a new relationship with medium-big businesses. 
However, it is very difficult to embrace medium-big businesses because they 
are not dependent upon the local government. Their business is relatively 
lacking in local government support. Unlike the government-related 
contractors, medium-big businesses are individual-based activities. They have 
two main concerns: how the local government can maintain labour wages at a 
low level and reduce the amount of local taxes and levies. 
In doing so, the representatives in APINDO lobbied the government to lower 
labour wages. APINDO is involved in the determination of the wages standard 
with the local govemment·and the labour association. In terms of increases in 
local taxes and levies, medium-big businesses have become the source for local 
revenue for the loca1 government of Sidoarjo. A number of new regulations on 
local taxes and levies has been directed toward this type of business. 
Most medium-big businesses are dominated by Chinese people. They normally 
play their roles individually and covertly. For example, big businesses do not 
show openly that they are against the decision about the standard of wages. 
Rather, they keep quiet but they do not entirely comply with what has been 
agreed together. When there are conflicts between the employer and the 
employees, they usually try to influence the local government. The local 
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government usually backs up the business people. Employees also often 
perceive that the local government never stands behind them. 
Also, increases in local taxes and levies have had worse impacts for medium-
big businesses. However, they have not raised this issue as a collective concern 
that has to be coped with by APINDO. Rather, they cope with this issue 
individually and covertly with the local government officials. 
Small businesses have a different relationship with the local government. 
Although this group is the biggest number in Sidoarjo, they have been 
neglected by the local government. Due to the limited local government budget, 
allo~ation for small businesses has also been limited. The budget for training, 
credit schemes and promotion for the group has decreased. On the other hand, 
the local government does not expect much from this group either. Small 
businesses have not been a target for local taxes and levies. In terms of 
regulations, small businesses are not required to have business permit or other 
permits that are normally necessary for medium and big businesses. 
Therefore, this group plays independently as they are not dependent on 
government projects or governmEmt funds. Business people in this group do 
rely on their business associations, and not on the local government, political 
party or the local assembly. 
Based on the three different groups of business, it can be concluded that the 
relationships between business and local ·government are different in nature. 
This study shows that business groups are themselves varied and each of the 
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groups has a different type of relationship with the local government. This 
study has also confirmed that looking at the relationship between business and 
government from the perspective of central government would be misleading. 
Since decentralisation was put into effect, the role of the central government has 
changed. 
9.3. Local Government, Decentralisation and the Business 
Sector: Looking Beyond Sidoarjo 
Looking at the cases from Sidoa~o, how should one place them in the broader 
discussion about decentralisation, local government and the business sector? In 
terms of decentralisation and local government, most scholars seem to have 
perceived local government as autonomous or integrated vis-Q.-vi s the central 
government. Indeed, to some extent the degree of autonomy of local 
government in Sidoatjo may be similar to the autonomous or the integrated 
model. However, this study suggests that the two models are inappropriate to 
explain a local government in such a d}'namic situation as that prevailing in 
Sidoatjo in particular or in Indonesia generally. 
As suggested by the autonomous model, the local government is an 
autonomous body that can govern its affairs without intervention from the 
higher government. The integrated model describes the position of local 
government as being under the supervision of the central government. In other 
words, the central government plays the role of principal controlling the local 
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government that functions as the agent. This idea of local-central government 
relationship is based on the principal-agent model. 
In the case of Sidoarjo, the local government has received most power except 
for the power over five affairs. It has been stated dearly in Law No 22/1999 that 
the status of local government has become strong. However, the delivery of 
power and responsibility does not automatically make local government 
powerful since the central. government still holds the power over financial 
sources. Some sources of income have been devolved to local government. 
Unfortunately, the more lucrative sources of income are still kept by the central 
government and some others are retained in the provincial government. The 
law also limits the authority of local government to tax local activities. 
Political decentralisation providing local government with power and 
responsibility only strengthens the basis of power within the local government 
and local parliament vis-a-vis the society. In relation to the central government, 
its basis of power is still weak since the main source of power, namely the 
money, is still beyond the control of the local government. This in turn 
influences its ability to act contrary to the wishes of the central government. 
The case of Sidoarjo reflects the picture of local governments in Indonesia. 
Sidoarjo, while richer than most other districts, relies for only 16 per cent of its 
revenue on local taxes and levies. More than 75 per cent of the local budget 
comes from the central government budget. Compared with other countries, 
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this condition is most similar with Mexico municipalities but contrasts strongly 
with the case of local government in Australia, where the proportion is 55 per 
cent to 17 per cent (Burki et al. 1999: 28). 
Compared to other types of local government existing in other countries, the 
role of local government in Indonesia is wider. In the traditional model, 
municipal or district governments in Latin America normally played a 
relatively minor role in the production of public goods and services (Burki et al. 
1999: 21). Australian local governments, for example, only provide limited 
public services such as garbage collection, park and recreational are 
maintenance, street repairs and public lighting. In contrast, local governments 
in Indonesia cover almost all public services, local economy and management 
of conflict between employers and employees. 
The case of Sidoatjo also shows how decentralisation leads to services being 
provided by the local government to the business sector. Has decentralisation 
brought about the local government response to business people? Much of the 
literature suggests that decentralisation can produce better public services at 
the local level. As suggested by Azfar et al. (1999: 2), 'subnational governments 
are closer to the people than the central government, they are considered to 
have better information about the preferences of local populations than the 
central government'. Thus the closer the local government officials are to their 
constituents, the more responsible they will be. 
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In the case of Sidoarjo, the delivery of functions has enabled the local 
government to establish an institution that can deliver better services for 
business people. This is a positive response given by the local government to 
attract business people to come to Sidoarjo. The difficulties faced by business 
people in coping with permit matters have been responded to in a very creative 
initiative. The establishment of the new local agency for permit and capital 
investment is, unfortunately, contradictory with new local tax and levy 
regulations that have inhibited business activities. This situation could damage 
business people as the cost of maintaining a business is getting higher. This 
indicates that decentralisation has actually produced mixed results. On the one 
hand, business people can enjoy the better facilitation of public services 
provided by the local government. On the other hand, the short-term interests 
of the local government have led to the creation and adoption of local taxes and 
levies. From the business people' s perspective, the local government policy is 
a burden since the increase in charge of local taxes and levies weighs more 
heavily than the improvement of public services. The local government often 
just imposes local levies on business people without providing any services. In 
short, the behaviour of the local government can be predatory on business 
people 
How can business people still stay in Sidoarjo when the burden is heavier than 
the benefits they receive? In this regard, we can use the Hirschman's (1970) 
theory of voice and exit. Local government can provide several mechanisms by 
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which business people can participate in the decision making processes of 
public service delivery. Voices of business people can be used for input to 
improve public services. However, when the mechanisms of voice do not exist 
and the public service is unsatisfactory. Business people have the option to exit. 
They can stop using the service or switch to alternative service providers. 
Unfortunately, such an exit strategy requires perfect information and perfect 
movement. There is no choice for business people in Sidoarjo. There is no 
guarantee that other districts will provide better services and levy less tax and 
charges. In terms of cost of local taxes and levies, there is a tendency for other 
districts to copy what Sidoarjo local government has done. It means that other 
districts will apply similar policies. The cost of moving is more expensive than 
that of paying local taxes and levies. Sidoarjo provides better infrastructure 
such as roads, electricity and ports than the other districts. It is too costly to 
move to another district without adequate infrastructure. 
In terms of corruption, how should we relate this case to the broader theory 
connecting decentralisation and corruption? As Ostrom et al. (1993) argued, the 
aims of decentralisation are to promote accountability and reduce corruption in 
the government. However, this study suggests that decentralisation has not 
reduced corruption yet. This is not only in the case of Sidoarjo but also in other 
areas of Indonesia. The evidence showed that in many districts in Indonesia, 
corruption has mushroomed. This study has also revealed the other side of 
decentralisation, that it can be hijacked by the elites within the bureaucracy and 
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the legislature. The study also underlined the fact that corruption does not have 
a single definition. What is perceived as corruption is different from one person 
to another. Corruption can be perceived negatively by someone but can be seen 
as something normal by someone else. 
As suggested by Azfar et al. (1999: 3), in fact, 'since subnational governments 
are closer to the people, citizens are considered to be more aware of subnational 
governments' actions than they are of actions of the central government'. If 
this is true, the question is, why has decentralisation led to corruption? Why are 
people not aware and how has corruption become widespread while power has 
been devolved from the central government? The answers to this must be 
speculative. They relate to the mechanism of decentralisation itself. Power, in 
fact, has come to the local government and the local parliament. However, both 
institutions have become difficult to control. In fact, local government has been 
weakened vis-a-vis the local parliament . that is supposed to control the local 
government. Unfortunately, the control function of the local parliament did not 
work. On the contrary, a conspiracy between the two institutions has emerged. 
Why has this occurred? Why could they not be controlled? This might relate to 
the mechanism of accountability between the local government and the local 
parliament. One key idea in the decentralisation process is that decentralisation 
should increase local people's influence over the public sector (Burki et al. 
1999: 31). Unfortunately, another possibility is that decentralisation often 
simply transfers power from the national government to local elites, whether in 
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the local government or local parliament. Further, decentralisation gives 
opportunities for local elites to access public resources, thus increasing their 
opportunities for corruption. 
At the moment, the formal electoral process is still problematic. The election of 
governors, mayors or district heads and members of local legislatures does not 
represent the wishes of the citizens. The district head is still elected by the local 
parliament on the one hand, and the local parliament members are elected by 
the party. It is true that people elect the parliament members, but the party still 
has the authority to select who would be the candidate in the local parliament. 
In such a political system, it is very difficult to select the best among all the 
candidates to take a seat in the local parliament. 
How should we describe the relationship between local government and the 
business sector? Some scholars perceive that patrimonialism (Crouch 1986) or 
patron-client relationship (Muhaimin 1990) is the character of state-society at 
the national level. King (1982) used the corporatist model to depict the 
relationship between the state the society (including business). Macintyre (1988) 
citing three cases of groups of business (textiles, pharmacy, insurance) has come 
up with pluralism to distinguish his conclusion from other Indonesianists. 
The answers arrived at in this research present different pictures from those 
given in previous research. Clientelism does not reflect the relationship 
between the two parties. None of the three groups of businesses in my study 
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represent a patron-client relationship with the local government. King's 
corporatist model could not be applied either in the case of businesses in 
Sidoarjo. The local government does not control the corporatist organisations 
any more. The mutual symbiosis relations have placed the local government 
and GAPENSI in a similar position. GAPENSI has become a pressure group in 
pushing the local government for reform related to project tendering. The 
medium-big business association (APINOO) is also beyond the influence of the 
local government. APINOO is not the arm of local government interests. 
Medium-big businesses do not always rely on APINDO when they are dealing 
with the local government. Small businesses are now becoming more 
independent. No program, scheme or other activities of the local government 
can force small business people to follow the wishes of the local government. 
Does the pluralist theory fit this study? In relation to big businesses, Mcintyre 
stated that 'sections of business in Indonesia today can and do organise 
themselves in a collective fashion and pursue groups interests in an 
independent manner' (1990: 245). His findings are similar to the case of local 
government-related contractors rather than with those of medium-big 
businesses. GAPENSI, previously clientelistic and corporatist, has now become 
very strong in pursuing its interests through collective action. APINDO 
represents medium-big businesses in determining the minimum standard of 
wages at the formal level. However, when implemented, medium-big 
businesses tend to play individually and covertly. They do not organise 
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themselves to protest if they do not agree with the amount set for wages. As 
medium-big businesses are predominantly Chinese people, the way they 
interact with government officials is similar to what Maclntryre says (1994: 8) 
' ... Chinese business people avoid high profile collective political action and rely 
instead upon more covert forms of political representation ... '. 
Why has the case of business in Sidoarjo presented a different picture of 
government-business relations from the previous studies? First, it relates to the 
subject chosen for this study, the focus on local government and not national 
government. The case is also different in terms of types and sizes of the 
businesses. Second, it is associated with political changes. The current situation 
is completely different to the situation before the reformasi. Demands for 
political reform have led to the changes of government-business relations. 
9.4. Implications and Future Directions 
The findings of the research conducted in Sidoarjo are important to be followed 
up. The focus should be oriented towards improving policies to attain a better 
local government and expanding research that can complement this research in 
order to have a better understanding of local government behaviour. 
9.4.1. Policy Implications: Towards Better Local Government 
How should policy be reviewed to attain the goal of decentralisation? First, it is 
concerned with the central-local government relationship. Second, it relates to 
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the balance of power between local government and the local parliament. 
Third, it deals with the local government/parliament and business relationship. 
In relation to the central-local government relationship, a new arrangement 
should be devised to decrease the tension in the interests related to the 
functions that have been devolved. It is certain that the burden of local 
government is very heavy since they have to handle many of the jobs that were 
previously carried out by the central government. A sudden transfer of a huge 
number of functions and staff from the central government has made it difficult 
for local government to adjust itself. For example, the reorganisation of local 
agencies has to accept all functions and personnel. Actually, not all functions 
are needed at the local level. The difficulties come when, on the one hand, the 
central government forces the local government to maintain the functions and 
personnel in the local agencies, and on the other hand, the central government 
has limited the number of local agencies that will be established at the local 
level. 
I suggest that the devolution of power from the central government be 
reviewed based on the capacities identified for each local government. There 
should be an independent board to evaluate which local government has 
enough capacity and which does not. The number of functions can vary from 
one district to another. There should be a possibility for local government to 
return the functions if they cannot manage them. In terms of functions, the 
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central government should not retain only those functions that produce a lot of 
money and deliver those that have no financial benefits. 
As far as the relationship between the local government and local parliament is 
concerned, it is essential to have direct elections for district heads. By direct 
election, the accountability of the district head is also directly toward the 
constituents. Local parliament is not supposed to have the authority to stand 
down the district head. In any case the authority of local parliament tended to 
be used for increasing its bargaining position to gain personal benefits. 
Revision of Law No 22/1999 (Law No 32/2004) focused on direct election may 
lead to better local accountability of local government. 
9.4.2. Research Implications: More Studies Beyond Sidoarjo 
This research aimed simply to explore data from the Sidoarjo area during the 
early period of implementation of decentralisation. It would be interesting to 
reinvestigate Sidoarjo in five years time, to see whether the findings of my 
research represented a temporary situation in the early implementation of 
decentralisation or a permanent impact as a consequence of decentralisation. In 
2006, the political setting will be different, since the new district head will be 
elected directly by the people. This may have different impacts on 
accountability as well as money politics at the local level. 
A case similar to that of Sidoarjo could arise in other districts, however, it will 
not be generalised to all other districts in Indonesia. Sidoarjo has some unique 
qualities that may not be reproduced in other districts. First, Sidoarjo is a 
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business area where the local government relies for its income on the local taxes 
and charges on the business sector. Most other districts would have different 
characteristics. Few other districts in East Java have any similarity with 
Sidoarjo, except for Pasuruan, Gresik, Mojokerto, Sur.abaya and, Malang. 
Second, Sidoarjo has stepped ahead of most other districts because in 1995 the 
local government was selected as a pilot project for decentralisation. Only one 
district in each province was involved in such a project, meaning that there 
were only 26 districts participating in the decentralisation pilot project. Districts 
representing provinces in Java island were Sidoarjo of East Java, Banyumas of 
Central Java, Bandung of West Java, and Sleman of Yogyakarta Special Region. 
Therefore, generalisation of the findings from Sidoarjo should be developed 
from research conducted in other places. In doing so, it would be· intriguing to 
investigate other 'Sid oarjos', to see whether the same pictures are found. 
Areas similar in some respects to Sidoarjo include Surabaya, Pasuruan and 
Gresik in East Java or Kudus and Semarang in Central Java. Besides, it would 
also be challenging to investigate areas with different types of local 
government. There are some criteria that could be used to determine areas to be 
selected as research areas. First, another research could be conducted in districts 
not relying on the local taxes and levies. Some districts in East Java or Central 
Java that derive their income from agricultural activities could be selected. 
Second, one could also focus his/her research on areas that were not selected as 
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pilot projects. In this respect, only one district in each province was involved in 
the government pilot project. 
9.4.3. Future Directions: Reorienting Development Administration 
There are two issues that can be learnt from this study to formulate the future 
of the discipline of development administration. They relate to focus and 
methods. 
In terms of focus, this study has provided a good lesson, that policy should be 
concerned with the stakeholders. Studies of development administration 
should not be too focused on institutions within the state. Understanding the 
behaviour of other stakeholders such as business people is very important. In 
future, the role of the state may be less and less involved in difficulties related 
to financial resources or political demand. Therefore, focusing on internal state 
institutions may be less relevant in the future in development administration. 
The study of the behaviour of business people would be more useful in 
understanding the impacts of policy. 
In terms of methods, this study has provided an important insight, that some 
issues are sensitive and impossible to be investigated using merely the survey 
approach. Issues of corruption as well as business-government relations are 
examples that need different methods. Ethnographic approaches, such as those 
adopted in this research, can help researchers go more deeply into the 
problems, and find more insightful answers. 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Pengantar 
Kuesioner ini dirancang untuk mengetahui bagaimana kebijakan desentralisasi/ otonomi daerah berpengaruh terhadap sektor 
swasta, bagaimana dan strategi apa yang digunakan oleh pengusaha untuk merespon kebijakan tei:sebut. 
Agar kuesioner ini bermanfaat, kami berharap Bapak/lbu/Saudara menjawab dengan jujur dan terbuka. Tidak ada jawaban salah 
dan benar terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini karena kami menginginkan apa yang Bapak/lbu/Saudara pikirkan dan rasakan 
terhadap perubahan kebijakan mengenai otonomi daerah. 
Jawaban terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini seluruhnya bersifat rahasia (confidential). Seluruh kuesioner akan diambil oleh 
peneliti. Tidak seorang pun baik dari pengusaha maupun pejabat pemerintah memiliki akses untuk memperoleh jawaban 
individual dari kuesioner ini. 
Mohon kiranya Bapak/Ibu/Saudara berkenan untuk mengisi kuesioner ini dengan meberikan tanda V (tick) pada setiap 
pertanyaan yang tersedia. 
Apabila Bapak/lbu/Saudara ingin memberikan catatan pengalaman yang berkaitan dengan birokrasi pemerintah, kami silahkan 
untuk menulis di tempat yang kosong di dalam kuesioner ini atau di lembar lain. 
Terima kasih atas kerjasamanya. 
Agus Pra.musinto 
Policy and Governance 
John G. Crawfor Building 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 02000 AUSTRALIA 
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1. Nama Perusahaan 
2. Alamat Perusahaan 
3. Telepon 
4. Facsimile 
5. Jenis Kegiatan: 
a. Produksi 
b. Jasa 
c. Perdagangan 
6. Pasar produk perusahaan: 
a. Dalam negeri: .... % 
b. Ekspor: .......... % 
7. Kantor Pusat Perusahaan 
a. Luar Negeri 
b. Jakarta 
c. Surabaya 
d. Sidoarjo 
385 
8. Jenis lnvestasi 
a. Investasi PMA 
b. lnvestasi PMDN 
c. Investasi Swasta Nasional 
9. Tipe Kepemilikan 
a. Orang asing 
b. Pribumi keturunan Cina 
c. Pribumi keturunan Arab 
d. Pribumi asli 
e. Lainnya (sebutkan) ..... . 
10. Golongan (untuk kontraktor) 
a. B 
b. Ml 
c. M2 
d. Kl 
e. K2 
f. K3 
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11. Jumlah karyawan tetap: ..... orang 
12. Umur perusahaan: .... tahun .... bulan 
13. Jelaskan sejarah perkembangan perusahaan: 
14. Dalam waktu dua belas bulan (setahun) terakhir, menurut Bapak/Ibu apakah Ya Tidak Tidak Tahu 
bagaimanakah dampak otonomi daerah terhadap berbagai isu di bawah ini: 
a. Kemudahan memperoleh ijin usaha 
b. Meningkatkan promosi untuk investasi 
c. Memberi kemudahan untuk proses tender 
d. Mendorong persaingan usaha yang makin sehat 
e. Menurunkan biaya distribusi 
f. Mengurangi pajak dan retribusi daerah 
g. Menurunkan tingkat korupsi 
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15. Bagairnana pendapat Bapak/Ibu tentang jurnlah pungutan liar dibandingkan dengan sebelurn otonorni daerah di kabupaten 
.. ? llU. 
a. Lebih banyak dari sebelurn Otda, dan perbedaannya sangat besar 
b. Lebih banyak clari sebelurn Otcla, clan perbeclaannya ticlak begitu besar 
c. Sarna saja 
cl. Lebih seclikit clari sebelum Otcla, clan perbeclaannya ticlak begitu besar 
e. Lebih seclikit dari sebelum Otcla, clan perbeclaannya sangat besar 
16. Dalam setahun terakhi, berapa banyak pungutan liar yang clilakukan oleh Pemda Sicloarjo terhaclap perusahaan ancla? 
(Persentase dari biaya yang dikeluarkan oleh perusahaan) Rp .... atau ..... % 
17. Kepada siapa saja biasanya uang tersebut diberikan? (Bisa clijawab dengan beberapa pilihan) 
a. Bupati atau wakil-wakilnya 
b. Sekda 
c. Ketua Bappecla 
cl. Ketua DPRD 
e. Pimpinan Parpol 
f. Dinas Tenaga Kerja 
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g. Dinas Perdagangan dan Perindustrian 
h. Polisi 
i. Jaksa 
j. Hakim 
k. Lainnya 
1. Tidak tahu 
m. Tidak mau menjawab 
18. Kepada pihak mana mana Bapak/lbu/ Saudara membayar paling tinggi di antara semua yang dibayar? Sebutkan tiga urutan 
dari yang tertinggi: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
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19. Bagaimana pendapat anda mengenai terjadinya money politics (politik uang) Tidak lazim 
dalam hal [ ..... J di Kabupaten Sidoarjo lazim 
a. Pemilihan Bupati 
b. Pemilihan Ketua DPRD 
c. Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Bupati 
d. Pengesahan Peraturan Daerah (termasuk APBD) 1· 
20. Menurut pengalaman dan pengetahun Bapak/Ibu, Tidak Sangat Jarang Sering Sangat 
selama setahun terakhir ini strategi yang diperlukan pernah jarang sering 
untuk menghadapi birokrasi di daerah yang 
menghambat kegiatan usaha 
a. Menjalin hubungan dengan pejabat pemerintah pusat 
b. Menjalin hubungan dengan pejabat pemerintah daerah 
c. Menjalin hubungan dengan anggota DPRD 
d. Menjalin hubungan dengan partai politik 
e. Meminta bantuan kepada asosiasi pengusaha 
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Profit responden: 
21. Apa posisi Bapak/Ibu/Saudara dalam perusahaan saat ini? 
a. Pemilik penuh 
b. Salah satu pemilik 
c. Manajer (bukan pemilik) 
d. Lainnya, sebutkan ..... . 
22. Berapa lama Bapak/Ibu/Saudara sudah berada dalam posisi tersebut? ..... tahun ..... bulan 
23. Pendidikan tertinggi yang pemah dicapai? 
a. Setingkat SMU 
b. Satjana Muda 
c. Satjana 
d. Pasca Satjana 
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Appendix 2: Names of Respondents and Informants 
1. Win Hendrarso 
2. Achmad Soedjianto 
3. Vino 
4. Syaiful Adjie 
5. Ima 
6. Sigit 
7. Achmad Zaini 
8. Asyfiak 
9. Soenaryo 
10. Suseno 
11. Wartono 
12. Soegiono 
13. Soedjalmo 
14. Ali Mas'oe d 
15. Syaiful Gani 
16. Bambang Djatmiko 
17. Nurthoyib 
18.Bagus 
19. Sumarbowo 
20. Soemorejo 
21. Asrofi 
22. Masita 
23. Sugeng Haryadi 
24. Wuryanto 
25. Anas Budi 
26. Supini 
27. Setyo Basukiono 
28. Mathias Pani 
29. Bobby Soemiantoro 
30. Husnan 
31. Komang Warry 
32. Delta Tirta Company 
33. Mustafad 
34. Amrullah 
35. Ali Fauzan 
36. Sholeh 
37. Bambang Soebiantoro 
38. Hermin 
39. Nadhim Amir 
40. Puryadi 
41. Soetarjo 
42. Sodikun Said 
43. Wawan Karyawan 
44. Kepala Kantor Pajak Sidoarjo 
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45. Muh Machyuddin 
46. Haryanto 
47. Eddy 
48. Purboyo 
49. Unggul 
50. Budiono 
51. Samuel 
52. Yetti 
53. Ismail 
54.Sumiran 
55. Teguh 
56. Abas Ali 
57. Lies 
58. Atak 
59. Subandi 
60. H. Totok 
61. Soedjalmo 
62. Hasbi 
63. Mulyono 
64. Nova Zihono 
65. Sungkono 
66. Prasetyo 
67. Hadi 
68. Nyoman 
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Appendix 3: Names of Kabupaten (District) and Kota 
(City) in East Java 
1. Bangkalan 
2. Banyuwangi 
3. Blitar 
4. Bojonegoro 
5. Bondowoso 
6. Gresik 
7. }ember 
8. Jombang 
9. Kediri 
10. Lamongan 
11. Lumajang 
12. Madiun 
13. Magetan 
14.Malang 
15. Mojokerto 
16. Nganjuk 
17. Ngawi 
18. Pacitan 
19. Pamekasan 
20. Pasuruan 
21. Ponorogo 
22. Probolinggo 
23.Sampang 
24. Sidoarjo 
25. Situbondo 
26.Sumenep 
27. Trenggalek 
28. Tuban 
29. Tulungagung 
30. Kota Blitar 
31. Kota Kediri 
32. Kota Madiun 
33. Kota Malang 
34. Kota Mojokerto 
35. Kota Pasuruan 
36. Kota Probolinggo 
37. Kota Surabaya 
38. Kota Batu 
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Figure 1: Budget of Districts and .Cities in East Java 
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Notes: the number 1-38 shows the name of districts and cities listed in Appendix 3 
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Figure 2: Local Original Revenue of Districts and Cities in East Java 
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Figure 3: Local Original Revenue and Balance Fund of Districts and Cities 
in East Java 
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Figure 4: Proportion of Development Expense to Total Budget of Districts and Cities 
in East Java 
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